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Chapter One
Introduction
Part I. Introduction:
Though studies of Roman warfare are a mainstay of academia, and many different 
permutations and aspects of the field have been examined, what has not been looked at exclusively 
is that of adaptation (or lack thereof) to arid environments, in this case comprising both the East and 
North Africa, including Egypt.  This study endeavours to address that lack by an examination of 
Roman military operations in desert environments from 108 BC to AD 400.  In this study I will 
argue that there was no overall 'way of war' in the East that was different from that of the West.  I 
will instead argue that the Romans presupposed little or nothing with regard to desert operations 
and allowed the circumstances, including factors of climate, terrain and enemy fighting styles, to 
dictate their actions.  Therefore, for example, because so many of Rome's opponents were light 
cavalry (which required a certain type of terrain and a certain type of response) they developed 
similar countermeasures in different places.
The spatial boundaries of the study are restricted to those areas which are arid year-round, 
and in which water and food supplies would have consequently been scarce.  With regard to North 
Africa I follow Mattingly, who points out that Tripolitania is the only African province (apart from 
Egypt, generally considered part of Asia by the Romans) to be a fully desert limes zone;1 as such, I 
will only be discussing Numidia and Mauritania in the context of desert campaigning (e.g., the 
revolts of Jugurtha, Tacfarinas and Firmus, as well as Paulinus' brief campaign into Mauritania). 
Likewise, I will not be focusing upon any semi-desert areas (e.g., Iberia, Lusitania) as the 
climatology of these areas roughly equal that of many areas of Greece which are not considered 
semi-desert, and summers in Rome are drier than summers in many areas of Southern Spain, based 
upon admittedly modern climatic data.  Because all of these regions would thus have to be included 
1 Mattingly D. Tripolitania. London, BT Batsford Press, 1995, p 68.
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in order to include Iberia, I have decided to exclude all of said regions to focus more deeply upon 
the East and North Africa.
The temporal boundaries of this work are that of Jugurtha's revolt beginning in 108 BC and 
AD 400, date of the Notitia Dignitatum.  These dates were chosen in order to cover most 
Republican and Imperial campaigns in arid environments for which we have literary evidence as 
well as both the expansion and stabilisation of the Empire.  Multiple archaeological excavations and 
surveys, albeit somewhat irregularly grouped, are also available from within this time period, 
allowing that data to likewise be used.
I have endeavoured to utilise both literary/historical and archaeological data  in this study. 
Lack of access and irregular overall studies of much of the region, however, has meant that I have 
been forced to rely more heavily upon the extant literary sources.  This has, unfortunately, meant 
that I have been left without the ability to corroborate literary evidence with material remains in 
many cases.  
With regard to content, I have decided to focus primarily upon tactical and logistical 
adaptation.  This is in part due to constraints of word count and also due to the wide range of 
literature which already is concerned with strategic discussion in the spatial-temporal bounds within 
which this study operates.  Wider strategic concerns will be touched upon as applicable but will not 
be a main topic of discussion.  
The organisation of the study will proceed as follows.  This chapter will introduce both the 
Roman conception of the desert (inasmuch as that conception can be determined) and modern 
definitions for deserts, their types and features. The second chapter will review the pertinent 
secondary sources and discuss how they contribute to this particular study.  Chapter three will be an 
examination of various aspects of campaign preparation such as geographical foreknowledge and 
logistics in arid environments.  The fourth chapter will address adaptations made for pitched battles 
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and sieges, whilst chapter five will examine adaptations with regard to asymmetrical warfare.  The 
final chapter will summarise the conclusions determined and discuss any adaptations over time and 
space in the arid areas of Roman operation.
Part II. Roman Conception of the Desert:
The Romans do not seem to have had a particularly strong ideological impression of the 
desert.  There is little anthropomorphising seen, and what little there is generally takes the form of 
having a camel stand in for a conquered Arabia on coins as discussed elsewhere.   I shall thus begin 
with an examination of the usual terms for desert in Greek and Latin.  The Greek term is ἐρῆμος, a 
term that usually translates as 'empty,' 'solitary' or 'bereft'; due to its legal usage as an undefended 
case one can speculate that absence of something expected is a main connotation and because these 
undefended cases are lost by default most usage of the word is negative.2  The Latin desertus, a 
participial form of desero means literally 'to cut away' or 'to sever a connection' (de-sero).3  The 
term has been in use since the Augustan period for arid regions, suggesting that the desert was seen 
as separate somehow from what was perceived as the 'normal' world.
There are extant histories which take place at least in part in deserts and some discussion of 
desert areas in extant geographic works (which shall be discussed below) but no author says 
anything on the order of 'in my day, this is how we thought of the desert'.  Herodotus relates that the 
Sahara was believed to be devoid of life south of a zone of wild beasts for at least 'many days' 
(πολλῇσι ἡμέρῃσι) until a group called the Nasamonians were reached;4 whether this view of a 
lifeless waste was still held by the Roman era is unclear.  The closest we have is Lucan's Pharsalia,  
which, though not ideal for its history does, at least, give an idea of how the poets encapsulated the 
abstract idea of the desert.  
2 'ἔρημος', LSJ, [online] http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/morph?l=erhmos&la=greek#lexicon (accessed 
10/10/11).  In Pl.Lg.862e 'ἀνδρῶν κακῶν ἔρημος πόλις'  ἔρημος has a meaning of 'free from,' but all other cases have 
negative connotations.  
3 'desero,' L&S, [online] http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/morph?l=desero&la=la#lexicon (accessed 10/10/11).
4 Hdt. 2.32.5-6.
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Lucan spends much of Book Nine talking about the Libyan desert, specifically his tale of 
Cato's expedition in Book 9.302 ff.   Lucan gives us the longest description of the desert as a 
fearsome place, full of sudden deadly sandstorms and venomous creatures, where anything could 
happen; this is supported by Libya being one of the few places in Lucan connected to mythological 
history specifically, something which further supports a liminal status.5   Allowing for poetic licence 
and factoring in Lucan's Stoic influences biasing him toward a universal view of chaos versus order, 
this does support the idea that the desert was an unknown entity, not just a country full of peoples 
with whom the Romans were unfamiliar, but am area where the laws of Nature might change, or 
perhaps not apply; Lucan says of the Syrtes that they were in dubio pelagi terraeque reliquit by 
natura.6  Whilst this can certainly be translated as being merely an area where the sea was full of 
sandbars and the coastline varied widely based upon tides and storms, it can also be interpreted in a 
more abstract manner, suggesting that this area, which includes a wide swathe of the Libyan desert, 
is an Other, or a liminal space of uncertain or shifting properties.   This can perhaps be supported by 
the above parsing of the term desero, meaning that the desert was seen as having been cut off from 
the 'normal' world.  Whilst extrapolating the average Roman's conception of a desert merely from 
this small bit of evidence is certainly suspect, this is the only extant data we have which suggests 
any sort of perspective on the subject.   
With regard to the duties of the Romans who found themselves stationed in the deserts, they 
include logistical support (Chapter Three), conquest during the Roman expansionist phase (Chapter 
Four) and low-intensity/policing duties once a region has been taken over (Chapter Five).
Part III. Modern Deserts:
Generally, a region is classified as 'desert' if its average annual rainfall is under 250 mm per 
5 Bartlett, C., 'Geography, Venom, and Misinformation: Snakes in Lucan De Bello Civili IX.587-937,' given at 
Approaches to Ancient Medicine 2010, 23-24/8/10.
6 Lucan, 9.303-304.
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year, and 'semi-desert' is its average annual rainfall is between 250 and 500mm per year.7 
Temperatures vary; there are hot deserts, cold deserts and even polar deserts; as the regions with 
which we are concerned are exclusively hot and arid, we will ignore this particular differentiation. 
Two differences we cannot ignore, however, are the differences between desert regions 
within our spatial bounds and those between modern and ancient times.  I shall begin with the latter. 
Palaeoclimatology is problematic at best, but Cremaschi argues that, though the regions with which 
we are concerned would have been arid over the course of our time period, overall they would have 
been growing increasingly arid, with hyperaridity in the Sahara (and possibly parts of the East) 
setting in during the third and fourth centuries.8  This has, by some, been argued to be a contributing 
factor to the seeming increase in nomadic movement (and possible increase in raiding, something 
discussed in chapter five) during this time period.  Because our evidence is not year-by-year but 
overall trends, we cannot be specific about exact conditions; we must however keep in mind both 
that conditions may well have been slightly wetter earlier in the temporal bounds (and thus having a 
slightly higher carrying capacity) but were growing more arid as time moved on, and that some 
scholars do not take this into account.9
The other consideration is that all deserts are not created equally.  In the regions under study 
here, we have the Sahara (including the Western Desert of Egypt) which is a sand sea with 
predominantly oasis settlements and foggaras.  This is in contrast to the rockier Eastern Desert and 
Negev (actually the same geologic region) which are prone to flash floods and use natural 
subsurface deposits for water.10  The Syrian desert features waterless hardpan surfaces and a 
combination of oases (e.g., Palmyra and Damascus), qanats and river systems.  This means that, 
7 USGS, 'What is a Desert?' [online] http://pubs.usgs.gov/gip/deserts/what/ Accessed 2/8/10.
8 Cremaschi, M. 'Steps and Timing of Desertification during Late Antiquity.  The Case Study of the Tanezuft Oasis 
(Libyan Sahara)' in Liverani, M. (ed). Arid Lands in Roman Times: Papers From the International Conference 
(Rome July 9th -10th 2001). Firenze, All'Insegna del Giglio, 2003, pp 1-14.
9 e.g., Mattingly D. Tripolitania. London, BT Batsford Press, 1995.
10 This is not to say that there are no sandy areas in this region; when excavating in the Negev (Yotvata 2005) I myself 
sunk into sand up to my ankle.
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though all areas are arid and life is thus centred around water, each individual area must be analysed 
in its own geological context as well as cultural and historical contexts.
Though there is not room in this study for an exhaustive discussion of deserts and their 
geomorphology, let us consider certain specific landforms and characteristics of the desert.11
A. Desert Types: There are two distinct types of deserts.  The former, basin-and-range, are 
characteristic of Central Asia and Persia, and, as such, are not relevant to our current discussion. 
Therefore, I shall focus upon the second type: the shield and platform desert.  These are typically in 
tectonically stable environments and consist of flat plains with occasional mountains or other raised 
features.  
B. Ergs and Dunefields: The most common conception of 'desert' is that of an expanse of 
dry sand, frequently featuring sand dunes.  These areas do exist in the areas with which we are 
concerned; called 'ergs' or 'sand seas' if they exceed 30000 square km and 'dunefields' if they do not, 
these regions are common to the Egyptian Western Desert and the Sahara.12  They are characterised 
by sand and dust overlying harder bedrock, though the dunes themselves are frequently nothing but 
massed sand, creating a problem for foot traffic as well as animals and carts or any kind.  
Because of the high amount of lightweight material, there is a high degree of variability in 
the landscape from day to day, if not more frequently.  This, rather obviously, can pose a problem 
for travellers, even those familiar with the region.  The numerous examples of this from our time 
period will be discussed in later chapters.  
C. Playas: The term 'playa' has been chosen for this work from the many local terms which 
represent any sort of salt flat or clay-silt terrain in the desert environment.  They are extremely 
common throughout all deserts.  This type of terrain is, in many cases, suitable for foot, animal and 
wheeled traffic (modern 4X4s can be supported in some places), but is also both extremely variable 
11 For extensive discussion, the reader is directed to the standard textbook on the subject, Cooke, R., et al. Desert  
Geomorphology, London: CRC Press, 1993.  
12 Cooke et al, Ibid, pp. 18-20.
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and very vulnerable to changes in either the groundwater level or to flooding.  Springs are common, 
but are often brackish at best, fatally saline at worst.  
D. Aeolian Processes: This term refers to any activity of wind upon the desert.  As stated 
above sand and dust are easily moved by strong winds, and the North African desert especially is 
subject to regular, seasonal strong winds, e.g. the Trades and the monsoons.  These winds, though 
seasonal are somewhat variable in strength, and  such the amount of sand and dust movement is 
unable to be estimated.  It is, however, not believed to have varied enough for differences to have 
affected ancient military operations, and even now it is very difficult to predict these changes.  
Seasonal winds, however, are not the full extent of the difficulties.  Though microclimates 
are predominantly characteristic of basin-and-range deserts, due to differential heating or sometimes 
areas of intense heating, many areas are subject to smaller-scale sandstorms or duststorms.  As the 
only difference between the two is in the size of particles; we can consider both to be the same for 
our purposes.  Small areas of intense heating produce dust devils; these are also frequently seen in 
areas that have recently suffered fires due to the combination of solar and ignition heating and large 
amounts of ash and dust.  
E. Rainfall: In addition to the predominantly wind-based storm activity above, there can be 
sudden and/or extreme precipitation in deserts.  This is relevant not only for those caught in the 
particular storms but also because of the knock-on effect of run-off.  This can take the form of 
simple flash-flooding or river flooding, but more dangerous is the effect of sudden influx of water 
into a playa basin.  If the playa is clay-rich, then it would have a low permeability to water; i.e., run-
off would stay upon the surface until it evaporated.  If the area was clay-poor and salt-rich, as is 
also quite common,  then the water would dissolve the salt in the surface layers, making the 
previously solid surface crumble.  
In the case of run-off raising the underground water table, this too has an effect upon surface 
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conditions.  From a solid surface the ground can become mud or marsh from infiltrating water, and 
if the area is salt-rich then any springs could become saline.  
Part V. Conclusion:
As can be seen from the above, an arid environment presents a significant difference to what 
the Romans would typically have faced elsewhere.  Due to variability and frequent unsuitability of 
terrain, limited availability of food and water, as well as few peoples from whom to pillage or 
purchase, incursion routes would be severely limited.  Climate would also be problematic, as even 
acclimatised troops would still be at the mercy of unpredictable extremes of weather.
Furthermore, the Romans did not seem to have any particular ideological views or 
conception of the desert beyond as a vast expanse of heat and aridity.  They had views on the 
peoples who dwelt in these regions, as will be discussed in chapter three, but the desert itself to 
them seemed almost blank, apart from the somewhat unsatisfying evidence from Lucan.  Perhaps it 
relates to a belief that the desert regions of their south and east were the edges of the world, which 
were then surrounded by Ocean?  Or may they have instead thought that such areas were not worth 
the effort?  Or even so unnatural as to surpass understanding?  At any rate, they seem not to have 
invested much in the way of philosophical or abstract thought upon the matter.
With that, let us now turn to more concrete matters.  As there is virtually no evidence on 
concept of deserts, we may instead opt to look at the practicalities, and see how the Romans adapted 
or not to military operations in arid environments.  A review of the relevant literature on major 
arguments in Roman military studies will comprise Chapter Two of this study.  Chapter Three will 
be a study of logistics in arid environments.  Chapter Four will discuss tactical operations in the 
Roman desert (e.g., pitched battles and sieges), with Chapter Five addressing small force operations 
and policing.  Finally, Chapter Six will review and contextualise these findings.
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Chapter Two
Literature Review
Part I. Introduction:
There are four main arguments with regard to this study with which I shall concern myself. 
One of these, that of the function of Roman forces occupying the desert limes zones, will be 
discussed in chapter five; the other three shall be discussed now.
The first argument I wish to discuss is that of the ancient sources.  I agree with the 
prevailing belief that literary sources are deeply problematic at best, though the irregularity of well-
studied and published material remains in the areas with which I am concerned mean that at times I 
am forced to rely upon these texts alone or with incomplete corroborating evidence.  Secondly, I 
discuss whether or not one can apply modern views, theories and methods of warfare onto ancient 
war.  I will argue that, though in certain instances modern data can be used to understand ancient, it 
is likewise deeply problematic and can only be used with caution.  Finally, I will argue that the 
changes in the Roman army seen in the desert are an adaptation to local conditions, though because 
the Romans were facing enemies on multiple fronts who engaged in asymmetric warfare and who 
required a higher degree of tactical mobility and flexibility, we find similar changes occurring in the 
Empire.
Part II. Ancient Sources:
Multiple ancient sources discuss desert campaigns of the Romans within the stated time 
frame.  Each of these authors and works have their own set of problems, however.  Though specific 
instances shall be discussed as they are encountered, the general problems are that most literary 
works were written at temporal remove, each author has his own particular biases, many works are 
incomplete and many are abbreviated epitomes.  
The only authors from this study who were eyewitnesses to the events of which they wrote 
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were Ammianus and Josephus.  The latter is problematic on three counts.  The first difficulty is that 
Greek was not his native language.  This means that a close reading for military terminology (such 
as will be done in chapter five) may be impacted by Josephus' potential misunderstanding of nuance 
or amalgamation of different operational units or procedures under blanket terms.  The second 
problem is that Josephus was an unreliable source.  His actions in BJ 3 show him to be very self-
serving, including flattery and support of the Romans, thus we cannot take what he says at face 
value.  Finally, the problem that he and Ammianus share is that, though both were eyewitnesses to 
events, the accounts were written after the fact.  This means that they can be given 'spin', as 
Josephus shows or accidental errors can creep into the narratives.  This is borne up by recent studies 
of battlefield archaeology of medieval battlefield sites, which have shown that, even with several 
primary sources available from eyewitnesses, the picture developed from the material remains can 
differ widely from that developed from textual sources.13  Whilst it is true that a footprint does not 
look like a boot, the artefact assemblages do still call into question just how much of these battle 
reports can be trusted, even if written in the immediate aftermath by an eyewitness.14  
These problems are only magnified if writing at a temporal remove, such as Polybius, 
Appian, Sallust, Tacitus, Vegetius, Cassius Dio and Livy did.  These authors not only would fill in 
gaps in their data with assumptions from their own time periods, but they would also use a number 
of sources of varying degrees of accuracy with various levels of critical analysis; for example 
Vegetius cherry-picked from various periods of Roman army practice.  There is also the problem of 
these sources only existing as quotes in other, later works, which allow corruptions in.  There is also 
the matter of what are term rhetorical or literary topoi, e.g., the 'deceitful foreigner' who maliciously 
sends the Roman army into danger, something commonly come across in the sources for this study 
(see Chapter Three).  These topoi are particularly problematic as we are not in any position to 
13    Lynch T, Cooksey J., Battlefield Archaeology, Stroud: Tempus, 2007, p. 18.
14 Eyewitness statements even now are often flawed, as is frequently found during law enforcement and legal 
investigations.
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evaluate them well with regard to military operation.  The fact that these 'stock pieces' are used in 
fictional narratives pre-dates even our temporal bounds here; Plato (Republic 10.601a-b) states:
'And similarly, I believe, we shall say that the poet himself, knowing nothing apart 
from how to imitate, puts on with words and phrases the colours of the many skills in 
such a way that those equally ignorant who see things only via words, will rate his 
words most excellent, should he speak in metre, rhythm and harmony about 
shoemaking or generalship or anything whatsoever.'15
This presents us with a double problem.  The first is that authors writing military operations 
in their narratives may or may not strive for accuracy so much as plausibility, using earlier warfare 
narratives as their basis for how the battle unfolded.  This also means that, since these works were 
written by and for elites who may or may not have had actual experience, that these topoi became 
truth, that they might have rejected as false or flawed any eyewitness accounts that did not accord 
with their expectations.  This means that these accounts may have been lost due to 'proper' battle 
narratives being preferentially copied and preserved over the years.  
Additionally, many of these authors had underlying agendas, with Livy promoting the new 
Augustan Empire and Sallust, Tacitus and Vegetius being great moralisers, Vegetius especially 
trying to flag up a 'golden age' of Roman military prosperity (by combining practices from several 
periods into one).  There are also multiple works of uncertain author (e.g., the Notitia Dignitatum) 
and the SHA, which purports to be by six authors from the reigns of Diocletian to Constantine I but 
is actually by an unknown number of authors from an unknown time.  This added to the fact that the 
extant manuscripts are often the umpteenth copy of an original, meaning that errors and scholiasts' 
notes can creep in, not to mention the unconscious biases brought into matters by modern 
translators and scholars, means that any text must be used with great caution.
In order to offset these liabilities, one can attempt cross-checks of the data.  In some 
15 'οὕτω δὴ οἶμαι καὶ τὸν ποιητικὸν φήσομεν χρώματα ἄττα ἑκάστων τῶν τεχνῶν τοῖς ὀνόμασι καὶ ῥήμασιν 
ἐπιχρωματίζειν αὐτὸν οὐκ ἐπαΐοντα ἀλλ᾽ ἢ μιμεῖσθαι, ὥστε ἑτέροις τοιούτοις ἐκ τῶν λόγων θεωροῦσι δοκεῖν, ἐάντε 
περὶ σκυτοτομίας τις λέγῃ ἐν μέτρῳ καὶ ῥυθμῷ καὶ ἁρμονίᾳ, πάνυ εὖ δοκεῖν λέγεσθαι, ἐάντε περὶ στρατηγίας ἐάντε 
περὶ ἄλλου [601β] ὁτουοῦν:...'
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instances there are multiple literary accounts, which allows for some fact-checking assuming that 
text A is not the source for text B.  A better option is the use of archaeological and epigraphic data, 
including administrative items such as ostraka and papyri.  Because my work is desert-based, 
papyrological evidence is a viable source as are ostraka, though these are frequently incomplete, 
damaged, and/or in a deposit of other material of differing dates and provenance.  This can make 
context difficult to determine.
The main problem associated with this type is the slow rate of publication; this is a problem 
for epigraphic and archaeological data as well.  Much as with the modern interpretation of ancient 
literature, archaeological and epigraphic data are similarly influenced by the unconscious biases of 
those who interpret them; as such, these studies must be read as critically as the literary works. 
Because the area under consideration is also politically unstable in large part, and has been so for 
some time, access to both sites and publications is irregular at best.  That said, whenever possible I 
have attempted to cross-check literary sources with archaeological data and to integrate both into 
this study.
Part III. Modern Interpretations and Associated Problems:
' The same sort of thinking that interpreted the Roman conquest of north Africa as a 
blessing for its indigenous peoples has traditionally understood the Roman frontiers 
to be lines of demarcation that distinguished and separated the civilised (that is, 
Roman) world from the barbarism that was thought to be beyond it.'
(Cherry, 1998, p 24).
The modern biases scholars unconsciously bring into ancient studies leads us to the next 
major argument.  With regard to Roman military operations (including strategy, tactics and 
logistics) there is one school of thought that endorses the use of modern military thinking onto 
ancient, and its opposite school wherein it is attempted to understand ancient operations in their 
own terms.  The former school of thought, for our purposes, is most clearly expressed by Edward 
Luttwak in his 1979 work The Grand Strategy of the Roman Empire.  Luttwak, a strategist for the 
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United States government, has essentially mapped Cold War strategy upon the Romans, arguing that 
the Empire pursued a coherent, long-term strategy of defence-in-depth against high-intensity 
external threats.  Conversely, Benjamin Isaac's The Limits of Empire from 1993 argues for an ad 
hoc arrangement emphasising control of traffic and what would in modern terms be considered 
police work again low-intensity threats.  Though I do not wish to engage deeply with these well-
trod arguments,16 it does warn the scholar against the imposition of modern thought upon ancient, 
especially as evidence from other contexts shows that the ancients thought differently.17  As Cherry 
points out in the quote that introduces this section, there is also the problem of imposition of 
modern biases in the sense of colonialist thought (e.g., the 'White Man's Burden') in which the 
Romans are held to be a stand-in for a Western empire whose duty it is to spread 'civilisation'. 
Awareness of this tendency, especially in older works, must be maintained in order to avoid 
idealising the Romans; one can of course argue that postcolonial works can lead to one demonising 
the Romans unfairly.  The best practice is to attempt to keep in mind these tendencies and filter 
modern scholarship through them.
With regard to tactics, literature which discusses reconstruction of battles is common, and 
tend to follow one of two schools of thought.  The first, based upon Whatley's 1964 paper,18 states 
that full reconstruction of any ancient battle is impossible, based upon a lack of immediate and/or 
official reports from each engagement.  He also points out that the modern scholar should be wary 
of assuming that the ancient generals were necessarily expert; his fourth point states that generals 
sometimes do idiotic things, something which is certainly borne up by the sources and will be 
discussed as appropriate below.  
There is also the so-called 'Face of Battle' school of thought, developed by John Keegan in a 
16 I will return to these arguments with regard to function in the limes zone in Chapter Five, including the effects of 
Isaac's Israeli heritage upon his interpretation of the Roman forces stationed there.
17 Barker, G. and Gilbertson, D. 'Themes in the Archaeology of Drylands' in Barker, G. and Gilbertson, D. (eds). The 
Archaeology of Drylands: Living at the Margin. London, Routledge, 2000, pp. 1-18.
18 Whatley, N.,  'On the Possibility of Reconstructing Marathon and Other Ancient Battles,' JHS 84, 1964, pp. 119-139.
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work of that name with regard to later battles.  This approach, adapted for the Roman army by 
Goldsworthy, Gilliver, Lee and others, attempts to reconstruct the view of battle from an average 
soldier's perspective.  Though this is also not without difficulty, most notably the absence of written 
accounts from 'the common soldiery,' it is not entirely incompatible with Whatley's view, and a 
blend of both will be used in this study. 
  Taking into account the above discussion of the frequent disjunction between eyewitness 
accounts and archaeological evidence, I thus agree with Whatley that a full and exact account of 
any given battle is impossible, and this work will avoid such a pitfall.  This does not, however, 
mean that a reasonable approximation of battle experience for a common soldier cannot be made, 
though it will be subject to modern biases and assumptions.19  This work will, where possible and 
with proper caveats, attempt such an approximation.
Logistics suffer from much the same problems as above, with the added issue in our case of 
whether or not modern conditions of climate, terrain and physiology can be used.  Chapter three 
will feature more specific discussions, but, with regard to climate and terrain there is uncertainty. 
Chapter One discussed the changing environment over the course of the centuries in this study; we 
do not have exact details for how arid every site was every year, however, nor are we able to say 
more than we believe there was an increasing aridity in the desert regions.  Terrain is likewise 
unclear; though we can occasionally use archaeological remains to reconstruct how the land was 
used, the flow of rivers and the like, we cannot know for certain.  This automatically means that we 
must frequently rely upon modern climate and terrain conditions infused with educated guesswork, 
meaning that we must automatically presume there are differences that we cannot define.  The best 
way to address this problem is to combine such ancient and modern data as we do have, and keep in 
mind that everything involved is speculative.
19 e.g., height and weight of soldiers having to be averaged, modern figures of ideal nutritional requirements being 
pushed back onto ancient, et cetera.
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With regard to physiology of humans and animals, we are slightly better served.  Material 
remains of both from within our time period show physiognomic changes but no evidence for 
physiological changes.  This means that, altering for lower height and weight, we can use modern 
physiological data on nutrition, hydration and other medical requirements.  This is not perfect, 
however, as one must remember that modern humans in the desert are often performing different 
tasks under different conditions than their ancient counterparts.  For example, much of the recent 
physiological studies on humans in deserts have been done on modern Western (mostly American) 
soldiers serving in the Near East.  Apart from some infantry patrols and special forces operations,. 
modern soldiers are generally not as physically active as they are aided by modern technology (e.g., 
whereas ancient soldiers marched or rode mounts, moderns drive in vehicles), they generally have 
recourse to shade at worst, portable air conditioning units at best, as well as modern medical 
treatment and ample nutrition.  That said, we can still use the modern data to make approximations, 
something I explore in chapter three.
Part IV. The Changing Nature of the Roman Army:
In the conclusion of his chapter in the Blackwell Companion to the Roman Army, Wheeler 
states the following:
'Efforts to discern a distinctive Roman way of war in the East are misguided...
Roman needs for better and more cavalry, light infantry, and missiles were already 
evident in the West...conditions in the East reinforced existing tactical trends. ...In 
the East, Roman absorption of native skills in cavalry and archery reflected local 
conditions.  Rome, as always, adapted to circumstances.'20
In short, Wheeler is addressing whether or not the changes in the Roman army which occurred over 
the course of the Empire were institution-wide or if they were geographically based.  I would argue 
that there was a change evidenced throughout the Empire, but that it was based upon local 
conditions.  As the Principate turned to the Dominate, both the needs of the Romans changed from 
20 Wheeler, E.L., 'The Army and the Limes in the East', in A Companion to the Roman Army, P. Erdkamp (ed), Oxford: 
Blackwell, 2007, p.263.
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that of an expansionist army to that of a consolidation force and their main enemies were low-
intensity raiding parties and internal unrest rather than a high-intensity external force.  This led to 
what can be termed parallel development, in which forces which had similar purposes and similar 
enemies developed similar tactics, though specific local factors were also highly influential.  As 
Gilliver states, the Romans changed their operations with regard to local conditions, which means 
that, for example, in the desert where camels were present and well-adapted to the environment, 
their incorporation was part of the adaptation; this also means that units stationed in a particular 
location also took on some of the characteristics of that region's fighting styles as a 
countermeasure.21
Part V. Conclusion:
This study will thus operate upon the following arguments.  First, all ancient sources 
(including material remains) will be both analysed critically based upon data known about the 
author, work, deposition and interpretation.  Secondly, I will only use modern data with regard to 
physiology and, to a degree, climate, and even these will be adapted to take into account known 
differences with ancient conditions.  With regard to military operations I will based my arguments 
upon extant ancient data rather than modern operations.  Finally, I will operate under the 
assumption that the changes in the Roman army, though similar all through the territory, are 
reactions to the needs of local conditions, rather than institutional changes directing the army on 
how to operate in the East as opposed to the West.  Now that these have been established, let us 
begin our in-depth analysis in the following chapters.
21 Gilliver, C.M., The Art of War, Tempus: Stroud, 1999, p161.
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Chapter Three: 
Logistics
Part I. Introduction:
In order for any campaign to succeed, adequate preparation must be made.  This includes 
four main elements: determining where one is going and how to get there, what or who might be 
waiting for one upon arrival, supply and logistics, and communications.
All of the above considerations are heavily impacted by the geography and climate of the 
particular area of operations.  The desert, naturally, is no exception to this.  Though the specifics of 
desert geology, geomorphology and climate (and ancient understanding of same) are discussed in 
chapter one, each section of this chapter will address the effects of desert conditions upon each 
aspect of campaign preparation and any adaptations made to compensate (or lack thereof).
Part II. Geographic Knowledge and Mapping, Communications and Intelligence:
Intelligence gathering is one of the most important aspects of military operations.  Austin & 
Rankov's seminal book Exploratio contains a detailed assessment of Roman intelligence-gathering 
procedures, but no attempt is made to subdivide the methods based upon environment.  This could, 
theoretically cause it to appear that the Roman methods were uniform across their domain.  Looking 
at the primary sources, however, it does appear that Austin and Rankov are somewhat justified in 
that blanket approach.  For example, messages were smuggled to Ammianius via the inside of a 
scabbard,22 information from and inducements to deserters were used in all major campaigns and 
scouting parties, usually light cavalry, were used frequently in the desert (as they were in other 
environments) something discussed more extensively in chapters four and five.  Frontinus, perhaps 
the most obvious source for data of this type, further supports a lack of differentiation.  He cites 
several examples of the use of spies, including how to use a known spy to spread false information23 
22 Amm Marc 18.6.17.
23 1.1.6
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and how to disguise spies and intelligence gathering activities, such as by pretending to chase a 
runaway horse.24   Though these events all took place in desert areas, they are not adaptations based 
upon environment; we find comparable activities taking place elsewhere.25  Thus by and large all 
intelligence gathering activities were conducted the same way regardless of area.  
Geographic and ethnographic knowledge was likewise of vital importance, with Strabo, in 
1.1.16-17 of his Geography citing various times in which military operations have been won or lost 
based upon knowledge of the area, including the Roman/Parthian conflict of his day.    
By the Roman Empire, maps and itineraries were available,26 but their accuracy is questionable at 
best.27  Millar points out that their lack of topographic understanding would make a 'global' strategic 
awareness impossible;28 in a region known for difficult and changeable conditions of both climate 
and terrain this problem of lack of knowledge would be even more acute.29  Though the prevalence 
of 'malicious native guides' in the literature suggests a topos,30 the apparent danger suggests a 
reliance upon local knowledge, rather than a pre-existing awareness of conditions.
The reliability of what data were available with regard to those who lived in the desert is 
likewise hit-and-miss.  It is difficult to assess whether or not most data were gathered with regard to 
24 1.1.3 and 1.2.1.
25 Cf Frontinus 1.1, 1.2, wherein stratagems of the same general category are grouped, and the same principles apply 
regardless of environment.
26 Nicolet divides the typology of Roman maps into three parts; geographies, which refer to global conceptions, 
chronological, which feature land and shore contours, and itineraries, or lists of road stations.  Nicolet, C. 
L’inventaire du monde : geographie et politique aux origines de l’empire romain, Fayard, 1988, p 111.  It is the 
latter two with which this study is most concerned.
27 Ancient mapping is a discipline all its own; see Graham, M., News and Frontier Consciousness in the Late Roman 
Empire, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, 2006, Lee, AD, Information and Frontiers: Roman Foreign Relations  
in Late Antiquity, Cambridge: CUP, 1993, Dilke, OAW, Greek and Roman Maps, London : Thames and Hudson, 
1985, Nicolet, C. L’inventaire du monde: geographie et politique aux origines de l’empire romain, Fayard, 1988. 
28 Quoted in Isaac, B. The Limits of Empire. Oxford, Clarendon, 1993, pp.401-2.
29 Pliny NH 6.33 points out that the only way to Arsinoe from Pelusium if one goes across the sand is to use reeds that 
have been fixed in the soil along the route because of the aeolian processes.
30 e.g., Gallus, who was given spurious advice by the Nabatean Syllaeus.  Gallus was told that he needed to take a long 
sea route, which ultimately cost him a large (but otherwise unspecified) number of troops.  Upon arriving at Leuke 
Come, he was told of a much shorter, better-provisioned land route that the locals used. (Dio 53, Strabo 16.4.22-24, 
Pliny 6.32).  Pompey was led astray by guides in Northern Mesopotamia leading to the deaths of many of his men 
(Dio 37.3.5-6).  Antony's lack of foreknowledge of the road from Praaspa to Armenia led to his troops being lost and 
the victims of disinformation by their enemies. (Dio 49.28.3-4).  Emperor Julian, on the advice of local guides, 
decided to move away from the Euphrates river and go north, which would have trapped him in high desert. (Amm. 
Marc 24.7.3).  Lucan, though a poet rather than historian, gives several short examples of incoming troops being 
surprised due to ignorance of the terrain. (Lucan 3.240-266).
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ethnography, military intelligence, or some combination of both; all are subject to the usual Roman 
'Othering'.   Pliny seems to have as his purpose a more scientific study, wherein he is discussing 
cultural characteristics more for the sake of knowledge than practical military value.  Strabo, as 
stated above, begins his geography by a discussion of how necessary such data are for military 
success; thus whilst not perhaps writing the equivalent of a CIA fact-book per se, he does seem to 
have at least been considering the use his work might have for a military audience.  Ptolemy seems 
most concerned with maps and navigation, something borne up by his astronomical work.  Though 
possessed of military experience he seems more to be interested in the places and their locations (as 
well as points of mutual interest to military and civilians, such as harbours).  He does list the names 
of those who reside in each area, but there is no detail extant about them in the work.  This suggests 
little ethnographic interest and little expectation of military use with regard to one's opponents, 
though the work would be useful to anyone attempting to travel from point A to point B.
The purpose behind expeditions into various areas, such as Gallus' into Nabatea, the 
expedition to Arabia Felix and Nero's expedition to the source of the Nile are open to interpretation. 
These may have been missions of exploration that would either be followed up by either diplomatic 
or military operations based upon what was found, or they may have had pre-existing purposes, 
such as a surreptitious examination of military strength of an area or an assessment of economic 
potential.   These are not, however, mutually exclusive goals.  We can take as an example the 61 AD 
Nile expedition, which Seneca states was exploratory and Pliny military.31  The expedition, though 
not ultimately finding the source of the Nile, did make diplomatic contact with the Nubian Candace 
at Meroe and was given a military escort for the rest of their journey.   Thus this mission of 
exploration would have allowed the Romans to evaluate whether or not military or further 
diplomatic action would be worthwhile.  Much as with the expedition to Arabia Felix, there was no 
subsequent mission recorded, suggesting that military action was not considered worth the potential 
31 Seneca, NQ 8.3-5, Pliny NH 6.35.
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risks.32   The expedition into Arabia, on the other hand, was followed up by Roman expansion, first 
as client kingdoms and then coming under direct Roman control.  Certain expeditions can also be 
classed as punitive, such as the Garamantes expedition due to their support of Tacfarinas, Paulinus' 
excursion into the Sahara against the Mauri (Dio 60.9-1-6; Pliny NH 5.14-15) and several 
expeditions as part of the Judean revolts, all of which are discussed in chapter five.
As can be seen, the level of geographic understanding and its associated uses during the 
Republic and Empire was quite low in comparison with the modern day.  That being said, though 
we do have examples of their methods not being adequate, these do seem more the exception than 
the rule.  There would be no reason to include mention of a routine journey simply because it would 
not be particularly interesting or exciting for the audience.  Similarly, when discussing the peoples 
of the desert, only those who were exceptional (or who the writer wanted the audience to perceive 
as being exceptional) would be specifically discussed.  Unlike actual battles, which would have a 
guaranteed large audience demographic, the mundanities of intelligence gathering and geography 
would be of interest only to specialists.
Part III. Logistics:
The importance of an army's supplies in campaign, battle and peacetime is something that 
few, if any, would deny.  Vegetius, in his handbook states 'Saepius enim penuria quam pugna 
consumit exercitum, et ferro saeuior fames est'.33  He was referring to food, but we can include any 
sort of supplies, including both raw materials and finished items required by an army either in 
garrison or on campaign.  Without arms, armaments and some method of conveyance, an army 
cannot fight; without water, food, and salt, an army cannot survive, let alone function.  
Supplies could be acquired one of two ways, either by bringing items into an area or by 
finding them once one arrives.  Both of these options were used, and there are a variety of different 
32 Cf Kirwan, L.P., 'Rome Beyond the Southern Egyptian Frontier,' The Geographical Journal, Vol. 123, No. 1 (Mar., 
1957), pp. 13-19.
33 3.3.2-3.
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methods that can be used for either option, which will be discussed below. 
A. Rations and Supply: 
The main problem with the modern works on logistics, especially in regard to the daily 
supply requirements of soldiers and carrying capacities over animals, is that they take only 
averages.  As discussed above, with regard to animals and humans both, they fail to take into 
account the differences in exertion that differences in climate and terrain cause.  More specifically, 
they do not address the specific problems which one faces in the desert.  
1. Humans:  There are certain changes in needs based around environment.  There is, 
unfortunately, very little extant data in the ancient sources on this matter, however.  We do have 
several instances where heat and/or aridity caused problems.  Sallust 51.3 states that both the 
Roman and Numidian troops were badly affected by heat.  Dio 40.23.4 states that Crassus' troops 
were badly affected by heat, dryness and dust.  Antony is said to have lost more troops from disease 
and climate than battle on the march back from Parthia.34  According to Herodian 3.9.6, at the siege 
of Hatra by Severus, heat and dryness severely afflicted the besieging Romans.   Ammianus 
repeatedly describes the heat and dryness as being severely distressing, along with lack of food, in 
the Amida interlude (18-19), as well as in 25.1.3, 25.7-8.  Theodosius, when awaiting his troops' 
arrival in North Africa to suppress Firmus' revolt, was concerned not only for the difference in 
fighting style, to be discussed in chapter five, but also because his troops were used to a cooler 
climate.35  Julian, in Oration I 23B-C discusses how Constantius succeeded despite heat and troops 
unaccustomed to it.  Zosimus 3.91 attributes heavy losses of Jovian to aridity, though there is 
nothing further stated explicitly.  Pliny (NH 5.14-15) and Cassius Dio (60.9.1-5) state that the only 
recorded incursions of the Romans into the Western Sahara were thwarted by both the heat and 
aridity, as well as the inability to find food and water through lack of familiarity with the region. 
34 Plutarch Antony 50.1.
35 Amm Marc 29.5.7.
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We can perhaps extrapolate from some small missions (to be discussed in chapter five) supposedly 
designed to train (or retrain) Roman troops who were either inexperienced or who had become idle 
may have been in part to acclimatise them, but there is nothing specifically stated supporting that as 
an intended outcome. 
In the absence of data from the ancient world discussing how arid-environment requirements 
changed or how that was addressed, we must look at modern data and extrapolate backward; due to 
the current major theatres of war being in arid areas, since Roth and Erdkamp's works there are a 
number of studies that have been done on adaptation to the desert.  This sort of extrapolation does 
have a number of problems, however, though none are insurmountable.  The major differences 
between modern and ancient military soldiers are physiognomy, function and recourse. 
Physiognomy can be compensated for through the use of standardised height to weight ratios 
(discussed below) so that can at least be estimated to a reasonable standard.  Function is a bit more 
difficult.  Modern soldiers, unlike ancient ones, do not generally have to march everywhere.  Apart 
from some foot patrols, most soldiers will use vehicles of some type when travelling.  Modern 
soldiers also tend not to have to build camps every night-- the studies done on moderns tend to be 
soldiers doing garrison duty in friendly territory rather than those in combat or hostile territory, for 
rather obvious reasons of access and safety.  Modern soldiers also generally have recourse to 
modern heat-resistant tents or buildings, as well as sometimes air conditioning, as well as regular 
food and water, plus medical care should they become dehydrated or hyperthermic.  These are all 
conditions that are quite different from ancient soldiers in the desert.  That said, general recourse is 
unlikely to affect the determination of the ideal amounts of food, water and salt for a human, so it is 
the difference in activities that is the main bulwark.  Thus my below calculations can only be 
understood as approximate, as we have no accurate data for the average number of calories burnt by 
an ancient soldier per day.  We can simply guess that they would be more active and, as such, any 
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calculations are likely underestimates.
The major impactors upon human (and animal) health relate to food, water and salt.  The last 
two, because they are so closely linked physiologically, shall be discussed together, though most 
modern works undervalue salt intake severely.  Only Roth discusses water and salt, but even he 
underestimates just how important salt especially is in the desert by allotting only five pages to its 
discussion.  In addition to being a preservative for meats, without salt, but with water, 
hyponatremia36 can result; though we do not have any Roman sources which discuss this 
phenomenon, we have evidence from Arrian and Curtius that shows this during Alexander's 
campaigns.  Alexander's parched troops die, as Arrian says, 'because of their non-stop drinking.'37 
Curtius, in 7.5.15, says 'Sed qui intemperantius hauserant, intercluso spiritu extincti sunt multoque 
maior horum numerus fuit, quam ullo amiserat proelio.'  This can be taken to mean that the men 
choked on the water, which is possible, or to mean something like the life essence in breath was 
closed in.  Though a discussion of Greek medicine and physiological thought is well outside the 
scope of this work, it seems as though Curtius may in fact be describing a seizure.38   This a 
symptom of advanced hyponatremia.  Local sources of salt would no doubt have been available; if 
Herodotus' description of the main oasis route in Garamantean territory is accurate there were salt 
mounds present there,39 but these supplies, as with all others, would not necessarily be accessible at 
any given time.
The condition can also result from heavy exertion, especially in hot environments, so it is 
clearly something we might expect in a desert.  It is brought about by the blood essentially being 
diluted by too much water intake.  This dilution leads to the blood going from an isotonic solution, 
which means that the amount of dissolved substances (solute) in the blood (solvent) is equal to that 
36 Also referred to as 'water intoxication' or 'hyperhydration.'  This can be suffered by any mammal.
37 'Πρός αὐτοῦ του ἀπαύστου πότου.’ Arrian 6.25.6 (my translation).
38 Seizures were also thought by Erasistrus to have been caused by massive inrush of blood into the veins; Praxagoras 
calls it the aorta. Longrigg, J., 'Seizure: Epilepsy in Ancient Greece-- the Vital Step,' Seizure, Volume 9, Issue 1, 
January 2000, pp. 12-21. 
39 Hdt. 4.181.2 ff.
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of inside the cells, to a hypotonic solution, meaning that there is an imbalance in the ratio of the 
amount of solute and solvent, with more solvent having been created  thanks to the amount of water 
the person has drunk.  This creates a diffusion gradient, which causes the cells to swell as the now-
dilute solvent rushes into them.  This swelling includes the brain, which can only swell so far before 
it becomes too large for the cranium and damage can occur; symptoms include fatigue, confusion, 
seizures, coma, and, in severe cases, death; we can perhaps see evidence of this (or, alternately, 
heatstroke) in Strabo 15.2.6 and the similar problems associated with sudden feasting after 
starvation, as described in Josephus (BJ, 5.13.4) and Plutarch (Antony 49). Mild cases of this 
ailment (which would likely not have been mentioned in the sources unless being suffered on a 
wide scale) can be treated by increasing salt in the diet, but more severe cases would not be 
treatable at the time.  Avoidance was the best measure.  
As is perhaps only logical, one major concern for any army in the desert is that the water 
sources would be poisoned or otherwise spoilt.  According to both Strabo and Plutarch,40 the 
Parthians would not take the chance of contamination of rivers by fighting near them; if this was in 
fact the case then this would explain why we  find only one example of intentional contamination in 
Parthia; Arsaces is said to have endeavoured to fill and destroy at least some of the qanat system in 
order to deny water to Antiochus.41  With regard to North Africa, however, the Alexandrians made 
the water saline for Caesar's forces in Alexandrian War 6-7, Appian states in his Roman History  
2.7.44 that Curio's army fell afoul of poisoned water, and Pliny states that the Garamantes put sand 
into wells along the main road used by the Romans (NH 5.5) though this was circumvented under 
Vespasian through neighbouring Oea.  One also finds the occasional reference to manipulation of 
rivers, usually by damming or intentional flooding, in order to prevent the enemy from gaining 
access; the Persians flooded the plains to create a marsh along the road the Romans were taking, 
40 Plutarch, Antony, 3.47-48,  Strabo 15.3.14,16.
41 Polybius 10.28.5-6.
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requiring them to  cross the region on pontoon bridges and rafts,42 and Babylon is said to have had 
the Euphrates denied to them by both Alexander and Semiramis, though we do not hear of so 
dramatic an instance in the Roman period.43  What is remarkable, however, is that there are not 
more examples of water-spoiling in the extant sources.  This could be simply because the data did 
not survive or was for some reason not recorded, but given that there are examples from other areas 
(e.g., Greece),44 I believe it may have more to do with just how precious water would be in the 
desert.  If one were to successfully poison a river then one does deny it to the enemy but also to 
oneself, potentially rendering the area useless for an extended period of time and endangering the 
survival of one's own group.45   This does not account for why we do see instances of poisoning or 
blocking water supplies in North Africa, however; one could possibly speculate that it was related 
to the history of intensive irrigation of the Eastern desert areas as well as Egypt (remembering that 
Alexandria is in the Delta, and that the sabotage would have affected only that section of the city 
already under Caesarian control).  In the high desert of North Africa, most water sources are oases 
or seasonal rivers, rather than irrigation channels, canals or other anthropogenic structures.  Thus, 
by this reasoning, there might not be a culturally-ingrained sacrosanctness of water sources.  Also, 
the North Africans were predominantly nomadic, whereas the Eastern groups were a mix of settled 
and nomadic; being confined to one area of control would also potentially give a different view of 
spoiling one's territorial water sources.  Without more data on ancient North African culture, 
however, we must leave this as speculation.
We do know that the ancients frequently drank wine in some form as their main beverage on 
campaign. In his Western Way of War, Hanson discusses Greek use of wine before battle.  Though 
42 Amm Marc 24.3.10.
43 Frontinus 3.4-5.7.
44 Frontinus 3.7.6.
45 There are no data apart from the little mentioned above with regard to ancient nomadic belief about water.  Some 
modern nomadic groups will regard water as common property to the group, and the modern Bedouin offer food and 
water to travellers as part of their hospitality, but these analogies are imperfect at best. Sheik-Mohamed, A., Velema 
J., 'Where Health Care Has No Access: The Nomadic Populations of Sub-Saharan Africa,' Tropical Medicine and 
International Health, Vol. 4 No. 10 Oct. 1999, pp. 695-707.
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he does not examine it in the context of being a caloric supplement, he believes it to have been used 
primarily for anaesthetic purposes, with occasional overindulgences.46  At any rate, the consumption 
of alcohol at any time would have two main physiological effects, not counting drunkenness.47  As 
alcohol is both a diuretic and causes excess perspiration, the first would be dehydration, which 
would be exacerbated in the desert, though there are no examples from the ancient literature of 
attributing an increased dehydration to alcohol consumption.  The second effect, however, would be 
to increase the caloric intake of the army.  Modern studies show that there are about 7 kcal/g of 
wine, though as the Romans frequently mixed their wine with water and sometimes honey and/or 
juices, and consumption would likely vary on a daily basis even for the same soldier, it is 
impossible to give an accurate amount of just how much of the daily caloric intake was in liquid 
form.  In order to at least get an idea of the  maximum number of calories, we can use the following 
method.  Roth suggests an average wine ration of approximately 135 ml/day, or  about 160 g.48   If 
he is correct, then, taking the modern studies at their mean, this would mean that the average 
Roman soldier obtained up to approximately 1120 kcal/day through wine.  Whether this increase in 
caloric intake would adequately offset the water and salt loss through excess sweat and urination is 
unknown; the ancient sources do not discuss it. 
The Romans, however, often used sour wine, and so looking at the effects of vinegar may 
also be instructive, though how close to vinegar the wine was allowed to become is unclear and 
likely highly variable.  Pliny (NH 23.27) stated that vinegar was good for cooling the body, though 
it is unclear if he meant through use as an ointment or through imbibing; he moves onto extol its 
virtues for easing stomach problems when drunk by those suffering sunstroke so we can possibly 
interpolate that he meant both uses.   He also believed vinegar useful against various bites and 
46 Hanson, VD, The Western Way of War: Infantry Battle in Classical Greece, Oxford: OUP, 1989, pp. 126-134.
47 The effects of alcohol would also be more severe in the absence of food; this includes the electrolyte imbalance 
caused by alcohol's diuretic effect as well as the altered mentation.
48 Roth, J.P., The Logistics of the Roman Army at War (264 B.C.-A.D. 235), Brill, Leiden, 1999, p.40.
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stings, eye ailments, and respiratory problems.  These are certainly all problems we see in or can 
extrapolate from the texts with regard to the desert, though the consumption of sour wine was not 
confined to that region.   We also have no evidence of vinegar being used to treat any ailment apart 
from the combination of olive oil and vinegar discussed in Dio 53, which was used on the 
expedition to Arabia Felix as either an ointment or sunscreen.
With regard to modern data, wine vinegar has a much lower caloric value than wine, with 
modern balsamic red vinegar having an average caloric value of .16 kcal/g.49  At the average 
160g/day this equals about 25.6 kcal/day, not counting any additives such as honey.  This is not a 
significant addition, but recent studies have shown that vinegar has two other uses that would have 
affected the Romans.  The first is that vinegar is an appetite suppressant.  This would help to 
explain why the soldiers would not have felt any caloric debt incurred by activity, though as 
discussed above not eating or drinking to satiety is found in modern soldiers as well without 
imbibing vinegar.  The second, however, is far more relevant, and explains why vinegar acts as an 
appetite suppressant.  Recent studies have shown that vinegar reduces the glycemic index of 
carbohydrates, such as breads and starchy foods, sometimes by as much as 30%.50  What this means 
practically is that the breaking down and absorption of the calories from the carbohydrates would be 
slowed, giving the soldiers a slower but steadier source of energy, rather than a sudden rise in blood 
glucose level and then an equally sudden fall not long after.  Thus, though not significantly 
increasing the caloric intake, vinegar could still have helped in the efficient use of whatever 
supplies the Romans did have. 
A lack of wine, sour or otherwise, was however considered a serious enough change to 
49 'Vinegar' http://thecaloriecounter.com/Foods/200/2048/Food.aspx [online] Accessed 11/08/10.  The average is based 
upon the nutrition information given on the bottles of several modern brands of balsamic vinegar.
50 Ostman E, Granfeldt Y, Persson L, Björck I, 'Vinegar supplementation lowers glucose and insulin responses and 
increases satiety after a bread meal in healthy subjects.' European Journal of Clinical Nutrition Vol 59 (9) 
September 2005, pp. 983–8; Roberts S.B., 'High-glycemic index foods, hunger, and obesity: is there a connection?'. 
Nutrition Reviews Vol 58 (6): June 2000, pp 163–9.
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require acclimatisation.  In the Cyropaedia,51when informing his men about a fifteen to twenty day 
march  where there would be no food or wine available en route, tells them that, in order to avoid 
sickness from lack of wine, they must gradually begin to drink water every time they eat, and use 
water in their food preparations, with only a bit of wine after the meal.  Though potentially 
decreasing the overall caloric intake, this would have increased the overall water intake, and 
prevented dehydration from alcohol. In contrast to this, the Numidians supposedly drank only 
water.52  Appian does not say why this might be, but, given their climate this was probably based at 
least partially on the need for hydration. The Lusitanians, in a semi-desert region, are said to drink 
only water, but this may be Strabo showing them as being simple and/or 'un-Roman', as the rest of 
the section is devoted to their being warlike, dancing, being promiscuous, etc.53  Cato is also said to 
only have drunk water unless extremely thirsty, in which case he would call for vinegar or a little 
wine for strength, though this is attributed to austerity, rather than any physiological 
considerations;54 according to the HA the Egyptians drank only water, and Niger encourages his 
troops to do the same.55  
Though the primary sources do give some examples of what might be adaptation to heat and 
aridity (or lack thereof), as noted above we do not have definite data about what exactly the 
increased physiological needs were and how they were addressed.  Whilst I am comfortable stating 
that in the desert caloric, salt and water intake would have to be higher and that incidence of certain 
conditions caused by the desert environment or lack of adaptation to same certainly occurred,56 I 
feel that one can obtain a reasonable estimate of the required increase in daily salt, water and caloric 
intakes in desert environments, then take that percentage and apply it onto Roth's numbers, but 
51 6.2.25-40, especially 27-30.
52 Appian, Punic War, 11.2-3.
53 Strabo 3.3.67-68.
54 Plutarch, Cato the Elder, 1.
55 HA, Pesc. Niger, 7.7-9.  The history of beer drinking in Egypt argues against this, reinforcing the problems with the 
HA.
56 e.g., the siege of Hatra, Scipio's army in Spain, et cetera.  See chapters four and five.
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given the potential inaccuracies in those numbers, whether or not this would reflect the ancient 
reality is unknown.  For example, according to Consolazio et al., humans in a desert require 
approximately 56 kcal of food per kg of body weight (55.5 kcal in hot sun, 56.4 kcal in hot shade), 
as compared with 36.6 kcal in cooler environments.57  This means that caloric intake must be 
approximately 34% (or approximately one-third) higher than normal.  If we take Roth at his 
estimate of approximately 3000 kcal/day per soldier, then, in the desert, it should need to be 4000 
kcal/day per soldier.  If, as both Roth and Engels58 do, we take the average weight of a Roman at 55 
kg, however, then the required caloric intake drops to 2830 kcal/day in a desert, and 2035 kcal/day 
in a cooler environment.  In either case, the caloric requirements would be much higher, requiring 
more supplies.  This, like all the numbers in this section, is a projected 'ideal' number for optimum 
performance by the soldiers.  It would not have been met for a variety of reasons which are 
addressed in the analysis.  These projected numbers do, however, give us an idea of how much 
higher supply needs would be in a desert.
One point determined in a 2006 work on Mineral Requirements for Active Duty Personnel is 
that, despite energy expenditures of anywhere from 4000 to 7000 calories, the average caloric 
intake of soldiers was 2400 calories.59  Whilst modern data applied to ancient is, as discussed 
extensively above, not always applicable, and this paper focuses on training in a garrison, the idea 
that soldiers routinely under-eat is an interesting one.  The sensation of hunger, most likely familiar 
to the ancients, as discussed above, is not one modern scholars have attempted to take into account. 
57   Consolazio et al., 'Energy Requirements of Men in Extreme Heat,' Journal of Nutrition, Vol 73, 1961 pp. 126-134.
58 Engels uses 120 lbs as his baseline, which is approximately 56.1 kg.  Engels, D., Alexander the Great and the  
Logistics of the Macedonian Army, University of California Press, London, 1978.  Erdkamp uses the slightly higher 
estimate of 60-65 kg.  Erdkamp, P., Hunger and the Sword: Warfare and Food Supply in Roman Republican Wars 
(264-30 BC), Amsterdam: Gieben, 1998.  Height/weight ratio charts list the low-normal weight of a man between 
5'4 and 5'5 as between 55 and 60 kg; I have chosen the 55 kg figure in order to determine a minimum optimum 
caloric intake.  See Benn, R, 'Some Mathematical Properties of Weight-For-Height Indices Used as Measures of 
Adiposity,'  British Journal of Preventative Social Medicine, Vol 25, 1971, pp. 42-50; Thomas, A, McKay, D, and 
Cutlip M., 'A Nomograph Method for Assessing Body Weight,' American Journal of Clinical Nutrition,  Vol 29, 
March 1976, pp. 302-304.
59 US Food and Nutrition Board, Mineral Requirements for Military Personnel: Levels Needed for Cognitive and 
Physical Performance During Garrison Training, NAP, Washington DC, 2006 pp. 15-17.
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Though entirely subjective, and thus not quantifiable, this could explain why soldiers seemed able 
to cope with these rations.  The effect of vinegar as an appetite suppressant may also have played a 
role, though this is not explicitly stated in ancient literature.
Water and salt are even more important than food, as discussed above.  Modern US military 
requirements suggest 3.8 litres (1 gallon) for every 33 km (20 mi) walked during the night, or about 
1.2 litres per 10 km, and double that during the day.60  This does not take into account carrying 
equipment. Another study from 1993 estimates that water loss in the desert can be up to 10 
litres/day/person during high exertion, with a 10-20% increase on top of that during 
acclimatisation.61  Therefore, the US military recommended in 2005,62 admittedly with a baseline of 
a modern male soldier who is partially acclimatised to an environment where the temperature is at 
40 degrees C, that someone consuming 3600 kcal/day should need a minimum of 12 litres/day of 
water, and someone consuming 2900 kcal/day should require between 9 and 10 litres/day. This does 
not necessarily mean that this is the amount that will be consumed, even if ample water is available, 
much as with food.63  Schmidt-Nielsen showed that humans are often sated below the level of water 
which is lost, for reasons which are not understood.  Animals do not have this same problem, with 
donkeys and camels replacing approximately the amount lost.64  At cooler temperatures of 25 
degrees C, 6 litres/day is needed for 3600 kcal/day and 5litres/day is needed for 2900 kcal/day.  As 
60 United States Army, 'Water Usage in Desert Operations,' Army Study Guide, [online] available from 
http://www.armystudyguide.com/content/army_board_study_guide_topics/desert_operations/water-usage-in-desert-
ope.shtml.  Date of access 28/12/08.
61 Gisolfi, C, 'Water Requirements During Exercise in the Heat,' in Marriott,B., (ed). Nutritional Needs in Hot  
Environments: Applications for Military Personnel in Field Operations, Committee on Military Nutrition Research, 
Institute of Medicine, 1993 pp. 87-96.  Extra salt, in excess of that required by the desert conditions, would also be 
needed  during acclimatisation. Nelson N., et al., Army Medical Research Lab, Ft Knox, 'Determination of Water 
and Salt Requirements For Desert Operations,' Defence Technical Information Centre, p.2, available from 
http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=AD652256&Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf. Date of access 
28/12/08. This was also seen in the sources; in Afr 1.19, Labienus is very confident in his troops because they had 
been in Africa for three years and had acclimatised, and Julian considers troops with Constantius to have been at a 
disadvantage because they were not accustomed to the heat (Oration I, 23B). 
62 Institute of Medicine (U.S.). Panel on Dietary Reference Intakes for Electrolytes and Water, DRI, Dietary Reference 
Intakes for Water, Potassium, Sodium, Chloride, and Sulfate, NAP, Washington DC, 2005, pp. 488, 489.  
63 Sidebotham's empirical evidence suggests that a modern human performing archaeological work in the Egyptian 
Eastern desert requires 6L/day for drinking, based upon consumption of his survey team.  Sidebotham, S. 'Ptolemaic 
and Roman Water Resources and Their Management in  the Eastern Desert of Egypt,' 87-116.
64  Schmidt-Nielsen, K., Desert Animals, Oxford: Clarendon, 1964 pp. 62, 91.
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for salt, the 2005 study recommends just under 10000 mg/day for the 3600 kcal/day consumption in 
40 degrees C, with 7000 mg/day for 2900 kcal/day under the same conditions.  In 25 degrees C, 
5000 mg/day and  approximately 3500 mg/day are recommended for the respective diets.  So, 
invading ancient soldiers in the desert would have required, by these figures, twice the amount of 
water and salt as usual.65  
My use of modern numbers can certainly be accused of the same inaccuracies as Engels, 
who similarly uses modern military recommendations in his work on the Macedonian army.  This is 
why I merely suggest that the ratios of caloric, water, and salt intakes required for soldiers in a 
desert to that of soldiers working in a more hospitable environment are a valid estimate of how 
much greater the amount of supplies would have had to be.66  Though exact numbers cannot truly be 
given, what these data do strongly suggest is that the baggage trains for desert campaigns would 
have to be larger or heavier than those in more fertile areas, and/or that alternate arrangements 
would have to be made.67  Because they also would not be able to find reliable forage, and may or 
may not have been able to count on indigenous cultures for either voluntary or involuntary support, 
secure and long ranging supply lines would also be of vital importance for a successful desert 
campaign.
It must be said that the requirements given above refer to what was needed for optimum 
performance of soldiers.  This was not necessarily of great concern to generals; adequate 
functionality for battle, i.e., whatever was enough to allow the army to win, may have been 
regarded as acceptable.  This does not necessarily mean that ancient soldiers were worked to death 
and simply replaced; there is no evidence for this in the sources, and it would be both detrimental to 
65 Cyrus tells his troops to bring salted meats on their march as they are more appetising and satisfying.  Xenophon, 
Cyropaedia 6.2.31. Classical hoplites likewise brought salty foods with them.  Van Wees, H, Greek Warfare: Myths  
and Realities, London: Duckworth, 2004, p. 104.  These would have been clear attempts to maintain an adequate 
salt intake.
66  Deserts, of course, are not the only type of terrain where extra rations may have ideally been used; this is, however, 
outside the scope of this paper.  
67 See below for discussion of alternate approaches such as splitting the army, forward supply depots, forced marches, 
et cetera.
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morale and ultimately more costly given the required time and money to train replacements. The 
greater recourse to grievous punishment of non- or under-performing soldiers by their officers can 
also account for the continued high levels of activity on short rations. 
2. Animals:  As with human adaptation, the Romans have left us very little extant with 
regard to how they addressed changes required by the animals in their midst, leaving us again to 
extrapolate as best we can through use of modern data.  In addition to the incorporation of camels 
and camelry, the Roman forces had horses, mules and donkeys for mounts and pack animals, as 
well as potentially having cattle, sheep, and other food animals.  As with the humans, in a desert, 
water and fodder sources would be problematic to obtain, though, as pack animals may well have 
been worked to death,68 there would have been less concern for their continued well-being than 
would be the case for humans.  Whilst camels can graze even on desert scrub and obtain or retain 
enough to survive, horses, mules and other non-native creatures would, like humans, require both 
water and digestible fodder.  
Exactly how much more food, salt and water would be required would change from species 
to species.  For donkeys, Adams suggests between three and five artabas of barley per month based 
upon papyrological data, or between 47.1 and 75 kg/month, likely supplemented with pasturage or 
green fodder.69  We can attempt an estimate in the case of horses based upon an average ration for 
travelling horses as listed in the Persepolis Fortification Tablets, and comparing that to the Roman 
cavalry grain ration as given by Polybius.70  The latter equals approximately 1.6 kg/day for a horse. 
The former is somewhat more problematic, based upon difficulties of transliteration and translation 
from the Elamite.  The units of dry measure are called BARs, which roughly equals ten imperial 
quarts, or about 9.5 litres, and the QA, equalling about .95 litres.71  Exactly what type of grain is 
68 Goldsworthy, A., 'Review: The Logistics of the Roman Army at War 264BC-AD235' BMCR 11/1/99 [online] 
http://bmcr.brynmawr.edu/1999/1999-11-01.html Accessed 3/9/10.
69 Adams, C. Land Transport in Roman Egypt. Oxford, OUP, 2007, p85.
70 6.39.  Adams points out that it may not, in fact, be possible to determine a 'normal' ration. Adams, C. Land 
Transport in Roman Egypt. Oxford, OUP, 2007, p84.
71 Translation of units of measure is always open to question; for a good discussion of such issues see: Haldon, J., 
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being given is unclear, but for barley, at a specific gravity of .6 kg/litres, this works out to one BAR 
then equalling 5.7 kg and a QA equalling .57 kg/day.72  For wheat or millet, the maximum specific 
gravity is .8 kg/litres for both; thus this would be 7.6 kg/day for a BAR and .76 kg/day for a QA. 
The amount of grain given to these horses in the tablets varies.  Unfortunately, all that is 
listed is duration of days rather than distance travelled.  Still, in PF1781 and in PF1784, in the 
eighth and ninth month of the year respectively,73 horses were given 1 BAR/day of unspecified 
grain, or about 5.7 kg/day of barley or 7.6 kg/day of wheat or millet.  The rider in PF1784 was 
going to Susa, but whence is unclear.  In PF1783, from the twelfth month,74  horses got 5 QA/day, 
or 2.9 kg/day of barley or 3.8 kg/day of wheat or millet.  Finally, in PF1785, in the second month,75 
horses got 3 QA, or 1.6 kg/day of barley or 2.3 kg/day of wheat or millet.  
To compare to the Roman ration of 1.6 kg/day of usually barley, we can see that in PF1785, 
the rations are roughly equal between the Persians and Romans.  Elsewhere, however, it is far 
higher, at 2.9 kg/day or even 5.7 kg/day in the eighth and ninth month.  Looking back at the 1/3 fold 
increase required by humans in the desert, that would equal a requirement of 2.1 kg/day for optimal 
desert performance.  The Persians clearly exceeded this most times of the year, though exactly why 
these differing rations were given is unclear.  It could relate to climatic conditions, though the 
hottest part of the year for which we have record here is when the ration equals that of the standard 
Roman.  It could also relate to harvest, i.e., that the eighth and ninth month represent a time in 
which grain stores are full, which would actually be the case.  Or, it could reflect differences in 
terrain and/or distance, which cannot be determined from the tablets.  Finally, it could simply be a 
'Feeding the Army: Food and Transport in Byzantium, ca 600-1100,' Feast, Fast or Famine: Food and Drink in  
Byzantium, Mayer W. and Trzcionka, S. (eds)., Australian Association for Byzantine Studies, Brisbane, 2005, pp. 85-
100.
72 In order to convert from the imperial liquid measure quart to the metric dry measure kilogram (kg), one has to first 
convert quarts to litres, then find the specific gravity of the substance which one is attempting to convert, which is 
given in kg/litres.
73 The Persian year began at the vernal equinox, so this would be roughly mid-November and mid-December/January, 
respectively.  Smith, A., Ph.D, Pers Comm, 23/03/09.
74 Mid-February-mid March.
75 Mid-April-mid-May.
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difference in ration given according to status, and excess was given to an entourage or others to 
reflect this.  Thus, without more complete data we can only say that the desert-born Persians 
routinely equalled or exceeded the Romans with regard to their horses' rations.
In the absence of any other extant ancient data we must now turn to modern.  A 1964 study 
showed that food and water consumption go together in many animals, humans included, but not, 
for example, camels.  When the body begins to dehydrate, which fluids are most affected by this 
water loss are directly relevant to the animals' ability to adapt and survive.  Animals such as camels 
and donkeys tend to lose this water from interstitial fluid; humans and sheep, however, tend to lose 
this water from plasma.76  It seems reasonable that the difference in where the water dehydrates 
from is directly related to the ability to cope with the environment, and thus why camels and 
donkeys both are better able to do so.77  A truism from medicine is that salt follows water; in 
herbivores like donkeys, however, there is very little salt loss through sweat.  Therefore, whatever 
salt the animals take in tends to remain in their systems longer than in the case of humans.78
There is still the question of adaptation and acclimatisation to an assumed dearth of fodder 
in animals.  Whilst one study showed a 'metabolic switch' which desert mammals use to reduce their 
metabolic rates,79 this does not seem to be a feature of every mammal.  In most cases, strategies 
used by animals to compensate for the environment are behavioural rather than physiological.80  
In summation, what has been determined in this section represents the ideal ration of food, 
water and salt to obtain optimal performance from both men and beasts in the desert.  I must stress, 
76 Sheep regularly suffer loss of plasma volume in desert conditions which would kill a human.  Schmidt-Nielsen, K., 
Desert Animals, Clarendon, Oxford, 1964,  pp. 105-106.
77 The camel's ability to retain water is higher than a donkey's; for example, donkey faeces has about three times as 
much water as camel.  Schmidt-Nielsen, K.,Desert Animals, Clarendon, Oxford, 1964 p 85.  For a full discussion on 
camel physiology, see also Gauthier-Pilters, H., Dagg, A.I., The Camel: Its Evolution, Ecology, Behaviour and 
Relationship to Man, University of Chicago, 1981.
78 Schmidt-Nielsen, K., Desert Animals, Clarendon, Oxford, 1964 p. 90.
79 Merkt, J.R. and Taylor, C., '”Metabolic Switch” for Desert Survival,' PNAS December 6, 1994 vol. 91 no. 25 pp. 
12313-12316.  
80 This is especially the case in humans, who cannot adjust their excretory systems to retain water, nor 'downshift' into 
aestivation.  Schmidt-Nielsen, K., Desert Animals, Clarendon, Oxford, 1964 pp. 11, 187-192.  There is also no 
evidence that 'desert physiology' can exist in humans, though acclimatisation is of course possible. McCance, R.A., 
et al., 'Have the Bedouin a Special “Desert” Physiology?' Proc R Soc London B 185, 1974, pp. 263-271.
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however, that there is no reason to believe that this ideal was ever achieved.  Modern data, though it 
can give us insight into how the mammalian body reacts under the stress of desert environments, 
and can even do so under wartime conditions, still do not tell us exactly how much food or water 
someone living millennia ago required, much less how much they were given on a day-to-day basis. 
What these numbers can do is give us an idea of the magnitude of the logistical stress increase on 
ancient armies when entering into a new environment.   Once this magnitude becomes clear, we can 
begin to understand why so many sieges had associated famines and/or epidemics, and why 
planning ahead with regard to adequate food and water supplies was so vital, and how easily any 
campaign could end in disaster.
B. Tactical Logistics in the Desert:  
Having looked at the individual logistical needs, I shall now look at the next order of 
magnitude, that is tactical logistics.  Though the modern studies of logistics tend to focus 
exclusively upon strategic needs, the importance of tactical logistics cannot be overlooked. There 
are two factors with regard to tactical supplies.  The first is what should be done with baggage 
trains, including reserves, during battle, and the second is the maintenance of troops during the 
battle.  Several ancient treatises81 suggest that one should keep reserve personnel, horses and 
equipment far enough away from the battle to avoid the reserve forces being noticed and reserve 
animals being upset by the noise which could cause anything from a mild disruption to a stampede. 
This also allows the baggage train and reserve forces time enough to prepare and evacuate should 
the battle go poorly.  Most likely, the baggage was kept at the forward tactical base under guard.82  A 
good example of a badly placed baggage train is from Appian's Mithridatic Wars,83 where Tigranes, 
overconfident because of his numeric superiority, was goaded into allowing his forces to pursue 
Lucullus near a hill, which meant that Tigranes' formation was disrupted.  This  allowed Lucullus to 
81 Maurice 5.1-4, Onasander 22.1-2.
82 e.g., Plutarch Alexander 32.5-7.
83 Appian, Mithridatic Wars, 12.85.
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assault the enemy baggage train, which was driven into their own cavalry and infantry, causing 
mass confusion and allowing for a Roman rout.
Supplies and their lack also impact on where one sets up a marching camp.  Vegetius 3.7 
gives a list of criteria for an ideal location; the most critical for our purposes here is the requirement 
of water sources.  Gilliver states that water is the most critical factor in determining a location for a 
camp;84 in the case of desert campaigns I would agree.  We see several instances wherein being 
forced to camp in an area without water supplies was used as a deliberate tactic against an enemy.
In North Africa, Caesar was in dire straits when forced to camp in an area without any water 
sources; this was a deliberate tactic intended to diminish or destroy Caesar's army with no losses.85 
There is no explicit statement saying that a particular area was chosen over another because there 
was water, though given the discussions of the aridity of the areas in which the Romans operated it 
seems a reasonable assumption.
Supplies are never more obviously essential than in a siege, for both the besiegers and the 
besieged.  There are several examples,86 including several in the desert where a lack of supplies 
meant that a siege had to be raised.  Severus' victory in Persia, for example, could not be pressed by 
besieging Ktesiphon due in large part to this problem.87   Normally, a besieging army would be able 
to supplement its supplies through foraging and pillaging, but in a desert environment that was not 
always possible and supply lines could only bring in so much so quickly.88  The besieging army is 
also frequently struck by diseases,89 which should require an increase in supplies unless a great 
84 Gilliver, C.M., The Art of War, Tempus: Stroud, 1999, p 71.
85 Afr 69, 79.   Scipio Africanus did much the same to Hannibal just before Zama; by forcing Hannibal to make camp 
somewhere in which he was cut off from both imported and local supplies, he forced the Carthaginians to exhaust 
themselves before the battle in obtaining insufficient rations, something which must have played a role in the 
Carthaginian loss.  Appian, Punic Wars 36-40.
86 e.g., Heraklea in Polybius 1.18.10, Praaspa in Dio  49.263, Ktesiphon in the HA, Severus 16.2.  See also chapter 
four.
87 Dio 76.9.9. 
88 Masada was an exception to this; though in a desert environment it was the last area out of Roman control, thus 
allowing the Romans to bring in supplies through secure lines.
89 Both from being in close, unsanitary quarters (e.g., cholera) and from diseases endemic to where they are invading 
(e.g., the Syracusan malarial swamps).
37
Just Deserts: Roman Military Operations in Arid Environments (108 BC-AD 400).
many are lost to disease, and assuming that a lack of something is not the cause.90   Heat and other 
environmental conditions can be just as devastating; for example, the siege at Hatra had to be lifted 
when the besieging Romans began dying due to the heat.91   
Supplies for the besieged are always important.  In a desert, however, because of the hostile 
conditions cities would additionally have had to have stockpiled foodstuffs because of the potential 
for disruption to their transport systems.92  Additionally, desert cities were sited with water in mind; 
most if not all cities would have had a secure water source of some kind, be it springs, wells, or a 
river; frequently, access was maintained via irrigation tunnels if the water source was outside the 
walls.93  These tunnels could, of course, be used to transport more than just water.  Unless this 
access could be cut,94 the city could hold out for sometime. Disease was, however, a common 
problem, and could be exacerbated by heat.95
There is not a lot of information available in the primary sources on tactical logistics in 
general, which prevents us from making much of a determination on how it would function in the 
desert.  We can, I believe, safely assume that the most critical aspects would be ensuring that there 
was a sufficient supply of food and water in place during sieges, whatever side one was on, as well 
as ensuring the safety of the baggage train during battle.  These concerns, though exacerbated by an 
inability to forage or pillage nearby siege camps and a potential continual food shortage as 
discussed above, would hold true for an army no matter where it was operating, desert or not.
C. Strategic Logistics in the Desert:
90 e.g., scurvy caused by lack of vitamin C, as occurred in the campaign into Arabia Felix. Dio 53. 29.  Also unfamiliar 
foods, as in App Sp 10.54, and hostile creatures, as in 20.42.2.
91 Hdn 3.9.6.
92 e.g., Julian Oration I 26D.
93 Any city with Ain, Ein, or En ('fountain') in the name was built around a spring (e.g., En Gedi, En Boqeq).  Some of 
both Petra's and Jerusalem's water supply came in through tunnels, as did Palmyra's and Rabbat Ammon's. 
Jerusalem: Dio 65.4.5; for all four: Semple, E.C., 'Domestic and Municipal Waterworks in Ancient Mediterranean 
Lands,' Geographical Review, Vol. 21, No. 3 (Jul., 1931), pp. 466-474.  Ammianus says that Amida had a spring and 
later a tunnel cut to the Tigris (18.9.2, 19.5.4) and in 24.5.3 references an unnamed deserted city that had a spring 
connected by a tunnel to the Tigris.  
94  e.g., Scipio cutting semi-desert Numantia off from the Duero.  Appian Spanish Wars  14.91.
95 e.g., Amida.  Amm. Marc. 19.4.1-8.
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Having looked at tactical logistics, I should like to now turn to the extant evidence for 
strategic logistics.  Let us begin with specific examples of adaptation to desert conditions on the 
march.  Sallust (BJ 75.2-8) describes Metellus' preparation for an 83 km journey through the North 
African desert.  He strips the provisions to only a 10-day grain supply and water-carrying skins, 
plus wooden (i.e., lightweight/potential fuel sources) utensils, as well as arranging for the 
Numidians to supply him with water.  Depending on what figure is used for marching speed, and 
assuming no major difficulties in terrain, which is unknown, this could have taken approximately 
three days,96 or approximately four days.97   In either case, a 10-day supply is a good surplus in case 
something unforeseen should occur; Antigonus took a 10-day supply on a march from Gaza into the 
Sirbonian Lake region of the Sinai, though Diodorus does not give us an exact itinerary.98   This 
region, now called the Bardawil lagoon, is 85 km in length,99 and though it is suspected that he 
encamped near his off-shore fleet at the western end of the region,100 we can but approximate that 
this march was 140 km, which should have taken 4 or 5 days at the regular Roman marching 
speed.101   In a similar environment in Iberia, Metellus' son stripped down his forces to light arms 
and armour and had them carry a 5 day supply of rations in order to attempt to take the city of the 
Langobritae  from Sertorius in a two-day siege.  Unlike his father's success, however, Metellus' 
mission failed when Sertorius managed to get supplies of water into and the civilian population 
evacuated out of the city, and assaulted Metellus' foragers.102  There is, of course, the potential 
problem of transport in the sense of soldiers being unable carry water with them due to a lack of 
helmets or other suitable instruments; this happened to Antony on his trip back from Parthia, 
96 The standard 30-32 km/day, as discussed more intensively elsewhere.
97 This using the established 'maximum safe' speed for mounts, or about 20-25 km/day.
98 20.73.
99 Stanley, J..D. 'Configuration of the Egypt-to-Canaan Coastal Margin and North Sinai Byway in the Bronze Age,' in 
Egypt and the Levant, E.C.M. van den Brink, T.E. Levy (eds.), London: Leicester University Press, 2002, pp. 98-
117.
100 20.73 n5.
101 No data are available on average Antigonid marching rates.
102 Plutarch, Sertorius, 12.
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wherein he and his men reached a river, meaning both supply and safety, as the Parthians would not 
fight at rivers.103  Unfortunately, as Antony and his men were short on carriers, he had to be supplied 
with those as well from allies.104  These examples underscore both the importance of planning ahead 
as well as the narrow margin for success in the desert.
With regard to actual movement along the roads in the desert we can look at the few 
examples given of the order of march. We have examples of the Romans marching in a hollow 
square when expecting a threat, as discussed more in Chapter Five, but despite the different 
environment they seemed not to change particularly.  In fact, having looked through all of the 
primary sources on the matter, it was only in response to a believed enemy presence that there was a 
change.  Josephus, when talking about Titus' march into Judea, calls his order 'καθά Ῥωμαίοις 
σύνηθες'105 or in accordance with Roman methods.  It is possible that our understanding of the 
usual Roman order of march as discussed in the modern literature has been skewed by the 
assumption that Josephus is correct, or that Josephus may have mistaken what was a typical Roman 
order of march in a desert for a typical order or march anywhere, but there is no extant text showing 
any differences.  This implies that the Romans were not automatically changing their order of 
march due to being in a desert environment, but were in fact adapting to whether or not they felt 
that there was the possibility of attack.
Having now looked at the few alterations made to individual campaigns or incidents, let us 
now move to look at the overall logistical system.  In general the Romans as well as those 
indigenous groups for which we have evidence, used very similar logistical methods in all areas and 
time periods.   Though coastal and fluvial resupply was important in many instances, in order to 
focus my argument on desert-specific logistics I will be confining my analysis to land-based 
systems.  
103 Cf Strabo 15.3.14,16.  Fear of pollution by bodies of all-too-rare watercourses would be logical for a desert people.
104 Plutarch, Antony, 3.47-48.
105 BJ 5.50.
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Road systems pre-dated the Roman period in both the East and North Africa.  The Persian 
royal roads extended throughout the East and were added to by the Seleukids, Palmyrenes, and 
others, whilst the Ptolemies were road-builders in Egypt, adding onto Pharaonic road systems.106 
The rest of North Africa is less clear but Herodotus (4.181 ff) and Pliny (NH 5.5) tell us of a road 
into Garamantes territory, and there may have been Trans-Saharan trade networks in operation for 
far longer than that.  We also have information from survey expeditions; thus far only a few sites 
have been (or are being) excavated and published, however, so the data are far from complete.107 
These road systems had a number of factors in common.  They were all lined with road stations 
and/or fort(let)s through which they could protect and control supplies, especially water, which 
seems to have required a permit of some kind.108  I will discuss the function of these fortifications 
further in Chapter Five.
Keeping to logistics, what is clear is that what these road systems all hold in common is 
water.  Along each are either artificial or natural water sources in the form of either cities, burghi or 
hydreumata, sometimes also food and, in the case of Herodotus' discussion of the Garamantes route, 
salt.  As Cherry pointed out that water is the defining factor for the choice of sites,109 it is only a 
slight extension of that idea to believe that these pre-existing, secured water sources along roads 
would mean that almost all large-scale Roman and enemy movement would take place on these 
roads.  This is supported by the Cyropaedia, where Cyrus is advised that he and the enemy will both 
have to travel along the same roads,110 suggesting that the Persians did not normally march off 
106 Persia: Xen., Cyropaedia 1.5.36; Egypt: Partridge, R., Transport in Ancient Egypt, London: Rubicon Press, 1996, 
p.78.
107 For extensive information on specific roads/systems, see Jackson, R. At Empire's Edge: Exploring Rome's Egyptian 
Frontier.  London, Yale University Press, 2002., Parker, S. T. (ed) The Roman Frontier in Central Jordan: Final  
Report on the Limes Arabicus Project 1980-1989. Washington DC, Dumbarton Oaks, 2006., Sidebotham, S. et al., 
The Red Land: The Illustrated Archaeology of Egypt's Eastern Desert. Cairo, the American University in Cairo 
Press, 2008.,  Chevallier, R, Roman Roads, Field, N. H. (tr) Berkeley: University of California Press, 1976, Isidore 
of Charax's Parthian Stations, the maps of the Notitia Dignitatum and Antonine Itinerary, Strabo 16.2.27.  Isaac 
gives a good discussion in Limits of Empire, Oxford: Clarendon, 1993, pp 163-186.
108 Sidebotham, S. 'Ptolemaic and Roman Water Resources and Their Management in  the Eastern Desert of Egypt,' 87-
116.  
109 Cherry, D. Frontier and Society in Roman North Africa. Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1998, p37.
110 1.36.
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roads.  Strabo, when discussing Alexander's journey through the Gedrosian desert, pointed out the 
difficulties faced by infantry in walking through both level sand and dunes;111 though Gedrosia is 
outside our spatial-temporal bounds, this would be a problem faced by desert-operating groups in 
North Africa especially.   Pliny describes the problems the Romans had with the Garamantes filling 
the wells with sand along the road into their territory to prevent incursions.112  Later, Ammianus was 
at pains to secure the roads before the enemy; the tactical considerations of roads will be discussed 
elsewhere but the point supports that both armies will need the roads for movement of troops and/or 
supplies.113  There is in fact only one extant instance of Roman troop movement off main roads. 
Afrianus (Dio 37.55) is said to have left the main Mesopotamian route from the Parthian border to 
Syria, and suffered both from the harsh winter conditions and from a lack of supplies.114  This 
implies that he would have expected supply depots along the route, as well, presumably, as shelter 
or some kind.  Because of this and the difficulties of moving even infantry through sand as detailed 
in Strabo, and because of the dearth of extant narratives involving problems of moving through 
sand apart from during sandstorms, I believe that it is safe to presume that any major Roman 
movement in the desert was taking place on a road.  I believe we can also surmise that the reason 
why we see hydreumata in North Africa more commonly than in the East is simply due to distance.
One of the more perplexing features of the Eastern Desert and Negev is the lack of extant 
milestones upon the roads.  There are multiple suggested reasons for this, from the commonplace 
archaeological explanations of differential preservation or stones not as yet found to the 
cosmological.  The latter, proposed by Gates, relates only to the Egyptian desert and cosmology; as 
the same dearth is present in the Negev, Scotland and Eastern Anatolia as well we can dismiss this 
111 Strabo 15.2.6.
112  NH 5.5.
113 18.6.10.
114 Cf Demetrius in Diodorus 19.97.1 who entered Nabatean territory through trackless roads, heading toward Petra. 
He is said to have been observed, though any logistical difficulties en route are not stated; the Nabateans do remind 
him that he cannot besiege them long due to lack of supplies (19.97.5).
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possibility.115  The Eastern Desert and Negev both share a geological regime different from the 
Sahara/Western Desert and the Syrian desert.  We can perhaps suppose this relates to the dearth; this 
geological regime is prone to flash floods, implying that the milestones could have either been 
washed away or the Romans, knowing of the floods, did not feel it worthwhile to make the effort. 
The lack of milestones in non-urban eastern Anatolia and Scotland argue against this as well, 
however.
Therefore, it seems that these roads were unmarked for another reason.  Adams' suggestion 
of native cairns notwithstanding (and also not explaining the similar dearth elsewhere),116 I would 
argue that, as will be discussed more in Chapter Five, the limes zones, especially the limes Africae, 
seem to have been designed for traffic control.  The increase in forts in the Eastern Desert region 
around AD 300, especially the new port at Myos Hormos and associated road, does suggest that the 
Romans were reacting to a need for increased control of Red Sea trade.  Whether this is a response 
to changes in external agents (e.g., a probable Parthian state developing in southern India, whence 
the Red Sea trade in many Asian goods came)117 or a response to internal banditry is unclear (and 
these are not mutually exclusive, as will be discussed in Chapter Five).  A lack of clearly marked 
roads, however, would mean that the merchants would be by and large reliant upon Roman (or 
Roman-controlled) guides or patrols to direct them upon the roads to get their caravans safely to the 
Nile region.  This scenario would also have the added bonus of making it more difficult for any 
invading group to find their way, but I would argue that was a secondary consideration.  
With regard to movement upon the roads, something which seems to have not been confined 
to the winter months, one must wonder both how the guides found their way as well as how the 
115 Gates, J. E., 'Hidden Passage: Graeco-Roman Roads in Egypt's Eastern Desert',  in Robertson, E., et al, Space and 
Spatial Analysis in Archaeology, Calgary, University of Calgary Press, pp. 315-322.  Contra this: Isaac, B. The Limits of  
Empire, Oxford, Clarendon, 1993 p305.
116 Adams, C. Land Transport in Roman Egypt. Oxford, OUP, 2007, p22.
117 Abbas, S. 'India's Parthian Colony: On the Origin of the Pallava Empire of Dravidia,' The Circle of Ancient Iranian 
Studies. [online] Available from: http://www.cais-soas.com/CAIS/History/ashkanian/parthian_colony.htm (Accessed 
10/10/11).
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humans and baggage animals coped.  Most of the desert tracks were beaten earth or gravel, with 
large stones cleared away; this would prevent accidental steps into sandy areas.  The guides could, 
as Adams suggests, have used cairns to mark their way (at least in Egypt), though given the 
potential for inclement weather the cairns could be flooded out or buried by sand.  Additionally, 
there is the heat; however, celestial navigation was an option which was used by civilian caravans, 
according to Strabo,118 and night travellers would also have had the advantage of cooler conditions. 
The Romans would occasionally march at night due to the aridity and extreme heat, amongst other 
reasons.119  As it seems a reasonable precaution to make under extreme conditions, and it was a 
known practice from the Hellenistic precursors, though not, it appears, an indigenous practice, I 
would speculate that travel at night during the height of desert heat took place all throughout the 
Republican and Imperial Periods, even though the sources are curiously silent on the subject.
Perhaps the most obvious adaptation to the desert made by the Roman army was its 
incorporation of camels, for which we have extensive literary, epigraphic, and artistic evidence. 
Called dromedarii in Latin120 and κάμηλιτοι in Greek, they were clearly an official military 
speciality emplaced in cohortes equitatae and alae.121  Their strategic and tactical uses are poorly 
understood, though we are somewhat better served as far as logistics are concerned.  They are used 
in both campaign conditions and as part of the logistical system of the established provinces. 
Strabo records the use of camels by Gallus in his campaigns against the Nabateans,122 and that the 
Berenike-Koptos route was built by the army of Ptolemy Philadelphos for long-distance camel 
118 17.1.45.
119 e.g., Pompey in northern Mesopotamia/Armenia and Scipio in the semi-desert plateau of Spain both marched at 
night due to the environment.  Dio 37.3.5, Appian, Spanish Wars, 14.89. Strabo 15.2.6, when discussing the 
Gedrosian desert, says that most travel must take place at night due to the heat and aridity. Amm. Marc. 24.6.4 says 
that Julian sent Victor to begin a river crossing at night.  
120 Except at Bu Njem, where they are called camellarii, an obvious transliteration from the Greek. OBN 3-5, 7-10, 42.  
Marichal, R., Les Ostraca De Bu Njem, Grande Jamahira Arabe, Libyenne, Populaire et Socialiste Departement Des 
Antiquities Assraya Al Hamra, Tripoli, 1992, pp. 119-129, 156-157.
121 e.g., the cohors XX Palmyrenorum dromedarum known from papyri at Dura-Europos, the cohors I Augusta 
Praetoria Lusitanorum known at Apollonopolis Magna by papyri, the ala I Ulpia Dromedariorum Milliaria known 
by inscriptions at Palmyra, et cetera.  
122 16.4.24.
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caravans, though it is unclear if he had military or civilian transport in mind.  Camel caravans on the 
Dura-Palmyra route had been under the protection of the Palmyrenes long before Roman 
encroachment into the region, the Persians used camels to carry reserve arrows, amongst other 
things,123 and both Arab and North African nomads had used camels as beasts of burden for 
centuries.  In short, there was a long history of logistical camel use by Near Eastern and North 
African societies as well as invaders.
Camels have significant logistical advantages over other beasts of burden.124  Though mules 
and donkeys have comparable distance per day rates, and horses can be force-marched trough the 
deserts as well, camels can not only handle the stress of heat, aridity and lack of supplies, but will 
also recover completely if the lack is no longer than four days; this is because their physiology of 
water retention is far more efficient as discussed above.  Camels can also graze on any sort of desert 
scrub and obtain both water and calories, thus fewer supplies must be carried, their long eyelashes 
protect against blowing sand and dust, plus their dung can be used for fuel and females continue to 
produce milk when on the march.125
When on campaign armies also would supplement by foraging; these small parties were a 
frequent target of attack, as were supply lines was also well-known in antiquity.  The former will be 
discussed in chapter five, but assaults on supply lines appear several times in literature.126 The 
123 Hdt. 1.80, Cyropaedia 7.1.49. 
124 The average safe distance for a camel to travel in a desert  is 20 km/day in summer and 25 km/day in winter. Shaw, 
B.D. (quoting Gautier-Pilters), 'The Camel in Roman North Africa and the Sahara: History, Biology and Economy,' 
BIFAN 41, Ser. B. 4 (1979), reprinted in: ibid., Environment and Society in Roman North Africa, Ashgate, Aldershot, 
1995, p. 704. A horse could make this distance, but would require at least 38 litres (10 gallons) of water per day, 
whereas a camel could go without any, if absolutely necessary.  A horse also would not be able to keep up the pace, 
especially if shorted food or water. Engels, D., Alexander the Great and the Logistics of the Macedonian Army, 
University of California Press, London, 1978, pp. 126-130.  To give an example of ancient thought, both  Pliny and 
Aristotle thought that the normal span for a camel was 4 days without water. Shaw, ibid, p. 704, whilst Diodorus 
19.37.6 states that camels could travel continuously for almost 1500 stades, or about 283 km; 14 or 15 days, keeping 
to Gautier-Pilters' averages. 
125 Gauthier-Pilters, H and Dagg, A.I., The Camel: Its Evolution, Ecology, Behavior, and Relationship to Man. Chicago 
and London: Univ. of Chicago Press, 1981, pp59-77.
126 Plu, Lucullus 11.1, Sallust,  BJ, 81, Ps.Caesar African Wars 75, Polybius 5.51.9-11, Diodorus 21.16 and 20.108.6, 
App, Punic Wars 36-37, Mithridatic Wars, 12.80-81, 85, 15.99, inter alia. See also Chapter Five.
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baggage train of an army was likewise a target;127 though Roth believes that the train was sent in 
small groups from supply base to supply base primarily in order to reduce its size, I believe this also 
would have had the additional effect of minimising any losses.  In the case of desert warfare, where 
sudden climatic and terrain changes, not to mention hostile forces of various sizes and 
organisations, could spell disaster for the only supplies in the area, this compartmentalisation would 
seem to make sense from a logistical point of view, though there is no direct evidence in the sources 
for this.
Roth also expands on the differentiation between logistical base types as used throughout the 
Republic and into the Principate.  He lists operational bases, which were storehouses for provisions 
in secure areas, tactical supply bases near the enemy and forward supply depots.  His system, 
though developed with the entirety of the region of Roman operations in mind is borne up with 
regard to desert operations.  Though this will be addressed in far greater detail in Chapters Four and 
Five, as the control of all such bases is a major determinant in both regular warfare and 
asymmetrical strategy, we can for the moment simply say that we see several instances of all of 
these categories in the desert.  Both the Romans and North Africans used Capsa and Cirta as 
operational bases, with Cirta of course being used as part of the coastal supply route; Utica and 
Uzzita were both used by Cato and Scipio respectively for the same reasons.128   Operational bases 
in the East would vary based upon where the enemy were, but Dura-Europos was clearly used as 
one based upon its position, with the chain of smaller forts extending into the desert from it and 
along the Euphrates acting as either tactical or supply bases depending on where the borders were at 
the time.  Joppa was an operational base for Judean rebels and then later the Romans; it seems that 
almost any major garrison or garrisoned city on the major overland routes could be used as an 
operational base if it was in a secure area.  Tactical bases would vary based upon the area of 
127 See Chapter Five.
128 Sallust BJ 21-26, 81. (Cirta); Ibid 87, 97 (Capsa); Ps.Caes. African Wars 41 (Uzzita); Ibid 36, 61 87 ff. (Utica).
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conflict, but because towns in the desert would invariably be based around a water source of some 
kind they too were limited.  From Alexander onward, the practice of stocking forward supply depots 
was used in desert environments, usually performed by allied or surrendered governments and often 
guaranteed by hostage exchange.129  Incoming troops could also find caches of supplies made by 
indigenous persons for their own use, such as in Ps. Caesar African Wars 67; Erdkamp points this 
out as a disadvantage to the system.130    Julian's Oration I, 26D says that Constantius laid supplies 
of food and equipment in Syria during the winter after he had heard about a potential usurper to the 
throne.  The hydreumata discussed above that were seen along the Egyptian and Trans-Saharan 
routes, as well as the road stations of Isidore of Charax and the Antonine Itinerary also acted at least 
as water supplies, if not depots for other items.  These bases and depots, however, as Roth points 
out are utilised all throughout the Roman territory, and are not confined to the desert nor do they 
differ in any discernible way.
What can be seen from this analysis is that there were very few adaptations made to strategic 
logistics in the desert.  In general, the Romans utilised the same general logistical operations as they 
used elsewhere.  The major changes, i.e., the incorporation of camels and the occasional change to 
night marches, merely act as adjuncts or slight variations to the usual themes; these methods may 
also simply have been the most sensible.
Part V. Conclusions:
One of the main challenges to our understanding on ancient logistics no matter the 
environment is the lack of coherent ancient data.  The information we have is scattered and often 
contradictory; recall Polybius' statement at various points that Romans carried rations for 4 days, 10 
days, 30 days, and finally 'a long time.'131  Factoring in attempts to extrapolate logistical systems out 
129 Arrian 2.4.2, 2.13.7; Curtius 3.1.23. Arrian 3.6.8 says that the viceroy of Syria was removed for failing in this supply 
collection.  
130 Erdkamp, P., Hunger and the Sword: Warfare and Food Supply in Roman Republican Wars (264-30 BC), 
Amsterdam: Gieben, 1998, p. 24.
131  8.26.3, fragment 88, fragment 75, 11.26.6.
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of accounts which seem uninterested in those details we are frequently left to fill in the gaps with 
modern knowledge.  Though certain aspects would not change appreciably, e.g., human physiology, 
there are so much data unavailable to us that much of our understanding must be considered 
speculative.
With all that in mind, let us briefly review what this section has shown.  First of all, the 
desert did not seem to affect general intelligence gathering techniques at all.  Spies and stratagems 
were tailored to each individual circumstance, and the same principles applied no matter the region. 
Geographic knowledge seems to have been poor at best, but this could be said of all regions distant 
from the Roman heartland.  The variable nature of the desert landscape seems to have caused 
celestial navigation to be preferred during night-travel and would very likely have caused large-
scale movement of personnel and/or materiel to be confined to roads.  The main transport routes 
also frequently featured hydreumata and led to most major cities; given the importance of water in 
the desert it is a reasonable expectation that any group would not willingly divert from such 
supplies without a compelling reason.  
Water again, as well as salt and food were critical for military success and yet we have very 
little data on how the Romans adapted when in the desert theatre.  Because mammalian physiology 
would not have changed appreciably from modern, we know that the soldiers and their animals 
must have required acclimatisation to the heat, aridity, and solar intensity.  They must have had 
higher caloric and hydration requirements, and they must have needed more salt in order to remain 
effective.  There is virtually no ancient data extant on the subject, however, so we are left to use our 
understanding of the reasons why the mammalian body reacts as it does to the desert and to the 
potential conditions encountered there, including disease, and extrapolate from the extant narrative. 
Because of all of this uncertainty, any calculations must be considered inexact.
With regard to tactical and strategic logistics on the march, there is again very little 
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difference from Roman practice in non-arid environments.  The order of march did not change 
except in response to threat; there were a few instances of an increase in attention to supply needs 
under unusual circumstances, such as Metellus' 83 km march described above, but these are the 
exceptions rather than the rule.  The only major difference in that the desert seems to confine the 
army to the road network(s) even more strictly than anywhere else due to the variability of the 
desert terrain and the need for supplies, water especially. 
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Chapter Four:
High Intensity Warfare: Pitched Battle and Siege
Part I. Introduction:
The most obvious aspect of warfare, regardless of environment, is the engagement between 
opposing armies.  When environment is taken into account, however, there are significant 
differences to be found, especially with regard to equipment and climate.  The same cannot be said 
of tactics, however; they seem to have been based more in reaction to any unique or unusual tactics 
used by their various enemies.  They did, when possible, choose to fight on suitable terrain, but that 
would be the case for the army no matter where it was operating.  
That being said, however, their combat operations were affected by the desert, as were their 
forces, something often only realised in the aftermath of battle.  Because of this, data such as 
casualty figures relating to particular, environment-specific illness or wounds will also be 
examined.  I will, however, focus upon the innovations (or lack thereof) made by the army in the 
desert.132  
Part II. Pitched Battle:
In order to understand how the Romans fought in the East and North Africa, one first must 
determine the composition and organisation of their forces.  Before the Notitia Dignitatum, 
generally assumed to be accurate for the fourth century, we are badly hampered in this due to spotty 
evidence.  That said, Maxfield has noted fluctuations in Egypt between the Augustan period (3 alae, 
9 infantry cohortes) to AD83 (3 alae and 7 cohortes) to AD 156/61 (4 alae, 12 cohortes) and AD 
179  (4 alae, 9 cohortes.)133  The next data we have is from the Notitia Dignitatum, which lists 41 of 
132 In order to focus strictly upon the topic, this work will only discuss tactics or adaptations specific to the desert or 
indigenous cultural groups, rather than a full discussion of pitched battle or siege.  Such discussions are quite 
common in the modern scholarship.  See, inter alia,  Webster G., The Roman Imperial Army of the first and second 
centuries A.D, London: Black, 1969, Watson, G.R., The Roman Soldier, London : Thames & Hudson, 1969, Peddie, 
J., The Roman War Machine, Stroud: Alan Sutton, 1994, Goldsworthy, A.,  The Roman Army at War: 100 BC-AD 
200, Oxford ; New York : Clarendon Press, 1996, Gilliver, C. M., The Roman Art of War, Tempus: Stroud, 1999, 
Southern, P., The Roman army : a Social and Institutional History,  Oxford; New York : Clarendon Press, 2007.
133 Maxfield, V, 'The Eastern Desert Forts and the Army in Egypt During the Principate,' in Bailey, D. (ed) 
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the 70 units in Egypt as being cavalry.134 With regard to the rest of Africa, again we turn to the 
Notitia Dignitatum, which gives us approximately 10500 cavalry and 11500 infantry,135 though unit 
size in the Late Empire is unclear.
Moving to Roman Arabia, Spiedel states that in the late second and early third century, the 
Arabia garrison totals about 10000.136  Kennedy further points out that new cavalry units were 
brought in during the late third century, roughly the same time as Arabia was split in twain.  The 
north part was still termed Arabia with the south renamed Palaestina Tertia.137  Each half had its 
own army, with the southerly Palaestina Tertia under the dux Palaestina; his army was comprised of 
60% cavalry to 40% infantry.  Roman Syria is difficult to determine before the Notitia Dignitatum, 
though Pollard points out attestation of a Palmyrene archer unit at Dura that pre-dated the Roman 
takeover (and was thus incorporated), as well as the cohors XX Palmyrenorum (a milliary 
dromedary unit) and legio II Parthica by AD208, legio I Parthica, legio III Parthica, cohors II  
Ulpia equitata, cohors II Ulpia Paphlagonum, cohors III Augusta Thracum and cohors  
Palaestinorum.  Dedicants from vexillations comprised of members of legiones IIII Scythica, III  
Cyrenaica and XVI Flavia Firma have been found at Dura,138 but the unit size of the vexillations is 
unclear.   In the Notitia Dignitatum, Syria Coele has already been amalgamated into Eufratensis 
Syria, under the dux Syriae.  As this is the region containing most of the desert area, I am focusing 
upon this entry; Augusta Euphritensis is Commagene which is not desert so it is being omitted.  The 
units listed are: equites scutarii Illyriciani, equites promoti Illyriciani, two equites sagittarii  
indigenae, equites promoti indigenae and two equites sagittarii.  Serving both regions under the 
dux Syriae were: ala prima nova Herculia, ala prima Iuthungorum, cohors prima Gotthorum, 
Archaeological Research in Egypt, Ann Arbor, University of Michigan Press, 1996, pp. 9-19. 
134 Alston, R., Soldier and Society in Roman Egypt, London: Routledge, 1995, p147.  Alston also suspects that cavalry 
may also have been mixed in with infantry units, though offers no support.
135 Mattingly D. Tripolitania. London, BT Batsford Press, 1995, p 187.
136 Kennedy, D. The Roman Army in Jordan, London, The Council for British Research in the Levant Press, 2000. p 47.
137 Kennedy, D. The Roman Army in Jordan, London, The Council for British Research in the Levant Press, 2000. p 51.
138 Pollard, N. Soldiers, Cities and Civilians in Roman Syria. Ann Arbor, University of Michigan, 2000, pp.120-129.
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cohors prima Ulpia Dacorum, cohors tertia Valeria, and cohors prima victorum.
For Mesopotamia we have mainly the Notitia Dignitatum again.  Under the dux 
Mesopotamiae were: equites scutarii Illyriciani, equites promoti Illyriciani, equites ducatores 
Illyriciani, equites felices Honoriani Illyriciani, equites promoti indigenae, equites promoti  
indigenae, equites sagittarii indigenae Arabanenses, equites scutarii indigenae Pafenses,
equites sagittarii indigenae Thibithenses, equites sagittarii indigenae, legionis primae Parthicae 
Nisibenae, legionis secundae Parthicae, ala secunda nova Aegyptiorum, ala octava Flavia  
Francorum, ala quintadecima Flavia Carduenorum, cohors quinquagenaria Arabum, and cohors  
quartadecima Valeria Zabdenorum.
What can we first conclude from all of these units?  What is most striking is the 
preponderance of mounted units which increases over time.  Tactically speaking, this means that, 
especially in the third and into the fourth century, it was felt that a highly mobile mounted force was 
needed.  The nomadic tribes of both North Africa and the East were predominantly what we would 
term 'light cavalry'.  Putting aside our uncertainty as to exactly how 'light' cavalry must be before it 
is termed so, what is important to note is that the Romans, so used to relying primarily upon their 
infantry forces (ala literally meaning a wing), was at a major disadvantage to a faster, more flexible 
enemy.  While this was not unknown elsewhere (e.g., Viriathus used light cavalry against the 
Romans to great effect in Lusitania, Gallienus put together a cavalry army in the Alps against the 
Allamani)139 it was a major feature of warfare in desert regions.  The increased need for mobility 
may also be a response to the unrest of the late third and fourth centuries, in which the Empire was 
repeatedly beset by mobile groups on all of its borders (e.g., the Huns, the Allamani and various 
groups in the desert regions to be discussed in turn in chapter five).
In addition to the increased use of cavalry, we also see the innovation of camelry use in the 
Roman army.  Evidence for the tactical use of camels by the Romans in uncertain.  There is ample 
139 Southern, P. and Dixon, K, The Late Roman Army. London, Routledge, 2000. p11.
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evidence for the existence of camelry units as part of cohortes equitate, alae, turmae, and/or numeri  
in papyri and the Dura sculptural friezes, but their exact use, apart from postal camels and 
bodyguards to the Arabian governor is unclear.140  The incomplete nature of excavation and survey 
in desert environments does not allow for a great deal of speculation on those grounds apart from 
noting that there is a high degree of probability that camelry were present at the end points of 
various Egyptian communications routes.141   
With regard to camelry in combat, we do have some information from literary sources. 
Appian's Syrian Wars 6.32 and Livy 37.40 both describe an Arabian contingent of camelry fighting 
with Antiochus against the Romans.  We are told that they were  archers who fought while mounted, 
and that they also had a long sword (gladius or μάχαιρα) for close quarters fighting.  Livy also 
says that they were positioned in front of the cavalry. Adding to this Appian's listing this Arabian 
contingent with the light-armed forces, it strongly suggests that, at least in this battle, the camelry 
was being used as skirmishers.  Because of the purported four cubit length of the sword from Livy, 
Dabrowa suggests that these were spears rather than swords.  Whilst there is evidence for spear-
bearing dromedarii, these are from artistic representation at Dura, so Palmyrene (or Palmyrene-
influenced) forces.  Those forces do show both sword and thrusting spear, and, as discussed below, 
are armed and armoured in a  way which suggests an entirely different use than skirmish.  These 
Arabian dromedarii are clearly intended to be light and fast and fighting preferably at distance, as 
140 Libanius 109.3, OC 142 for post camels.   CIL III.93 reads:
M CAECILIO
FVSCIANO CRE
PeREIANO FiO
RiANO LEG AVG
PR Pr.ET M CAE
CILIO RVFINO
FILIO EIVS
      Eq  SING
EXERC ARAB
ITEM DROM
141 Sidebotham, S., et al., 'Survey of the Abu Sha'ar-Nile Road,' AJA, Vol. 95, No. 4 (Oct. 1991), pp. 571-622. cf. 
Sidebotham, S. et al., The Red Land: The Illustrated Archaeology of Egypt's Eastern Desert. Cairo, the American 
University in Cairo Press, 2008.
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would be expected for archers, though if they got into a close quarters battle they would have a 
weapon to use, but it is a backup weapon in this context.   To call it a thrusting spear seems 
unnecessary.  I would instead suggest that Livy's figures were merely exaggerated, either 
intentionally or accidentally.  Both gladius and μάχαιρα simply suggest a long straight knife 
which is shorter than a ξίφος but not curved like a falcata.  This weapon would certainly be less 
likely to get in the way of a camelry archer, a long knife is a common tool of even the modern 
Bedouin,142 and μάχαιρα is used of A long knife being utilised as a utensil as well as one used as a 
weapon.  There is thus no reason to assume that a thrusting spear is meant.
Neither Livy nor Appian tell us about the armour used by this force.  We thus have two 
options.  Herodotus tells us that Arabian camelry fighting with the Persian army against the Greeks 
were armoured (and possibly armed) as their infantry archers; this means that they wore a long 
zeira, or a thick robe with a girdle.143  This is in direct opposition to what can be seen at Dura-
Europos, however, which has sculptural representation of a headless Palmyrene camelryman 
wearing a cuirass, what appear to be trousers, and either a knee-length boot or an ankle boot and 
greave.  The rider has a quiver and what appears to be a small round shield; the top of the frieze is, 
however, lost.  
Material remains from the Roman period at Dura agree with the artistic representation. 
Though it seems that camelry and cavalry equipment are indistinguishable-- indeed, James notes the 
similarity of equipment between Dura and sites at the west end of the Empire, suggesting a 
standardisation of equipment by the second century AD144-- the types of equipment seen on the 
friezes have been found.  Many examples of the ankle boot or calceus have been found at Dura, as 
142 I saw these knives when travelling in Jordan in 2005, and own a small one.
143 Hdt. 7.69, 86.
144 James, S., Excavations at Dura Europos. Final report VII, Arms and Armour and Other Military Equipment, British 
Museum, London, 2004, pp 251-254.  If this is true, then perhaps we can see camelry armed and armoured 
elsewhere in the Empire in the same way as at Dura.
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has a fragmentary copper greave.145  Stephenson and Dixon reconstruct their dromedarius with 
ankle-high boots and only trousers over  the rest of the leg;146 I must disagree with this, however. 
The Dura frieze clearly shows that trousers were tucked into either a knee-high boot or that the 
figure is wearing greaves and an ankle-high boot.  Given that greaves and ankle-high boots are 
found at Dura, and upon a camelryman's greater need for calf protection, as their mounts are taller 
than horses, thus the vulnerable area on a camel-rider's leg is lower than on a cavalryman, I believe 
the latter reconstruction to be more accurate.
Stephenson and Dixon have given the dromedarius a conical helmet, though the Ebenezer 
mural from Dura shows some cavalrymen wearing what appears to be a cloth head covering, 
perhaps an arming cap.  James believes that the conical helmet found at Dura in the collapsed 
undermining tunnel is Persian, not Roman/Dura-European.   It should be noted that James does 
mention a decided lack of helmet finds, and, as discussed above, I find his explanation for their lack 
to be unconvincing.  Because of these factors, I tend to support the mural representation, with 
perhaps one of the typical Roman helmets found on the site or a Palmyrene helm, as the 
incorporation of the name 'Palmyra' may refer to a style of armour and/or dress.
Why then, is there a difference in armour between the two represented groups? The answer 
is likely function.  If we are correct in seeing the Arabian camelry contingents with both the 
Persians and Antiochus as functioning as light-armed skirmishers, then putting them in the heavier 
armour seen at Dura would be counter-productive.  Dura dromedarii seemed to also have been 
armed with a thrusting spear and shield, in addition to a sword and bow.  That suggests an 
expectation of both distance and close quarters fighting, and an expectation that these dromedarii  
would have to withstand a more sustained assault in one area, rather than rushing forward in a 
wave, firing a barrage of arrows and turning back.  They seem to be armed and armoured for 
145 James, S., Excavations at Dura Europos. Final Report VII, Arms and Armour and Other Military Equipment, British 
Museum, London, 2004, pp 59, 113.
146 Stephenson, I and Dixon, K., Roman Cavalry Equipment, Tempus, Stroud, 2003, plate 10.
55
Just Deserts: Roman Military Operations in Arid Environments (108 BC-AD 400).
stronger defence and offence than the Arabian camelry.  While I doubt seriously that camelry would 
ever be used as 'shock cavalry' for the reasons discussed at length in chapter one,147 the increased 
armour does suggest to me that camelry are being put in a position where they would expect to be 
attacked.  This could be because someone is attempting to disrupt lines of communication (e.g., the 
post camels discussed above) or because the camelry are operating in an area where they could be 
set upon by brigands.  Whether this is because they are actively guarding something or simply 
patrolling an area is unclear.   
The only study completely devoted to any ancient camelry force-- in this case, the 
dromedarii-- that I have been able to find is the article by Dabrowa discussed above which is 
slightly over 2 pages long.148  This is a bare survey, and predates most of the work done by 
Sidebotham et al in Egypt as well as the publication of the Bu Njem ostraka, but there are some 
data to be mined.
To begin, Dabrowa notes quite aptly that there is very little extant data, but that we should 
potentially see dromedarii in many desert-based cohortes equitatae, even if we cannot prove it. 
This would seem a logical enough assumption.  On more tenuous ground is his assumption that 
calling an ala the ala Ulpia dromedariorum Palmyrenorum means that the soldiers were necessarily 
all Palmyrene; if the cohors XX Palmyrenorum are anything to judge by, these men were all local 
Semites rather than Palmyrenes.  It could simply mean that these dromedarii were armed and 
armoured in the Palmyrene manner, which he later describes, but this is a completely different kit 
from that of the Arabians fighting with the Persians and with Antiochus. 
When discussing organisation and use, Dabrowa first poses the question of size, asking why 
the units were so small, despite so much of the Eastern and North African limites being on or near 
147 e.g., the camel's vulnerable knees, lack of speed in comparison to horses, their strong herd instinct, and the reality 
that their scent is not necessarily off-putting enough to cavalry to make the horses break their training.
148 Dabrowa, E., 'Dromedarii in the Roman Army: A Note,' Roman Frontier Studies Maxfield and Dobson (eds). 
University of Exeter Press, Exeter, 1989 pp 364-366.
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the desert.  He admits a lack of evidence in North Africa, and then relies upon a single quote from 
Vegetius which says that camels are ineffective on the battlefield to explain away the small number 
of dromedarii.  Even ignoring the generally problematic nature of Vegetius, I find this argument 
unconvincing.  Whilst I certainly do not contend that camelry was an effective replacement for 
traditional cavalry, or even a necessary or ideal contingent, small size does not necessarily denote 
ineffectiveness-- a short span of use might, but not small size.  If anything, it argues for a highly 
specialised purpose, possibly being some type of 'elite squadron.'  In Herodotus, Appian, and Livy, 
Arabian camelries were used as skirmishers; these would be a small group amongst other small 
national groups of light-armed peltasts, slingers, archers and others.   I feel Dabrowa puts too much 
faith in Vegetius and in size, or at least does not offer enough evidence to support his claim. 
When one examines the size of the camelry in regard to the rest of the mounted forces, the 
results are as follows.  Mommsen's roster for the cohors I Augusta Praetoria Lusitanorum has 114 
cavalry troops to 19 camelry, or about 17% of the mounted force, and 15-20 seems to have been a 
normal number of camelry in Egypt and North Africa.   Heavier staffing (approximately 33-36 on 
the rosters) seems to have been the norm in the East, however, at least according to the 
papyrological evidence. At Dura-Europos, PDur 82 lists 34 dromedarii  to 223 equites for both 27 
and 28  March, ca. 223 AD, whilst PDur 89 lists 36 dromedarii to 233 equites for 27 and 28 May of 
239 AD.149   Thus, according to the papyri, dromedarii made up just over 15% of the mounted force 
at Dura.  Therefore, despite there being a greater number of dromedarii stationed at Eastern bases, 
the percentages are very similar.   Thus, we can therefore speculate as to the percentage of camelry 
in the different areas.  The suppositions are as follows: that any ala or cohors equitata will be 
assumed to contain 15% camelry troops and that this percentage is stable throughout the desert 
regions and stayed constant though time. Therefore, in Africa, taking Mattingly's figures above, 
149 Welles et al do have question marks near both of these figures, though they seem reasonably consistent with earlier 
troop strengths at Dura.  Welles C.B., et al, The Excavations at Dura-Europos: The Parchments and Papyri, Yale 
University Press, New Haven, 1959, p. 285.
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camelry should make up about 7.5% of the overall force in the fifth century.  For Egypt, between 
the Augustan period and AD179 camelry should have made up about 5% of the forces, increasing to 
8.7% in the Notitia Dignitatum.  For Arabia in the Notitia Dignitatum the camelry force should 
make up about 9%.  For Pollard's figures in third century Syria the camelry percentage was 4.2%; 
from the Notitia Dignitatum it equals 10.4%.  Finally, for Mesopotamia in the Notitia Dignitatum 
the percentage of camelry works out to 5.3%.  This means that the camelry force was always small 
and likely had a specialised use, perhaps aiding or replacing light cavalry as scouts or in policing, 
along with their already-discussed logistical and communications uses.
This of course is all based upon paper strength.  Examination of the material evidence, 
however, gives us a far different picture.  Though exact numbers for horses are not listed, at 
Da'janiya camel remains are the second-highest number of bones after sheep/goat.  El-Lejjun, which 
had a minimum of 72 individual camels, had only a minimum number of 7 horses in the same 
strata.  Qasr Bshr had a minimum of 2 horses to 6 camels, and Rujm Beni Yasser had 1 horse and 1 
camel.  At these eastern bases, on the basis of material remains alone, it seems as though there were 
more camels than horses.150
At the well-published site of Berenike, the excavators were more interested in looking at 
both camels and horses in the context of food sources than in a military context.  That being said, 
from the Ptolemaic to Late Roman periods, camel bones vastly outnumber horses.151  This could 
simply mean that horses were so valued that they were rarely eaten, or it could imply that there 
were more camels present.
The material and papyrological evidence would seem to be in direct conflict. Part of this 
conflict can be ameliorated by the reasonably safe assumption that the camel remains represent a 
150 It is, of course, possible that horse remains simply have not been found.
151 From 1995-1997,  Sidebotham et al found 1 camel bone and no horse bones in the transitional phase between 
Ptolemaic and Early Roman periods; 180 camel bones to 14 horse bones in the Early Roman period, and 24 camels 
bones to 2 horse bones in the Late Roman period. Sidebotham, S. and Wendrich, W., Berenike '95, CNWS, Leiden, 
1996, p. 339-347; Sidebotham, S. and Wendrich, W., Berenike '96, CNWS, Leiden, 1998, p. 364; Sidebotham, S. and 
Wendrich, W., Berenike '97, CNWS, Leiden, 1999, p. 346.
58
Just Deserts: Roman Military Operations in Arid Environments (108 BC-AD 400).
long period of camelry use, and that the 72 camels at el-Lejjun represent two complete 'generations' 
of a camelry contingent (approximately 36 camels in the East, based upon the Dura example).  As 
for why camel remains seem to vastly outnumber horse remains, we can only speculate without 
evidence.
Returning to Dabrowa, he goes on to list duties which he believes the dromedarii performed. 
They include caravan escort (obviously based upon the Palmyrene precedent) patrolling, scouting, 
communications, bodyguard duties for high-ranking officials, and other police functions.  Whilst I 
do agree with this list in theory, he has only given evidence for bodyguards.  Other documents, 
primary and secondary, do suggest these other functions, with the noted exception of caravan escort. 
Dabrowa simply assumes that at least the cohors XX Palmyrenorum dromedarium continued the 
Palmyrene practice of the military escorts for caravans.  The incorporation of the Palmyrene 
ethnicity into the unit name (even though the troops do not appear to be Palmyrene) can be 
interpreted as not only reflecting the origin but function of the unit, and the numerus appellation 
seen in the Dura papyri can further be seen as expressing that this irregular unit had a speciality 
outside the norm (e.g., frumentarii were also called numeri).  It could also be the case, however, that 
the unit name refers to their style of arms and armaments.  
Apart from historical precedent, there is no direct evidence that states that any dromedarii 
were escorting caravans.  They do escort people, as stated above, and given that at least two routes 
in Egypt (Abu Sha'ar-Qena, including Mons Claudianus, and Berenike-Qus) have camelry bases at 
their termini and even along the road (Abu Sha'ar-Qena), there may have been a military escort for 
State caravans, but civilian caravans are not explicitly mentioned anywhere as being guarded by the 
military. P.Vindob G 40822, for example, is a contract between two civilian merchants transporting 
goods from India.  It states: '...διά του ὅρους μετά παραφυλακης καί ἀσφαλείας [εἰς τά]ς 
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ἐπί Κοπτοῦ...'  but there is no indication that this security is being provided by the Roman 
military.152  The possibility of camelry providing security as part of a police force will be discussed 
in chapter five.153 
As to the organisation of the camelry forces themselves, there is not a great deal of clear 
evidence for how the dromedarii/camellarii fit into the greater Roman army.  We have several 
instances, where an ala is given a dromedarium (or variant thereof) suffix.  We do not have any 
evidence as to their exact numbers or use, however, simply where they were stationed.  No cohortes 
are given that suffix,154 but in both Dura papyri (PDur 82) and Bu Njem ostraka (OBN3-OBN8,  
OBN10), dromedarii are listed as part of numeri.  This, unfortunately, is not particularly helpful as 
the term numerus is itself unclear.  Whilst it can simply mean a (usually) non-Roman unit which is 
'irregular,' e.g., not a legio, cohors, or ala but lower in rank than all three, it can also, especially in 
the plural, be used when referring to several types of units.155 As if this were not enough, these 
numeri can also be completely dissimilar from each other, even if they are contemporary.156 
Southern suggests that each should only be discussed upon its own merits, rather than trying to 
determine a 'blanket' definition of the term.157  Laudable an idea as this is, it does not help us 
understand the dromedarii numeri.  We must therefore accept that a full understanding is beyond the 
extant concrete evidence.
In addition to the increase in cavalry generally and the incorporation of camelry, we also see 
a preponderance of indigenous archer units in the East; this may be related to the strong native 
152 Casson, L., 'P.Vindob G 40822 and the Shipping of Goods From India,' Bulletin of the American Society of  
Papyrologists, Vol. 23, Issue: 3-4, 1986, pp. 73-79.
153 Adams, C. Land Transport in Roman Egypt. Oxford, OUP, 2007, p214 points out that civilians were involved in 
both military and civilian supply transport.
154 Though, if Dabrowa, Shahid and Isaac are correct and dromedarii are part of some cohors equitates and are just not 
mentioned, then there may be some other unknown reason why certain groups get the dromedarium suffix and some 
do not.
155 e.g., Tac. Agricola, 18.2, Hist 1.6.2, both referring to more than one type of unit in an area.
156 The function of numeri also change over time; by the second century they do much the same work as the auxilia. 
LeBohec, Y., The Imperial Roman Army, BT Batsford, London, 1994, p. 28.
157 Southern, P. 'The Numeri of the Roman Imperial Army,'Britannia, Vol. 20, (1989), pp. 81-140.
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archery tradition as well as supporting the increased need for mobility suggested by the 
preponderance of cavalry.  With regard to Roman innovation, Livy 30.11 says that Massinissa learnt 
about the organisation of an army into cohortes from the Romans, whilst Sallust 2 explains that 
Jugurtha learnt his lessons in warfare from Scipio in the Numantine war.  Herodian 3.4 says that the 
Mesopotamians learnt the creation of Roman-style arms and armaments from those Roman veterans 
who settled in the region.  But perhaps most interesting is what the Romans learnt, according to 
Procopius I.1.11 and 15.  He states:
'Apart from this, they were indifferent to the skill [of archery] such that they 
were drawing the bowstring to their own chest; accordingly, the missiles sent 
away were naturally dainty to those receiving them within.158  Thus was, it seems 
(or it is seen) the archery of the past...they [now] draw the bowstring toward the
forehead/face, nearly even to the right ear, therefore the missile, having been 
impelled with strength, so as to kill any who stand in the way; neither shield nor 
cuirass able to hold off its force.'
What is most notable about this statement is that the 'modern' archers' draw is completely 
different from the typical Mediterranean, which was to the chest.  Drawing to the ear is a typically 
Near Eastern style of archery, as seen in Assyrian friezes from Khorsabad as well as images of 
Parthian horse archers.159   The eastern method is not only more powerful, but also requires a 
different type of bow, which is shorter and thus easier to use whilst mounted.  It may also be the 
case that the dryness of the environment caused the wooden Mediterranean bows to crack.160  
These are the main differences in tactical use and organisation in the desert.  With regard to 
tactical operations, as Mattingly points out, warfare in North Africa is mostly desert campaigning, 
sieges and guerrilla warfare rather than pitched battles.161  This seems to be the case throughout our 
158 i.e., the arrows were weak and did not penetrate.
159 Khorsabad frieze image available at http://www.superstock.com/stock-photos-images/2102-449; original located in 
the Iraq National Museum.  Parthian horse archer from Palazzo Madama in Turin: 
http://sites.google.com/site/persanpersia/_/rsrc/1267594545447/Parthianhorseman.PalazzoMadamaTurinI-custom-
size-255-279.jpg. Both accessed 28/9/10.  See also Rostovzeff, M., 'The Parthian Shot,' AJA, Vol. 47, No. 2 (Apr. - 
Jun., 1943), pp. 174-187.
160 Constant use under arid conditions is attributed to breakage of bowstrings by Dio 40.24.1.  See also Miller, R. et al., 
'Experimental Approaches to Ancient Near Eastern Archery,' World Archaeology, Vol. 18, No. 2, Weaponry and 
Warfare (Oct., 1986), pp. 178-195.
161 Mattingly D. Tripolitania. London, BT Batsford Press, 1995, pp-69-70.
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period for most of the East as well, but there are a few points to discuss.  To begin, I shall briefly 
summarise the 'typical' Roman battle order for the Empire.  There were, as Gilliver points out, two 
possibilities: either legionary infantry was flanked by auxiliary infantry with auxiliary cavalry on 
the wings or the auxiliary infantry acted as the principle strike force with the legions held in 
reserve.162  The Romans do not seem to have developed any standard tactics for coping with heat, 
dust, sand or aridity whilst in battle; though they would adapt somewhat to terrain, that is something 
they would do no matter what the environment.  They seemed more to adapt to the differing styles 
of their enemies, with occasional incorporation or innovation.   
That being said, there are a few obvious areas of investigation. The organisational 
innovations and changes to the overall region are discussed above, but there are a few noteworthy 
items that would affect pitched battles.
Terrain in any environment would be something to which the army would be required to 
adapt.  In the desert, however, because of the difficulties posed by deep sand, rocks, and the 
variability of landmarks and water sources, areas for engagement would be quite limited and would 
have to be chosen quite carefully.163  Perhaps more important than this, however, is the lack of 
advance information which seems to characterise many battles, especially the direct aftermaths. 
While this will be discussed more thoroughly in chapters three and five on pre-campaign planning 
and small force tactics respectively, driving a fleeing enemy into containment and/or into an area 
without sufficient water or food sources was common. This is not exclusive to Rome; for example 
in the Mercenary War, the Carthaginians drove a mercenary force into a box canyon where they 
starved.  Examining satellite photos and maps of the area reveal that, at least in modern times, the 
walls of the canyon are quite steep; if this was the case in ancient times then the mercenaries would 
have been unlikely to have been able to scale the sides.  Because the only major permanent water 
162 Gillver, C. The Art of War. Tempus, Stroud, 1999, p106.
163 e.g., Sallust, BJ, 50, 57.3
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source  in the area, a river, would have been behind the Carthaginians, even if they had been able to 
climb out then they would not have necessarily been any better off than if they had remained.
Additionally, the Romans would alter their tactics to exploit specific weaknesses in their 
desert-borne enemies' styles of warfare.  The Numidians tended to assault and retreat in waves, 
which the Romans countered by not allowing them any respite in which to do so. 164 The 'Parthian 
shot,' however, in which the Parthians would feign flight then assault with mounted archers firing 
behind them, gave the Romans no end of grief.  As most of these adaptations fall under the aegis of 
small force tactics, they will be discussed in Chapter five.
As can be seen from the above, the Romans did make certain alterations to their tactics 
based upon the desert environment and the particular enemies they faced, with the most obvious 
being the development and incorporation of camelry units into the army.  That being said, apart 
from making certain that their terrain was suitable, in general they seemed to react to the tactics of 
those they faced, rather than developing anything new.165  
Part III. Siege:
The typical Roman siege, insofar as any operation can be termed 'typical,' begins with the 
city being surrounded with garrisons or siege camps to control the immediate territory, something 
often called setting up 'siege lines'.  An circumvallation wall (sometimes two in parallel (e.g. Alesia, 
Cremna) would prevent the besieged from exiting the city; if there were two in parallel then the 
inner wall prevented egress and the outer prevented external access to the city.  An embankment 
wall would then be placed wherever the terrain allowed for siege towers, allowing the Romans to 
'hold the high ground', as it were, and this held siege artillery and battering rams.166 
Because of the lack of available resources in the desert, cities tended to be built on or very 
164 Appian, Spanish Wars 27, Sallust BJ 74.9.
165 Part of this may have been a lack of training; for example, the Gauls at Amida were unsuited for anything apart from 
open-field battle.  Amm Marc. 19.5.2.
166 Campbell, D. Siege Warfare in the Roman World 146 BC-AD378, Oxford, Osprey, 2005, pp 50-56.
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near water sources and major communications arteries.  Therefore, major cities were frequently 
besieged multiple times, either going back and forth between Rome and another polity (e.g., Cirta 
and Amida) or being forced to fend off repeated assaults from one side or the other (e.g., Ktesiphon, 
Hatra).  Thus the long history of siege warfare in Mesopotamia, as well as the desert conditions, led 
to the development of the double or multiple city wall, sally ports, and the other familiar features of 
such fortifications.  
Looking more specifically at particular sites, the city of Hatra is unusual for several reasons. 
Not only was it a semi-autonomous kingdom, but it was also the site of three separate failed Roman 
sieges, one by  Trajan and two by Severus.  There were several unusual factors in these sieges.  First 
of all, the city is situated in high desert, away from rivers, but it controls one of the major trade 
routes.  This means that any besieging force will have to bring in supplies, and will not be able to 
supplement locally.  The flat desert plain would also allow for wind-borne dust and sand to 
exacerbate thirst and irritate the mucous membranes, all of which are reported by the sources.167 
Dio also reports that Trajan's forces suffered from severe thunderstorms; this was a common 
problem in the desert.168
Later, in Dio 76, we are told more about Severus' two attempted sieges of Hatra.  The first is 
given only a sentence; he lost many men, his siege engines were burnt, and he 'accomplished 
nothing' (ἐπέρανε δ᾽ οὐδέν).169  His second attempt, however, is discussed in more detail.  Owing 
to the dearth of local resources, Severus put together a large supply of food and built new siege 
engines.  Unfortunately, he did not count on two things; first, assaults on his foragers, which will be 
discussed more in the chapter on asymmetrical warfare, and the Middle Eastern incendiary par 
excellence, naphtha.  Also used against Lucullus in his failed siege of Tigranocerta,170 this petroleum 
167 See Hdn 3.9.6 for Hatra specifically; others will be discussed below.
168 cf. Amm. Marc. 24.1.11.
169 Dio 76.10.1.
170 Dio 36.1B.  Pliny, however, says it was maltha.  NH II.CVIII.235.  A mixture of bitumen, pitch and sulphur was 
used as an accelerant on firebrands at Jotapata. Josephus, BJ 3.20; see also below.
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derivative was used to burn both flesh and wooden siege engines.  
Pliny the Elder discusses both naphtha and a related substance, maltha, in his Naturalis  
Historia.  He says:
'In the Commogene city Samosata, is a marsh emitting flammable mud they 
call maltha.  When it touches a solid, it adheres; after having been touched it 
follows those fleeing.  Thus they defended the walls attacked by Lucullus; the 
soldiers were burnt by their own arms.  Water increases the burning; 
experiments have taught that earth/soil extinguishes the fire.
'Naphtha is similar in nature, as is called a substance which flows like liquid 
bitumen near Babylon and in Astacen Parthia.  It has a strong natural 
relationship (cognatio) to fire, and immediately leaps across to it from all 
directions, having been seen.  Thus by Medea the rival/concubine (paelex)  
was made burnt, after having ascended to the altar to make sacrifice, her crown 
was seized by fire.'
(NH II.CVIII.235).
From these accounts, we can assume the naphtha and its related substances were used much 
in the same way as modern napalm, though the Romans do not appear to have used it directly 
against their enemies.  Whether this is based upon a lack of access to it or an inability to develop or 
adapt a delivery system is unclear.  There is too little information on the substance in Roman texts 
to be certain. 
Naphtha and related substances were particularly efficient as they did not require any fuel to 
start it burning (i.e., those who used it as a weapon did not lose any of their fuel supplies in kindling 
a flaming arrow or other more traditional fire source), and also was very difficult for those struck by 
it to remove.  Though it is difficult to determine exactly how hot naphtha would become-- the exact 
composition is unknown, and even now varies in its modern derivative of napalm-- the strong 
adherence to skin especially would create serious to severe burns.  This is especially problematic in 
the ancient world, as burnt areas are prime breeding grounds for infection, something which was a 
problem for both besiegers and besieged even when incendiaries were not involved.  It seems that 
the Romans were unable to counter this weapon.
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Herodian's discussion of Severus' sieges is somewhat different.  For one, he makes no 
mention of the earlier siege; more important, however, is the cause to which he attributes the failure 
of the second attempt.  When discussing Trajan's siege, Dio reports that flies would descend any 
time Trajan's troops would eat or drink; anyone who has spent time in a desert is familiar with this 
phenomenon.  Herodian, however, attributes the defeat of the Romans to the use of insect life as a 
weapon.  
'Having made a vessel (σκευή) of ceramic, they were filled with small 
flying things (πτηνῶν), stinging and poisonous,171 thrown onto the Severan 
forces by the Hatrenes.  These having fallen into the eyes and if onto a certain 
part of the body which was exposed, escaping their notice, going within and 
they were severely wounded.'172 
Whittaker has stated that the term πτηνός  must be some form of metaphor for arrows fired 
by a ballista.  That is certainly possible, but I believe there is good reason to take Herodian at his 
word.  First of all, the term θηρίον is associated with bees in Theocritus, and both it and ἰοβόλος 
are associated with poisonous stinging or biting animals.  In addition, these clay pots may well have 
been beehives; ancient hives found in Israel would seem to fit the description.173  Once hurled at the 
soldiers and broken, the bees would be released and swarm.  That they would aim for the eyes or 
any unprotected surface also suggests angry bees; they are attracted by exhaled carbon dioxide 
which is why the face is a common target.  Bees also range in size from 40 mm to 2 mm, so 
Herodian's assertion that the insects would not have been noticed right away is not impossible.174 
Alternately, these could have been biting sandflies, which would match Dio's description of the fly 
infestation; however, again, many sorts of flies are present in the desert.175  The one factor which 
171 I disagree with the Loeb's punctuation of the Greek, which has a comma between πτηνῶν and μικρῶν, as the two 
terms clearly go together.
172 Hdn. 3.9.5.
173 See Sanchez, M.J., 'Archaeologists Discover Beehives from Ancient Israel', Christian Science Monitor, [online] 
http://www.csmonitor.com/Science/2010/0609/Archaeologists-discover-beehives-from-ancient-Israel?
utm_source=feedburner&utm_medium=feed&utm_campaign=Feed%3A+feeds%2Fcsm+
%28Christian+Science+Monitor+%7C+All+Stories%29. 09/06/10.
174 Arizona-Sonoma Desert Museum, http://www.desertmuseum.org/books/nhsd_bees.php, [online] accessed 11/06/09.
175 cf. Amm. Marc. 24.8.3, which points out that anywhere hot and dry is infested with flies and gnats.
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could be seen to suggest sandflies is the point made by Herodian about illness in the camp, as 
sandflies are carriers of leishmaniasis,176 but there is no description given of the illness afflicting the 
soldiers which can be used to diagnose a particular disease and, as will be discussed below, illness 
during desert operations is common.  A final possibility is that this term refers to scorpions, as they 
would be easier to place into a vessel than a flying insect.
Fire and other incendiaries that the Romans would have had to hand would have been of 
limited use apart from as an anti-personnel weapon.  This is to do with the construction techniques 
of the region, as exemplified both by archaeology,177 and Ps Caesar's Alex 1.1, wherein it is stated 
that the buildings have no timber and thus will not burn.  As deserts are by definition timber-poor, 
most construction in the East and North Africa would be predominantly of stone and sometimes 
mudbrick construction.  Mudbrick, experimental archaeology has shown, will become vitreous at 
high temperatures,178 but even this amount of 'melting' would not cause major structural damage 
over a large enough area to be useful.179  Apollodorus, when discussing the destruction of brick 
walls, suggests drilling a hole through the superstructure and inserting the flame within; this may be 
a reference to a common Near Eastern building technique.  In order to give mudbrick structures 
flexibility in the case of earthquakes, timbers are inserted within the wall;180 burning them could 
theoretically cause a weakened wall to collapse, or could at least give access to the inner surface of 
the wall, thus affording sappers cover and less material to have to undermine.181
As for other incendiaries, at Bezabde, wicker baskets full of pitch were set alight and thrown 
down upon the Persians to devastating effect,182 in addition to the usual firebrands which would be 
used as at other places outside the desert; when the Romans attempted to retake Bezabde under 
176 Centre for Disease Control, 'Leishmaniasis Fact Sheet,' 
http://www.cdc.gov/ncidod/dpd/parasites/leishmania/factsht_leishmania.htm, [online] Accessed 3/8/09.
177 e.g., the fact that desert fortifications are drawn from local, inert materials such as mudbrick and stone.
178 Alalakh/Tell Atchana Excavation, http://www.alalakh.org/burnthehousewdown.asp [online] accessed 03/08/09.
179 The effects of naphtha upon mudbrick are unknown.
180 These timbers could also act as shock absorbers against direct battering by a siege engine.
181 Apollodorus 152.
182 Amm. Marc. 20.7.10.
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Constantius the Persians used iron urns for drawing lots that were filled with combustibles 
(sitellasque fereras onustas ignibus), clearly another example of improvisational use.183 At 
Ktesiphon, the Romans were attacked with various types of flammable objects, though specifics are 
not given.184  The other major incendiary, however, was boiling or burning oil.  Josephus implies 
that he invented this use, but there is no evidence for this; his work is the earliest Classical reference 
to it, however.  Oil was used at Jotapata and was poured or splashed directly from vessels onto 
Roman soldiers; it was likewise referenced by Apollodorus of Damascus in his treatise on siege 
weapons.185  The term used in all of these is 'ἐλάα' which, though commonly translated as 'olive 
oil,'186 should most likely be understood here as meaning any sort of oil.  
For all incendiaries, Apollodorus suggests building what is essentially a series of channels 
that would catch the liquids and carry them away from the equipment and personnel.187  Simply 
having a source of water available to fight fires would, of course, be problematic in a desert, even 
without the resistance to quenching of naphtha and related substances.  This is not only because of 
the scarcity of water in such areas but also because of the high rate of evaporation of free water. 
This would be ameliorated if the water were stored in closed tanks, of course, and, unlike for people 
or animals, saltwater would do as well as fresh, but other options that did not reduce available water 
supplies for the troops and animals would logically be desired.
What is interesting about these reports is that the Romans did not seem to use incendiaries of 
any kind when besieging, apart from after a wall had been penetrated, as discussed above, or in 
undermining which will be discussed below.  This supports the statement about Alexandria being 
essentially inflammable, but raises the question of why the Romans did not attempt to use either 
naphtha or oil as an anti-personnel weapon.  They were aware of at least maltha and naphtha, 
183 Amm. Marc. 20.11.16.
184 Amm. Marc. 24.6.2.
185 Jos BJ 3.28-29, Apollodorus 183-185.
186 As in the case of the Loeb translations of Josephus and Procopius.
187 Apollodorus 174, 183-185.
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according to Pliny, but did not seem to use their artillery to send ceramic vessels filled with these 
substances against those upon the walls. The only explanation that seems possible is a lack of 
access to the substances, even when in the particular regions whence it came.
Even the traditional λιθοβόλοι would have their problems in the desert.  At Jotapata, 
Josephus records that the Judeans used hanging sacks to push away the siege equipment.188  This has 
antecedents in Assyrian warfare, which was heavily focused upon siege, as can be seen in the 
friezes of the siege of Lachish, amongst many other examples.  More than this, however, is the 
problem of using local desert stones.  At Jerusalem, they were white-- mature sandstones often are 
white or otherwise light-coloured-- and this allowed them to be easily seen in flight by the Judeans 
on the walls.  In order to prevent this, the Romans ultimately blackened them to render them more 
effective.189
What is striking, however, is that the Romans do not seem to have changed their approaches 
overmuch from the 'typical' procedures discussed at the beginning of this section.  They did not 
develop incendiaries for offensive use, merely creating a series of devices for defending the siege 
machinery.  Though the concept of the Romans as being only able to copy and improve rather than 
innovate is an old, mostly-disproved bias, they do seem to have relied upon their traditional 
methods, perhaps deciding not to fix what was more or less unbroken.
Part IV. Effects of Climate:
Now that we have examined the adaptations (or lack thereof) of the army to the 
environment, let us now turn to the effects of the environment upon the soldiers themselves.  Once 
the army arrived into a new environment they suffered a great deal from endemic diseases, dietary 
changes, unfamiliar flora and fauna, heat and aridity.  This was especially the case during and in the 
immediate aftermath of engagement.  The various diseases associated with close quarters and/or 
188 Jos, BJ, 3.20.
189 Jos, BJ, 5.273.  White gypsum catapult stones have been found in Egypt.  Sidebotham, S. et al., The Red Land: The 
Illustrated Archaeology of Egypt's Eastern Desert. Cairo, the American University in Cairo Press, 2008, p 56.
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with the presence of decomposing bodies (e.g., typhus, cholera, and related conditions) were not 
only present in desert sieges but frequently exacerbated by them.  A generally lower carrying 
capacity of the region meant that the margin between surplus, shortage and famine was small under 
normal circumstances; with the added press of refugees and a strangulation of local intake, if not a 
full blockade, then a city  would quickly succumb to starvation.  In the desert, not only would water 
and its lack be felt sooner, but the heat would increase the metabolism of anyone in this situation.190 
They would need more food and water exactly when it was least available.  The high stress on the 
metabolism, plus the lack of replenishment, means that the immune system would begin to be 
affected.  Thus, those caught in these situations, both besiegers and besieged, would be more 
susceptible to any infection.  Dust, which will be discussed more below, would also cause a higher 
mucous production, which would thus increase the likelihood and severity of upper respiratory 
infections.
Though the arid conditions would dry out bodies, this would not prevent decomposition, and 
the high porosity of sand would allow for disease-bearing fluids to reach any near-surface 
groundwater.  Additionally, sheet and flash floods would have locally saturated the ground quite 
quickly, and any water that was not lost to evaporation could easily have become a breeding ground 
for mosquitoes and other insect life, as well as introducing any surface contaminants into the 
groundwater supply.  
Apart from this are several instances of 'non-specific' illness, where we are frequently told 
that a large number of troops died or were incapacitated due to illness and/or the air or other 
climatological factors.  This seems to reflect the Graeco-Roman inability to differentiate between 
hyperthermia caused by an immune response to illness (i.e., fever) and hyperthermia caused by 
physical exertion in a hot environment (i.e., heat exhaustion and/or heatstroke).
190 As would stress.  The heat would increase due to overpopulation as well, though for temperatures over 38C the body 
would become a heat sink and environmental influence would stress the body more.
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'Fever comes from these things-- whenever bile or phlegm are heated, all 
the rest of the body is heated from this, this is called fever.  Both bile and 
phlegm is heated from within by either food and drink, from which it is 
nourished and grow, or from without, by toil and wounds, or from heat 
making them overly hot, and cold making them overly cold; they are also 
made feverish by seeing and hearing, but the least by these.'191
This confusion is unsurprising as heat exhaustion and fever associated with influenza or a 
like ailment have similar symptoms.  Both feature headache and cognitive impairment that grows 
steadily worse as the hyperthermia worsens, both feature profuse sweating (diaphoresis), 
tachycardia, tachypnea, anorexia, dehydration, and can lead to coma and/or death, though the 
mechanism of action is an infection going systemic or to the central nervous system in the case of 
fever and severe hypertension leading to a cerebrovascular accident (CVA, or 'stroking out') in the 
case of heatstroke. 
Galen gives a prime example of this problem in differentiation.  In his discussion of fevers, 
he refers to two different treatment courses for fevers, one of which presupposes an illness, and the 
other of which suggests exertion in a hot environment.192  Galen warns that a misdiagnosis would 
lead to the patient becoming worse.  Also, as many of the treatments involve the provision of 
bathing, a particular diet, or both, the lack of resources that are a feature of the desert, especially 
when operating in hostile territory, would limit the already limited ability of the medical staff to 
treat hyperthermia of either type. 
The level of devastation of the Roman forces due to a combination of famine and illness, 
whether an infection or exposure, seems to have been immense.  Ammianus discusses the 
exhaustion of men due to heat in 24.6 and again in 25.1; the plague of Amida is made worse by the 
heat (19.4).  Herodian says that more men were lost at Severus' second siege of Hatra than in battle, 
though Dio attributes the losses to a combination of naphtha, poor decision-making by Severus, 
191 Hippocrates, Πέρι Nούσων 1.23.
192 Galen, De Methodo Medendi, 10 passim.  Ammianus also says that those in hot environments are afflicted with 
fevers. 19.4.
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poor-quality Syrian troops and recalcitrant European forces as discussed above.  Antony also lost 
more men from climate than in a battle, almost half of his complement as Plutarch tells us.193   But 
perhaps the most obvious case is in Procopius,  where one-third of the Roman army suffers from 
incapacitating heat exhaustion during the Mesopotamian summer.194  Though casualty estimates of 
ancient battles vary widely, one-third would certainly be considered a severe loss.  
The effects of differing plant and animal life in desert regions were just as much a hazard as 
the microflora discussed above.  Though one does think of deserts as being sparsely populated, they 
have a strongly varied ecology.  Sandflies and other insects as vectors of infection and/or weapons 
have been discussed elsewhere, as have venomous reptiles.  Mesopotamia was infested with lions, 
according to Ammianus 18.7.5, and Antony's troops also ran into poisonous herbs and unpotable 
water in the East, again based upon a lack of familiarity with the area.195
In several instances, the effect of enforced dietary changes, especially during a siege, were 
damaging to the Romans.  As discussed in the earlier chapter on campaign preparations, scurvy 
occurred in the troops on Trajan's campaign to Arabia Felix, and likely would have occurred in 
other desert areas as well.196    
Visibility problems due to dust and haze would have been a significant problem in any 
desert operations.  The most obvious example of this being a problem for communications is in 
Asklepiodotus II.9, where he says that the horn-player he lists amongst his supernumeraries was 
193 Plutarch, Ant, 50.1.
194 Procopius, History of the Wars, 2.19.  By comparison, smallpox kills approximately one-third of all those infected, 
so this can perhaps be best seen in the context of a plague.  Whilst this story is beyond the temporal terms of the 
study, I believe that it is certainly applicable to earlier incidents as there was no comparable change or innovation 
gained or lost which would have had so great an effect.
195 Plutarch, Ant, 45.5, 47.3.  See also chapters three and five.
196 This is supported by the oft-mentioned comment about African 'barbarians' who ate raw meat and undiluted milk. 
See Mattingly, D.,(ed). The Archaeology of the Fezzan, Vol 1: Synthesis. The Department of Antiquities, Tripoli, 
2003, pp. 76-79, Shaw, B.D., 'Fear and Loathing: the Nomad Menace and Roman Africa,' Rulers, Nomads and 
Christians in Roman North Africa, Ashgate, Aldershot, 1995, pp.25-46 for a full list of instances.  Raw meat is one 
way to cure scurvy in the absence of citrus fruits.  Rajakumar, K., MD, 'Infantile Scurvy: A Historical Perspective,' 
Pediatrics, Vol. 108(4), Oct 2001, pp. 76-81; Dutcher, R.A., 'Vitamine Studies: V. The Antiscorbutic Properties of 
Raw Beef,' Journal of Biological Chemistry, Vol XLII.2, 1920, pp. 301-311.  The undiluted milk would also have a 
higher amount of protein, fat, and, if camel's milk, salt, than diluted counterparts.  Thus, though the references to 
these practices are likely an expression of 'Otherness,' they may well be based in fact.
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there in case signals could not be seen due to dust.197  To give an idea as to the visibility problems in 
sandstorms, the late February 2009 sandstorm in the UAE reported a 1 km visibility in Dubai, and  .
4 km in Abu Dhabi and Jebel Ali.198  A mid-May sandstorm in 2001 brought visibility down to .5 
km throughout most of Egypt.199  The mid-March 2009 sandstorm in Saudi Arabia and Kuwait 
brought visibility down to zero and Shaanxi Province in China frequently sees sandstorms with 
visibilities of between .5 and .2 km.200   Thus dust and sand can clearly be a severe problem for any 
sort of visual-based operation.
First of all, as discussed extensively elsewhere, there is frequently a great deal of sand and 
dust kicked up into the air and carried on the winds.  This would have the effect of drying out the 
mucous membranes of the eyes, nose, mouth and throat, as well as being inhaled into the lungs. 
The dry membranes means that the voice would crack and/or become hoarse, limiting its range and 
the speaker's ability to utilise the voice at all.  If sand got directly into the eyes, then the tearing 
caused in the eyes would impact the ability to see but would also cause mucous production to 
increase as the moisture would be carried into the nasolacrimal ducts into the nose, some of which 
would also become postnasal drip and find its way into the throat, further  irritating the 
membranes.201  Inhalation of sand or dust would cause the airways to become inflamed and reduce 
197 See also, inter alia, Curtius 4.15.32, for a dust cloud at Gaugamela, 5.13.11, where Bessus' men were hidden in a 
dust cloud, 7.4.26 and 7.5.4 for problems with dust and haze in Bactria, Diodorus 17.61, where Darius conceals his 
troops in dust, 19.42, where Antigonus hid an assault on enemy baggage in dust, Polybius 5.58.1 where dust 
precipitated a charge, Ammianus 24.8.5-6, where Persians lying in wait are discovered due the dust they kick up, 
Ammianus 25.3.10, dust and heat hindered soldiers, Dio 40.23.4 where heat, thirst and dust cause the Romans 
problems in battle, Caesar African Wars. 52, where dust interrupted battle, Sallust 54, where dust gives away the 
advancing Iugurthine forces.  
198 Scott, K., 'Sandstorm Reduces Visibility as Strong Winds Buffet UAE,' Gulf News [online] 
http://archive.gulfnews.com/nation/Environment/10290223.html 28/02/09. Accessed 11/04/09.
199 'Heavy Sandstorm Engulfs Egypt,' IOL: News for South Africa and the World [online] 
http://www.iol.co.za/index.php?set_id=1&click_id=68&art_id=qw989759820496B221 13/05/01. Accessed 
11/04/09.
200 Associated Press, 'Blinding Sandstorm Hits Saudi Arabia, Disrupting Flights, Oil Exports,' New York Daily News, 
[online] http://www.nydailynews.com/news/us_world/2009/03/10/2009-03-
10_blinding_sandstorm_hits_saudi_arabia_dis-2.html 10/03/09. Accessed 11/04/09. Lei, X. J. et al., 'Analysis of 
Climate Characteristics of Heavy and Severe Sandstorms in Shaanxi Province,' Journal of Desert Research, Vol 25, 
No 1, Jan. 2005 pp. 118-122.
201 If this happened for a sustained period, then the excess mucous would also be a breeding ground for respiratory 
infections, much as with modern China.
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the amount of oxygen available and the expansion of the lungs, thus reducing the ability of the 
speaker to project his voice.202  The strong, sediment-filled winds would also interfere with sound 
transmission, both by the winds' own noise and the wind disrupting sound waves.
The hot and arid environment, so unfamiliar to incoming Westerners, had a profound effect 
upon the Romans.  Literary sources discuss the great number of soldiers who were killed or suffered 
debilitating effects from temperature, thirst, dust, unfamiliar flora, fauna and microflora.  In most of 
these instances, however, there seemed little that the Romans could do in regard to their tactical 
operations to ameliorate the problems save allowing troops to acclimatise as best they could.
Part V.  Conclusions:
What seems clear from the evidence is that, though they would ensure that anywhere they 
fought a pitched battle would be suitable for their forces just as they would in other places,  the 
Romans did not adapt to the desert environment.  Instead, they would adapt to the tactics of the 
particular enemies they faced, which forced them to react, rather than act.  
Everywhere in North Africa and the East we see a dramatic increase in cavalry after the third 
century AD, though this is not exclusive to the desert.  We also see the incorporation of camelry and 
archers, two unit types that are desert-specific.  The camelry units are very small, totalling between 
5 and10% of the total forces of a given area  and 15-17% of a given cavalry unit.  Their tactical use 
is unclear at best.  The other major difference in the East is the use of naphtha and related 
incendiaries by the Eastern forces.  The Romans developed defences against these, but either did 
not have access or did not desire to use them.  At Hatra, too, what seem to have been vessels full of 
insects, possibly beehives, were used as missiles.  The Romans themselves do not seem to have 
developed new offensive machinery, though Apollodorus does suggest additions and adaptations to 
existing engines in order to compensate for assaults from the walls.  In short, though the 
202 This could be either a chronic condition that grows progressively worse, or an acute condition brought on by a 
sudden, great intake of sand or dust, as in a storm.
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organisation and composition of the forces was becoming more tactically mobile, there were only 
the above adaptations made.
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Chapter Five
Low Intensity: Guerrilla Warfare and Policing
Part I. Introduction:
Because of the dearth of resources available to those indigenous inhabitants of desert areas, 
a nomadic existence was required in order to avoid overwhelming the carrying capacity of any 
given area.  Whilst this restriction did cause nucleation around certain resource-bearing areas, 
usually water sources, it also inhibited large-scale settlements in many areas.  This lack in many 
instances prevented the traditional city-state or kingdom, and its associated large armies, instead 
producing small, mobile, scattered 'tribes' which participated in such small-scale military activity as 
raiding.  In times of rebellion, these activities turned into full-fledged campaigns.  There were 
several major campaigns of this sort which took place in each of the areas under consideration;  the 
revolts of Jugurtha, Tacfarinas and Firmus in North Africa, Zenobia and Mavia in the East, along 
with frequent revolts in Judea.  This is not the only type of 'small warfare' to be examined, however; 
functions of patrolling and other 'police' duties as performed by small groups will likewise be 
examined.
To begin, we must first define the English terms to be used in this study.  Warfare conducted 
by small groups and/or through indirect methods against a larger or stronger force has had a number 
of different names attributed to it.  These include 'rebellions', 'guerrilla warfare', 'small force 
warfare,' 'insurgency', and 'asymmetric warfare'.  These terms tend to be inconsistent in use, even 
over the  same time period, something Blank's 2003 monograph decries.  He refers mostly to 
discussions of asymmetrical threats in regard to modern American defence policy that have now 
classed everything from terrorism and insurgency to area-access-denial such as would be expected 
by a regular military defending itself from invasion.203  
A further complication in both modern and ancient conception of asymmetrical strategies 
203 Blank, S. 'Rethinking Asymmetrical Threats,' Strategic Studies Institute Newsletter, September 2003.
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and small force operations is that it is often difficult, if not impossible, to differentiate between what 
would now be termed organised crime (including piracy) and more politically motivated groups 
utilising asymmetrical strategies.204  Often, in both the ancient and modern world, these groups are 
inter-related; with the somewhat unclear status and nature of Judean groups operating during 
Josephus' time.205 In translations, any practitioner of small force operation(s) is frequently called 
'bandit' or 'brigand', stressing the criminal and, in my view, diminishing their potential military skill. 
I shall thus explain in each instance whether I mean a guerrilla or a bandit.
Let us now discuss the Classical terms.  In Latin, the usual term for small force practitioners 
or groups is 'latro/nes'.   The original meaning was that of a mercenary or other soldier for hire, 
suggesting a conflation of military and outlaw, and also expressing a lack of trust of foreign or hired 
troops.206  The Greek term is λῃστής, clearly related to latro,207 but also related to λαστρις or one 
who is hired.208  This is the only Greek term used in this context, and seems to be a blanket term.209 
Livy, however, gives a good example of the Latin terms  in one section of his ab Urbe Condita.  In 
book 29, he uses the term 'incursione' when saying that Laelius only had enough men to make what 
Moore translates as 'raids' into Africa.210  The literal meaning of the term would be to run or rush 
in/upon; this does suggest a hit-and-run attack, a feature of small-force operations, and is supported 
by the context of the chapter (i.e., that Laelius cannot mount a full campaign because the bulk of his 
troops are still en route).   Latro is not used in this passage.
In 29.6.2, however, Livy says  'latrociniis magis quam iusto bello in Bruttiis gerebantur res', 
based upon the Brutti nature as well as their Punic alliance.  The juxtaposition between 'latronciniis' 
204 cf. MacMullen, R., Enemies of Roman Order, London: Routledge, 1992, pp. 255-269.
205 Criminal organisations filling a power vacuum is common in failed states even today.  Dodge, T., Iraq's Future: The 
Aftermath of Regime Change, London: Routledge, 2005, pp. 8-25.
206 Lewis, C.T., Short, C., A Latin Dictionary, Oxford: Clarendon, 1846, p. 1054.
207 And possibly a loanword into Hebrew, which calls 'bandits' listim.  
208 Liddell, H.G., Scott, R., A Greek-English Lexicon 8th Ed, Oxford: Clarendon, 1847, p. 891.
209 Greek military terms on the whole tend to be less specific and far more flexible than the Latin, though why this 
should be the case is open to speculation.
210 29.4.3 'iam haec agentibus nuntius tandem uenit Laelium non Scipionem, copiasque quantae ad incursiones 
agrorum satis sint transuectas; summae belli molem adhuc in Sicilia esse.'   Cf excursione in 29.6.3.
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and 'iusto bello' is a telling one; it suggests that, at least for Livy, small force operations were 
iniusti, or having a connotation of inappropriateness and possibly illegality.  This is how the term 
'asymmetrical warfare' is sometimes used in the modern literature; as a type of warfare that the 
party being attacked considers 'wrong' or is unable to conceive of as being war.211  
Finally, we can perhaps see the connotations to latrocinia in 29.31.  This section details 
Masinissa's struggles to regain his kingdom from Syphax.  The king was forced to retreat to Mt 
Bellus (location unknown) by Syphax after an undetailed pitched battle.  Masinissa was joined by a 
few of the local families (familiae aliquot) and the mountain was not only able to support the small 
group but acted as a base from which they secured the surrounding area 'inde nocturnis primo ac 
furtiuis incursionibus, deinde aperto latrocinio infesta omnia circa esse'.  This suggests that 
incursiones are on a smaller scale than latrocinia, and that both can be part of an asymmetrical 
strategy that is politically motivated, as Masinissa is attempting to defeat Syphax, who had usurped 
his kingdom.  That being said, however, Masinissa finds Carthaginian lands more wealthy than 
Numidian and that latrocinia is safer there; this kills more Carthaginians than 'proper warfare' 
('pluresque quam iusto saepe in bello Carthaginienses caderent...') Again, the contrast between the 
two styles of warfare; Syphax, it is further said, '... uix regium uidebatur latronem uagum in 
montibus consectari', again diminishing latrocinia in comparison.  
It is only in Livy's Latin that such differentiation is clear.  Why this is the case is unknown, 
but we can at least say from here that latrocinia can be understood roughly as asymmetrical strategy 
utilising small force tactics, and may carry a connotation of political motivations or at least anti-
authority effects.  The latter category allows us to integrate any of what we would now consider 
criminal activities (e.g., theft or piracy for personal, rather than political gain) into the term, and 
include peacetime policing duties into our examination of Roman use of and response to 
211 Blank, Ibid.
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asymmetrical strategies and small force operations.212
The terms for battles themselves in Latin show a difference in several works, though the 
differentiation is not always clear.  The term proelium is always used of a pitched battle.  Though its 
etymology is uncertain,213  the inclusion of the 'oe' diphthong suggests age, as this is a rare survival 
from archaic Latin.214  The other usual term for a conflict is pugnas, a term which is far more 
flexible; in Ammianus the term can mean anything from a quarrel (14.6.25) to a murder (14.7.6) to 
battle generally (16.5.1).  The same conflict can be called both, as in the case of an operation 
against the Alamanni which was begun when the scutarii rushed out against them (15.4.9,11) and an 
operation against a German manus who offered battle (16.2.12-13); both use first pugna then 
proelium.  Earlier texts show the same flexibility, such as in Ps. Caesar's African Wars 12 and 19, 
where again a single battle is called first pugna and then proelium.  Admittedly, the fact that 
Caesar's force was numerically inferior is stated, but the battle itself was not a small force 
operation; we can perhaps suggest that for Ammianus a battle which started as small force action 
and ended as a larger battle could be characterised in this way,  but that does not seem to be the case 
for the earlier works.   
In the description of a lone defence by a Roman officer against Tacfarinas' forces, proelium 
is used; again this was a case where Tacfarinas was using orthodox military tactics rather than small 
force operations.215  Tacitus also uses pugna when discussing the type of a battle being waged 
between the Romans and Germans (genere pugnae), then says that the Germans 'coacta stabile ad 
proelium'.216  This suggests that a proelium is a type of pugna, which is another possible 
interpretation for the uses discussed above wherein the same conflict was called both (i.e., it was an 
unspecified 'fight' or pugna which at the end was determined to be a proper 'battle' or proelium). 
212 See Shaw, B.D., 'Bandits in the Roman Empire,' Past & Present, No. 105 (Nov., 1984), pp. 3-52 for detailed 
discussion.
213 L& S 1456.
214 Clackson, James PT, 'Latin,' in The Ancient Languages of Europe, Woodard, R. (ed), Cambridge: CUP, 2008, p77.
215 Tac. Ann 3.20.
216 Tac Ann 2.21
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Similarly, Livy says that there was a proelium just under the top of a mountain range , but that the 
Romans were unable to defeat the Carthaginian light-armed troops because of a Spanish cohors that 
were better suited to the type of fighting (pugnae genere).217   Sallust, however, set the two terms in 
opposition when describing a conflict where Marius' forces were assaulted at dusk as ‘pugna 
latrocinio magis quam proelio similis fieri’ due to the disordered nature of the Roman response. 218 
Because of the qualifier on pugna we can perhaps see this again as an instance of a proelium being a 
type of pugna, as is a pugna latrocinio, but that is not certain.  In 87, Sallust says that new recruits 
were engaged in  proelia multa, ceterum levia,' and then in the next sentence moves onto the 
discussion of those who learnt to enter battle without fear, ' sine metu pugnae adesse'.  It is possible 
that Sallust was simply looking to vary his terms for stylistic purposes, or that he personally felt the 
terms synonymous whereas the others did not, but that is unclear.  Thus we can only say that, whilst 
proelium is reasonably stable in meaning, the understanding of pugna must rely upon qualifiers and 
context.
Part II. Small-Force Warfare:
Though small force operations were encountered elsewhere in the Roman sphere, it is the 
type of conflict which appears to have been most common and most problematic for the Romans in 
both North Africa (including Egypt) and the East.  I have decided to subdivide this section by these 
geographic regions on the basis of differences in climate and terrain; the North African desert is a 
vast expanse featuring ergs and dunefields whereas the Eastern areas are smaller, frequently feature 
more areas of semi-desert, and have more hills and other rock formations.  There is also a greater 
similarity of culture and language groups through these subdivisions. 
A. North Africa: There were three main campaigns which are well-attested that involved 
the Roman army having to cope with guerilla tactics; the revolts of Jugurtha, Tacfarinas and Firmus. 
217 Livy 22.18.2-3.
218 Sallust BJ 97.5.
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Each of these will be discussed extensively in turn.  There are two poorly-attested conflicts as well; 
Cassius Dio 60.9.1-6 and Pliny NH 5.14-15 both briefly mention that the Mauri became restive 
'again' and first Paulinus then Geta pursued them into the desert; Pliny reports they had to turn back, 
though Dio says they came to terms peacefully.  We have no further extant accounts.
The other poorly-attested conflict was the Blemmyes, a nomadic group from south of Egypt 
who began raiding Roman Egypt in the third and fourth century AD.  The Blemmyes are attested as 
living peacefully amongst Egyptian urban populations as a traders,219 but during Zenobia's assault 
and brief conquest of Lower Egypt the Blemmyes conquered northward into Upper Egypt, though 
they were defeated subsequently in AD279/280.  By AD298, however, they had retaken the region 
as Diocletian signed a treaty at that time.220  Clearly, the Blemmyes were taking advantage of 
Rome's distractions.
Let us now turn to the three major North African incidences of guerrilla warfare.
1. Jugurtha: Though trained in both Numidian and Roman warfare, Jugurtha utilised 
several methods of small force operation over the course of the campaign against the Romans.  This 
was evident from the first, as his initial strike (admittedly, against his brother) was a  campaign of 
cross-border raiding in an attempt to provoke the other party into conflict; this was a tactic he would 
later repeat against the Romans in order to control the choice of time and place for the battle.  This 
of course would give him a distinct tactical advantage.  Jugurtha's strategy also included the use of 
hit-and-fade attacks against Aulus, as well as other indirect methods such as inducements to desert, 
(which the Romans themselves would also utilise) as well as feints and misinformation.  
When Aulus was forced into surrender and a demeaning treaty after a night assault, however, 
a new Roman commander, Metellus was dispatched.  Having realised that regular tactics would be 
219 Sidebotham, S. et al., The Red Land: The Illustrated Archaeology of Egypt's Eastern Desert. Cairo, the American 
University in Cairo Press, 2008, p 368.
220 Sidebotham, S. et al., The Red Land: The Illustrated Archaeology of Egypt's Eastern Desert. Cairo, the American 
University in Cairo Press, 2008, p 370.
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ineffective,221 he adapted to the small force tactics in part by inducement to desertion and/or 
assassination, but, perhaps more tellingly, by interspersing light armed troops amongst his army on 
the march, thus increasing its mobility and flexibility in case of an attack; this was a logical 
precaution against the hit-and-fade assaults as well as a counter to Jugurtha's far more mobile 
cavalry.  Both parties attempt and protect against small force attacks on any vulnerable troops (e.g., 
fodder gatherers), but there is no detail given in the sources.
On a more strategic level, Metellus began a campaign to deprive Jugurtha of his support 
base, by which I mean not just the ability to obtain supplies but also his popular, financial and 
political support.  Scorched Earth tactics were utilised for this effect, which terrorised the 
indigenous populace to the point of making recruitment and safe haven difficult to find.  This also 
destroyed Jugurtha's ability to maintain his troops, and by the time of Marius' command, Jugurtha's 
financial and political capital were so poor that, after the loss of Capsa and its treasuries, Jugurtha 
was forced to promise Bocchus a third of his kingdom in order to get his support.222  Previously, 
Jugurtha had been able to use persuasion alone, saying that the Romans were cruel oppressors who 
would not suffer another political entity to exist.223   This was a master stroke which took away any 
guerrilla's main weapon; the ability to find supporters for his cause.224
The psychological toll of the inducements to betrayal caused Jugurtha to execute his main 
supporters and to suffer what would seem to be some sort of breakdown.  As Sallust was concerned 
with matters of morality it is entirely possible that this breakdown was intended as a reflection of 
Jugurtha's mad lust for power driving him over the edge; as there is no other extant source we 
221 Sallust, BJ, 54.
222  Sallust BJ 97.
223 Sallust BJ 81 'igitur in locum ambobus placitum exercitus conveniunt. ibi fide data et accepta Jugurtha Bocchi  
animum oratione accendit: Romanos iniustos, profunda avaritia, communis omnium hostis esse; eandem illos 
causam belli cum Boccho habere, quam secum et cum aliis gentibus, lubidinem imperitandi, quis omnia regna 
advorsa sint; tum sese, paulo ante Carthaginiensis, item regem Persen, post uti quisque opulentissumus videatur, ita 
Romanis hostem fore.' 
224 cf. Callwell, C.E., Small Wars: Their Principles and Practice, 3rd Edition, Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 
1996, passim.
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cannot know for certain one way or the other.  If we take Sallust at his word, however, we realise 
that there is potential support for Metellus' awareness of how to mitigate Jugurtha's main advantage. 
Jugurtha was said to move daily, feeling as though Metellus had constrained his movements 
completely.  This sort of constraint, whether real or imagined, acts against the major advantage of a 
decentralised small force; their tactical mobility.  Clearly, between this and the interspersing of light 
troops on the march, Metellus was well aware that the key to defeating a small force was to 
constrain its movements.
Marius' takeover of the Roman forces saw a continuation of adaptation to the small force 
tactics.  He began by training his troops with hit-and-fade assaults but realised that such tactics will 
not allow him to regain and hold territory,225 a common problem for small forces.  Subsequently, he 
turned to more regular operations until, when on the march to winter quarters, the Romans are 
ambushed by the combined forces of Jugurtha and Bocchus.  As discussed above, they have a battle 
described as ‘pugna latrocinio magis quam proelio similis fieri.’  After the battle had been won by 
the Romans the next morning, Marius marches with the army in a hollow square so that it will be 
ready and able to defend itself from all sides.  This is fortunate as it frustrates Jugurtha’s attempt to 
attack on all four sides; the assault is driven off with waves of Latin and allied Italian cavalry under 
Sulla,226 something quite similar to what the Numidians would do normally.  This adaptation was 
effective and Sulla’s assault on the forces under Bocchus at the Roman rear leads those enemy ranks 
to break and flee.  Jugurtha, at the Roman front, was forced to withdraw.227  Still, what the assaults 
did bring about was an increase in Marius’ fama, which is another common weapon against small 
force tactics; in modern terms it would be called ‘deterrence’ or perhaps 'shock and awe'.  Assuming 
Sallust is not exaggerating for rhetorical effect, because Marius was ‘feared as something more than 
225  Sallust BJ 87-88.
226 Sallust BJ 95.
227  Sallust BJ 100-101.
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human’228 however, it severely impacted Jugurtha’s ability to gain followers.  That perceived 
invincibility is no doubt why the victory at Capsa was so important; if Marius was seen to be 
vulnerable, especially as he was both the new commander and because of his rivalry with Metellus, 
then it might result in an upsurge in support for Jugurtha.  This indirect method was yet another way 
of assaulting the support base, specifically popular and political support.  
The above was the last major military battle of the conflict before Bocchus’ men ambushed 
and delivered Jugurtha.  It is notable, however, that Bocchus’ envoys to Sulla are assaulted Gaetulis 
latrionibus.229  The Gaetuli were Jugurtha’s allies, though it is unclear from context whether we are 
meant to read this as a politically-motivated attack or merely brigandage.  It does not seem that 
Jugurtha was forewarned of Bocchus’ betrayal, however.
What we can see most clearly from this story, with the usual caveat of having only Sallust's 
word for the events, is that Metellus and Marius after him both realised that the keys to countering 
Jugurtha's small force operations were to constrain his movements, thus reducing his tactical 
mobility, to increase the Roman's tactical mobility and flexibility, and destroy Jugurtha's popular, 
political and financial support base.  Ultimately, these succeeded.
2. Tacfarinas: Tacitus gives us very little information on Tacfarinas' motivations for and 
during his campaign against the Romans.  Why this is the case is unclear; he may simply have not 
had access to data about the man, and was attempting to carry through on his stated belief about 
impartiality.  At any rate, Tacitus does state that the war against Numidian Tacfarinas began after his 
desertion from the auxilia.  When this desertion occurred is unclear but, according to Tacitus, the 
war began in AD 17, when Tacfarinas took a group of latrones and other 'undesirables' and formed 
them into a Roman-style force.  Either because of this or subsequent to it, he was proclaimed as the 
leader of the Musulamii who were a desert-dwelling nomadic group.230  
228  Sallust BJ 92.2 ‘Numidae magis quam mortalem timere.’ 
229  Sallust BJ 103.3.
230  Tac Ann 2.52.1-2. 'Eodem anno coeptum in Africa bellum, duce hostium Tacfarinate. is natione Numida, in castris  
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Tacfarinas' war had four main phases and is the best example of small force warfare in 
Numidia, despite Tacitus' brevity.  The first phase, AD 17, saw Tacfarinas split his army into a 
Roman-style elite force who were kept encamped in an unnamed location, and incorporated or 
allied with the Mauritanians who conducted hit-and fade assaults.  Due to or subsequent to this, the 
army was substantially swelled in number by the Cinithii, but perhaps more importantly this group 
was based in the southern part of Africa Proconsularis, giving Tacfarinas a foothold and support 
within Roman territory.  This phase ended when Camillus brought a small army onto an unnamed 
area and provoked the larger Numidian force into a pitched battle.  We are told that the Roman 
regular infantry was stationed in the centre, with auxiliary infantry and cavalry on the wings; he 
says nothing about the Numidian order of battle, however.  If Tacfarinas was utilising Roman 
practices then we can perhaps speculate that he would have had his Roman-style elite force in 
centre, with the Mauritanian light cavalry on the wings, but there is no way to know for certain.  As 
Tacitus discusses elsewhere and as is also common amongst non-Roman forces (to the point of 
possibly being a literary topos, something which must always be kept in mind), the Numidians 
seemed to lack the discipline of the Roman army, and the Romans won the battle.231  Tacitus gives 
very little detail, however, so we cannot say more.
There may be a slight temporal confusion in Tacitus here, as Tacfarinas seems to have been 
defeated in AD17, but Tacitus refers to Tacfarinas' defeat as being 'last summer' when the Numidian 
appears again in AD20.232  The term used is priore aestate, which is translated as 'the previous 
summer,' in the Loeb and Penguin translations, but prior can just mean a previous time, as priores is 
sometimes used as a term meaning 'ancestors'.  At any rate, we do not know how or where 
Tacfarinas spent that time for certain.  He is recorded as having retreated to the desert after defeats, 
Romanis auxiliaria stipendia meritus, mox desertor, vagos primum et latrociniis suetos ad praedam et raptus 
congregare, dein more militiae per vexilla et turmas componere, postremo non inconditae turbae sed 
Musulamiorum dux haberi.'
231  Tac Ann 2.52 passim.
232  Tac Ann 3.20.1. 
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and as this is a logical enough action to take that I feel we can speculate with reasonable safety that 
he did this as a matter of course.233  The Romans would have been hard-pressed to find him in an 
unfamiliar desert and without trusted allies; it was also Tacfarinas' home territory and a major 
recruiting area.   At any rate, according to Tacitus in AD 20 raids attributed to Tacfarinas occurred; 
these hit-and-fade assaults, possibly to be interpreted as active probes of the Roman defences in 
Africa, were then followed by large-scale destruction and looting.234  This emphasis on plunder 
could suggest a need for money to pay his soldiers; alternatively it could be read as a return to the 
small-force warfare of AD17.  This was, however, followed up by a siege of a legion near the 
Pagyda river (of uncertain location).   This highly unusual action for a small army did result in a 
victory for Tacfarinas, as the (undetailed) line of battle created in front of the camp failed.  This 
proved so embarrassing for the Romans that decimation was used; this led to a very small force 
(Tacitus says five hundred) warding off a similar siege at the fort of Mala.
With that defeat, and with the Numidians rejecting (or despising) siege warfare, 'obsidia 
aspernantibus,' Tacfarinas returns to hit-and-fade assaults.  These were effective until his army 
became encumbered by plunder; this required a single base of operations near the coast.  Thus 
Tacfarinas lost his main advantages; with a centralised area to protect he was unable to be as mobile 
as small force must be, and being near the coast the Roman supply lines would be shorter and 
Tacfarinas also had given up the desert as protection.  Caesianus then went after Tacfarinas with 
cavalry, auxiliary infantry and 'velocissimos legionum,' which suggests that they were developing 
something on the order of a flying column, if not something closer to Tacfarinas' original army.  The 
Romans, using their now greater tactical mobility, defeated Tacfarinas somewhere in his area of 
control and drove the Numidians back to the desert.235  It is unclear, however, if subsequent Roman 
commanders used a similar adaptation.
233 Tac Ann 3.21.
234 Tac Ann 3.20.1-3.
235 Tac Ann 3.21.
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A year later in AD21, Tacfarinas rose again.  He had raised reinforcements in the desert (as 
he may well have done all along) and tried to demand land for himself and his army.236  Whether he 
thought this would be effective or not is unclear.  Tacfarinas may have simply wanted an end to the 
hostilities that would still allow him and his army to have a safe area that belonged to them. 
Alternatively, Tacitus reports later that Tacfarinas was portraying himself as a liberator of the 
Numidians and their allies (and possibly even all subject peoples) from the Romans, so it is possible 
that Tacfarinas was attempting a political gamble, believing that a rejection of his terms would give 
him a justification for a continuation of the war, almost an attempt at a politically legitimate 
mandate.    Whatever Tacfarinas' motives, the effect of sending envoys was that Tiberius became 
enraged and sent Blaesus.  Perhaps learning from Caesianus' success, Blaesus, after diminishing 
Tacfarinas' forces by offering an amnesty, divided his forces into three parts, two of which flanked 
Tacfarinas' area of operation and one of which set up garrisons to allow the Romans to always be 
able to constrain Tacfarinas' movements.  At the onset of winter, he split his forces amongst a chain 
of garrisons, further constraining Tacfarinas.  In amongst all this, forces ‘solitudinem gnaros’, were 
formed into flying columns and harried Tacfarinas on all sides.237  
The end of this phase of the war is curious.  Blaesus captured Tacfarinas' brother and then 
withdrew before Tacfarinas' forces were completely crushed.  Perhaps the brother was considered a 
hostage, but he is not referenced again by Tacitus, nor is there any indication of a treaty or other 
direct communications between the Numidian and the Romans.  We are not even certain if it was 
Blaesus' idea to withdraw or if it came from Tiberius, as Tacitus only says that the Emperor treated 
the war as if it were over.238  He even withdrew a legion from the area, leaving it under-defended.239 
There was deep unrest in Gaul at the same time, so Tiberius may have felt the troops were better 
236  Tac Ann. 3.73.
237  Tac Ann 3.74 passim.  Knowledge of the desert 3.74.9. The use of gnaros, clearly from the Greek, suggests 
understanding or experience of the desert. 
238  Tac Ann 3.74.16.
239 Tac Ann 4.29.3.
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used elsewhere, though it is impossible to say for certain.  At any rate, one could argue that this is a 
clear example of what would now be considered asymmetrical strategy as described above; the 
Romans were so unaccustomed to this style of warfare that they did not realise that they were, in 
fact, still at war.
The final phase of the war against Tacfarinas took place in AD 24, though a year before 
Tacitus does record that a Roman was acquitted of selling grain to Tacfarinas, though when that sale 
was purported to have taken place is not stated.240  The Numidian is said to have, by AD24, gained 
large numbers of Mauretanian auxiliaries; the Garamantes' king received Tacfarinas' plunder, 
presumably meaning that his court acted as a treasury and operational base for Tacfarinas' army, in 
addition to  supplying troops.  The poor and 'disreputable' also came to fight with Tacfarinas and it 
is here that we are told Tacfarinas sets himself up as a liberator, saying that other peoples were 
attacking the empire, which is why Africa was being evacuated-- this could support the reading that 
Tiberius' removal of a legion as being to deal with problems elsewhere-- and that if those who 
found freedom preferable to lying in slavery made a unified effort, 'si cuncti quibus libertas servitio  
potior incubuissent,' Rome could be defeated.241  In a way, this is a classic small force concept; if 
enough resistance cells coordinate then they can destroy a central or invading power; Tacfarinas' 
appeals to liberty only reinforce a desire to read him as an early 'guerrilla' of the type described 
above.  Whether Tacfarinas himself actually believed this, however, is unclear, as Tacitus gives us 
very little to go on with regard to his motivations, and we have no other source for comparison.  At 
any rate, after Tacfarinas attempted to utilise regular military tactics and besieged the town of 
Thubuscum, Dolabella gathered together an army and raised the siege due to a combination of 
Roman fama and because the Numidians are unused to fighting against an infantry charge.  After 
this, Dolabella re-fortified strong points to constrain Tacfarinas' movements, executed his 
240  Tac Ann 4.13.3.
241  Tac Ann 4.24.1-2.
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supporters, and organised four flying columns under Roman command and Mauretanian raiding 
parties.  There is no detail given about whether this arrangement led to any particular successes or 
failures, though the constraint of movement and commensurate reduction in tactical mobility seems 
to have been the object, as was the case with Jugurtha.  Tacitus does, however say that the Romans 
were frustrated by the enemy's refusal to fight (i.e., have a pitched battle).  So, when Dolabella 
ultimately received word that Tacfarinas was encamped near the site of Auzea surrounded by 
woods, he sent light infantry and cavalry against them and attacked at dawn, allowing the troops to 
vent their frustrations.  Tacfarinas was designated as a main target of this assault as well; after his 
bodyguards' deaths and his son's capture, Tacfarinas opted to die in battle.242   As with Jugurtha, the 
death of the driving force behind the campaign seems to have pacified the region.
3. Firmus: The revolt of Firmus is described in Ammianus 29.5, though with less detail than 
might be ideal.  He states that the local governor, Romanus, slandered Firmus to the Emperor over 
Firmus' murder of his half-brother in civil conflict following their father's death; the Jugurthine war 
began in much the same circumstances of internecine conflict.  Fearing that the slander would lead 
to direct Roman interference (i.e., execution), Firmus rebelled from Roman authority.  Whilst the 
circumstances of the entire war are unclear and open to debate,243 what is clear according to the text 
is that the king was forced to move before he was ready.  It appears that he was attempting to obtain 
support from neighbouring kingdoms but there is a lacuna in the text at that point so we cannot say 
more.244   This would seem a reasonable assumption, however, as has been noted above political and 
popular support was vital for guerrilla forces.
Once Theodosius was on site in Africa, awaiting his troops, he began pondering how 
'...hostem caperet discursatorem et repentinum insidiisque potius clandestinis quam proeliorum 
242  Tac Ann 4.25.
243 These include whether or not Firmus was exploited by Valentinian to catch out Romanus, and the extent to which 
Firmus' support of Donatism played a role in his actions and the Roman response.  Whilst both of these questions 
are important, they are well outside the realm of this study.  
244 Amm 29.5.3.
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stabilitate confisum.'245  He opted to assault the support base utilising scorched Earth tactics, as had 
many others before him; again attempting to deny Firmus a support base.  Like Jugurtha, Firmus 
tried false envoys and other diplomatic tactics;246 one does almost begin to wonder if Ammianus 
was drawing on the Jugurthine War for suppositions to fill in gaps in his data, but there is no way to 
know for certain.   
According to Ammianus there were some small set-piece battles in this conflict which the 
Romans won handily, though Theodosius found himself confronted with the potential for small 
force tactics again once the rebels had taken control of the high ground around Audia.  Much as had 
been done before, Theodosius opts to march in a hollow square to defend against an attack from any 
side; he is not able to penetrate far into the hills, however.247  That being said, Firmus was able to 
hold off the Romans with light mobile troops for quite some time before his position was betrayed 
and he committed suicide to avoid capture.248    
Summary: The response to North African small force operations was quite similar on the 
whole throughout the time period with which we are concerned.  Generals found the best and often 
only successful methods of defeating a highly mobile force with popular support was to attack that 
support base, both of supplies and political and popular support, and physically constrain the 
movements of the North African forces.  Once the mobility was reduced, the North Africans could 
be forced into either set piece battles or sieges, where the Romans could dominate.   Marius found 
that fama was quite an effective weapon as well, using the Numidians' belief that he was something 
more than human against them.  The Romans also acted directly against the leaders of the 
revolutionary army by targeting them specifically; though nobody is indispensable, once the 
commanders were dead the armies tended to fall apart, allowing the Romans to regain control. 
245 Amm 29.5.7.
246 Amm 29.5.8-11, 15, 19, 28.
247 Amm 29.5.39, 44.
248 Amm 29.5.54.
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These tactics are all used against groups conducting small force operations well into the modern 
period.249
B. The East: Ammianus states that Mesopotamia is heavily garrisoned because the region is 
often restive,250 this is supported by both the Notitia Dignitatum and by the number of 
archaeologically attested forts and fortlets that date from this period.   Both prior and subsequent to 
Julian's campaigns, however, several places in the East saw small force warfare.  
1. Judea: Several phases of the conquest of Judea (here including Peraea, Samaria, Gallilee, 
and Idumenea) featured the use of small force tactics.  Judea was, according to Josephus, 
eyewitness and the main source for the Jewish War, a region which had devolved into warfare 
between various groups (λῃστρικοῦ πολέμου).251  Much of the province, however is semi-arid 
and thus outside the scope of this study.  There was some small force activity in some areas in the 
desert, however; the Sicarii attacked En Gedi and local villages from their base at Masada, seeming 
to be supply and plunder raids.252  They also increased their forces with recruits, suggesting that 
these raids might have been required to pay, support, and possibly train the new Sicarii.  The 
scorched Earth techniques the Sicarii used would potentially destroy the supply and support bases 
of the Romans as well as any other groups in the area.  This was not the only area of instability, as 
λῃσταί groups joined together into small forces all through the countryside, leading to hit and fade 
attacks on towns and outlying synagogues.  Though engaged at Jerusalem, Vespasian decided to 
destroy the city of Gadara, whence came one of these λῃσταί groups, because it was too dangerous 
to allow to stand; the Gadarans fled but force-recruited into their army from a nearby village and 
attempted to engage the Romans in pitched battle, which failed.253  Vespasian garrisoned local 
249 Cf. Callwell, C.E., Small Wars: Their Principles and Practice, 3rd Edition, Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 
1996.
250 Amm Marc. 14.3.2.
251  Jos BJ, 2.65
252  Jos BJ, 4.398.
253  Jos BJ, 4.399.441.
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strong points and engaged in scorched Earth tactics into Idumenea.254   
Once Jerusalem had fallen to the Romans there were only two areas in revolt, both of which 
were too strong to be permitted to stand, Machareus and Masada.255  They were both eliminated 
through siege, and Josephus stated that Judea was then completely quiet.256    There are problems 
with Josephus' account here in that, because the area was so unstable we do not know whether the 
λῃσταί groups in Judea were rising in political revolt or if they were bandits taking advantage of 
instability for their own gain.  Though the Roman response would have been much the same in 
either event, it is difficult if not impossible to characterise the actions of the  λῃσταί .  Due to the 
seeming disconnectedness of these groups, apart from those jockeying for position in Jerusalem, I 
believe that it is best to characterise the Judean situation outside Jerusalem as endemic banditry.  As 
such, it falls under the aegis of policing, which I shall discuss in a later section.
2. Palmyra: Under Zenobia, Palmyra acquired territory from Arabia Petraea through 
Pelusium and into Egypt.  This route was the norm for invading armies, having been used since 
Pharaonic times.257  The primary sources do not give specifics,258 but the Life of Aurelian in the HA 
does refer to Syrian latrones delaying the Roman forces as they reconquered Egypt and moved 
toward Palmyra itself; this suggests small, mobile units attacking the Roman army on the march. 
These forces would be ideal to delay and diminish a regular army, as well as causing greatly 
increased psychological stress levels on the soldiers by not allowing them to feel safe at any time.259 
Our historical sources for this revolt are suspect at best.  The Historiae Augustae are 
anonymous and insecurely dated; Zosimus was from the sixth century and relied solely and 
254  Jos BJ, 4.442.
255  Jos BJ, 7.163-190, 7.252-406 respectively.
256  Jos BJ, 7.407.  
257 Dio 3.39.57, Caesar Alexandrian War 26, Josephus BJ 4.659-663, Plutarch Antony, 3.3.   Mavia later followed the 
same general route.
258 The HA and Zosimus are the primary sources for Zenobia's campaign.
259 It is essentially a variant on the panopticon; an army who is attacked often enough is soon always expecting to be 
attacked, believing that the enemy could be watching at all times.  Jugurtha did the same to Metellus and Marius. 
Sallust BJ, 54-55.
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uncritically upon his sources.  There is thus very little that can be said about the conflict beyond 
these bare facts and that the Blemmyes conquered Upper Egypt as Zenobia took Lower.
3. Mavia: The late Roman campaign of Queen Mavia is mostly attested in later 
Ecclesiastical sources.  Ostensibly due to a difference of opinion over the appointment of a 
bishop,260 Mavia rebelled against Roman power and brought together a loose coalition of nomadic 
groups from the general vicinity of Palmyra and formed them into an army.  Taking the same 
general route as Zenobia before her, Mavia's small raiding forces were able to wound the standing 
Roman army to the degree that Valens had to sign a peace treaty that heavily favoured the Arab 
queen.  This is one of the best examples of how a weak and decentralised force can defeat a 
centralised force, yet because of the tendency to epitomise in later historians, we have little specific 
data.  I would argue that Rome in 378 AD, though potentially stronger as a whole than Mavia, could 
not allocate sufficient resources to the area to make it an overwhelmingly stronger force.261  That 
being said, the Roman forces were still centralised in the sense of being based out of particular 
garrisons, whereas Mavia's troops were at  home in the desert.  They had no fixed city or garrisons 
that we are aware of, so there presumably was no central location(s) against which Rome could 
strike and destroy, as they had done with Palmyra. We have no extant data about her command 
structure or specific battles, the late historians' tendency to epitomes again thwarting our efforts, but 
one is tempted to suggest that each of the tribes in her federation would have fought together under 
their usual military or raiding leader, though ultimately answering to her authority as far as where 
and when to strike the Roman army.  
However her forces were arranged, we do know that they featured a strong cavalry 
component, as it was an elite cavalry unit she sent to aid Rome against the Goths later in 378.  We 
260 Mavia wanted an orthodox ascetic called Moses as her bishop and would accept no other, especially not an Arian. 
Socrates Hist Ecclesiastical 4.36, Sozomen 6.38, Rufinius 11.  Modern and ancient sources make much of this as a 
religious difference, completely ignoring the fact that modern conceptions of 'separation between church and state' 
did not exist at the time.  
261 Rome was fighting wars on several fronts at the time, with the Goths presenting a threat to the Roman heartland far 
in excess of Mavia.
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know nothing else of her or her federation after this point.  But the fact that she was able to force 
Valens to recognise her as a territorial queen and gave her client status both expresses the Roman 
weakness of the time and how well a small, weak force can exploit such distractions in order to 
defeat a larger force.  It is possible that the Romans thought that they would in future simply 
invalidate the treaty as they had done with others (e.g., Jugurtha, Tacfarinas, the Lusitanian 
Viriathus, etc), but we have no evidence that such action was undertaken. 
Summary: We have far less secure data from the desert regions of the East than we do for 
North Africa.  We have only epitomes extant for both Zenobia and Mavia, meaning that we are left 
to speculate as to their tactics and goals.  Banditry seems to have been endemic in Judea, both in the 
arid and semi-arid regions, which would fall under the aegis of police action.  
Part III. Policing:
Small force operations were not confined to military campaigns; they were also used during 
the occupation and control of an area as somewhere between what in the modern era would be 
termed policing; that is enforcing the law and defending from banditry and raiding.  These forces, 
which had parallels with the Medjay in Ptolemaic Egypt, patrolled their assigned catchment areas 
and, it is presumed, protected these areas against low-intensity threats.262  Shaw points out that 
many military personnel stationed in the interior of the provinces are listed in the papyri and 
elsewhere as fulfilling police functions.263
Though this paper does not seek to engage to any great depth with the debates on the 
defence strategy, strategies, or lack thereof of the Roman state in the limes, what must be addressed 
to some degree is the debate about control of movement within the regions and across borders.  As 
discussed in chapter three, the areas under consideration in this study contained several main 
262 Herodian says that Numidia is garrisoned against raiders.  7.9.1; cf Amm Marc. 14.3.2 about Mesopotamia. 
Ptolemaic Egypt had a similar system which the Romans initially did not use. Bagnall, R. Hellenistic and Roman 
Egypt: Sources and Approaches, Aldershot: Ashgate, 2006, pp 67-86.
263 Shaw, B.D., 'Bandits in the Roman Empire,' Past & Present, No. 105 (Nov., 1984), pp. 3-52.  See also Alston, R., 
Soldier and Society in Roman Egypt, London: Routledge, 1995, pp. 81-86.
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networks of roads, all of which had either cities, hydreumata or some type of road station along 
them.  Those like Parker and Luttwak who champion the 'defence-in-depth' argument for Roman 
limes argue that the smaller forts that line the roads are just that; depth in the event that an external 
force invades.  Following Whittaker, I do not contest that these small forts could act to delay and/or 
diminish an invading force if one should happen by.  The siting of most of these, however, 
especially in the Eastern Desert roads and the Negev, are on low ground near water sources rather 
than very nearby high ground.264  This idea that control of water means that traffic will be forced to 
move along constrained routes is supported by the siting of Gheria el-Garbia in Numidia. 
Goodchild points out that caravans could, potentially, pass unseen by the Roman garrison by going 
slightly to the north;265 however, the Romans controlled the water source for that vicinity.  If we 
assume that there was no other accessible water source nearby-- something which we of course can 
neither prove nor disprove, though Goodchild states that the forts in the region of Bu Njem are all 
oases, suggesting that there would have been no other permanent water features.  Water is the key 
factor for desert survival, and whoever controls it will control the region.  
The fact that there are forts on all of the known major roads also supports the notion that 
their main purpose was for traffic control; the fact that they also would be able to control the 
surrounding territory, and thus constrain the movement of any bandits or other small forces also 
supports their ability to secure against low-intensity threats.  It is quite true that we see a boom in 
the construction of fortifications all through the Empire in the late third and fourth centuries, 
including the desert, just as it is true that this was the period when oasis-based nomads the 
Austuriani and Laguatans began raiding Tripolitania, the Blemmyes began a series of assaults on 
Upper Egypt and the Isaurians came in from the north.  This was also when the proportion of 
264 I excavated one season at Yotvata in the Negev, where the fort was on what is now the Arava highway and which is 
backed by a very large cliff; tactically speaking one could not have picked a worse position if one was expecting an 
overwhelming invasion force.
265  Goodchild, R.G., 'Oasis Forts of Legio III Augusta on the Routes to the Fezzan,' Papers of the British School at  
Rome, Vol. 22, (1954), p67.
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cavalry to infantry rose markedly, as discussed in chapter four.  All of these things together suggest 
that the Romans, having just come out of a period of internal strife, were trying to re-establish their 
power in a very unsubtle way whilst trying to cover inadequacies.  For example, though Mattingly 
suggests that the increase in cavalry is to counter the threat of north African cavalry, I would argue 
that it also supports the reduction in unit numbers suggested by Alston and could relate to the boom 
in fortification-building seen throughout the regions under study starting from the late third and 
fourth centuries AD.   A smaller number of cavalry than infantry are required to cover or hold the 
same area, especially if one sees them patrolling the roads.  They can get to areas of trouble more 
quickly, and, as Mattingly correctly points out, they can defend themselves better against other 
North African cavalry troops.  Alston also points out that the number of forts suggests both that the 
army was widely dispersed in the province and that the forts were used as a way of 
monumentalising Roman authority, something not apparently needed previously; both of these 
suggest an increasing reliance on the perception of the Romans as a threat-- a deterrent, to use the 
modern strategic term-- rather than relying upon literal strength of arms.
Kennedy266 points out that much the same was occurring in the East in the late third and 
early fourth centuries, with Arabia also receiving an influx of cavalry forces in addition to the 
increased numbers of forts.267   This again may well be for similar reasons; as stated above nomad 
forces in the East were frequently cavalry, plus Zenobia's fast-moving forces had recently caused 
major damage from Syria to Egypt, so they would have been very aware of the need for increasing 
mobility of their own forces.  Increased monumentalising of their authority, whether a primary or 
secondary effect, would in theory act in concert with the Palmyrene defeat and destruction to help 
deter further unrest.  
266 Kennedy, D. The Roman Army in Jordan, London, The Council for British Research in the Levant Press, 2000. pp 
51-21.
267 Cf. Parker, S. T. (ed) The Roman Frontier in Central Jordan: Final Report on the Limes Arabicus Project 1980-
1989. Washington DC, Dumbarton Oaks, 2006, p 42; Kennedy, D. and Bewley, R. Ancient Jordan from the Air. 
London, the Council for British Research in the Levant, 2004, p 195.
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Thus the Roman military/police were responsible for traffic control and security against 
what were expected to be low-intensity threats.  Let us now turn to the question of what kinds of 
soldiers make up these 'police' forces, both on the borders and within Roman control.  One group 
which was always a small force and which would have some advantages in the desert was camelry. 
Camelry made up 15-17% of the mounted forces in the East, Egypt and North Africa; 5-10% of the 
total forces.  Though we have discussed the advantages of camels over horses in chapter three, we 
can recall that stamina and increased ability to graze would be primary advantages here.  A camel 
could carry its rider through the desert without needing roads, and could travel for longer stretches 
of time before having to turn back.  We have little information on how or if they were actually used 
in practice, however.  The closest thing to a camelry police force for which we have evidence is the 
Palmyrenes, who would provide protection for camel caravans along the Dura-Palmyra route. 
Whilst I refute Dabrowa's assertion that this practice continued under the Romans and was the duty 
of the dromedarii of the cohors XX Palmyrenorum based upon total lack of evidence, where one can 
perhaps interpret material remains as being somehow associated with desert route patrols would be 
in Egypt.  The evidence is far from certain, but along the Abu Sha'ar-Qena route one both sees 
evidence for camels at both termini.268 If they are correct, then it is possible to interpret these as not 
only 'rest stops' but also as something on the order of police stations, each of which are responsible 
for patrolling a particular area.  Thus the roads (and surroundings) would be kept secure by the 
military/police forces but they would not be acting as escorts.  Because these areas have only been 
surveyed, rather than excavated, however, everything must be considered speculative.
That camelry was used in police forces is somewhat more strongly suggested by papyri and 
ostraka.  In Apollinopolis Magna, modern Edfu in Egypt, the cohors I Augusta Praetoria 
Lusitanorum had listed in a pridanum instances where members of their approximately 15 camelry 
268 By 180 AD the cohors I Augusta Praetoria Lusitanorum was at either Qena or Koptos; camel dung was found in 
copious quantities at Abu Sha'ar.
97
Just Deserts: Roman Military Operations in Arid Environments (108 BC-AD 400).
were absunt in choram.  This could be interpreted as them being out on patrol.  At Bu Njem, ostraka 
OBN5 lists one person being ad stationem camellariorum, but again the meaning is unclear. 
Marichal believes that the term might refer to an hydreuma or analogous structure where camels 
were kept; it could also be an outlying structure from which patrols are conducted by camelry, 
though only one person being assigned there could be seen to argue against this interpretation.
Apart from camelry the other obvious candidate for patrolling is, of course, light cavalry. 
The high proportion of cavalry that has already been noted could easily account for their use in 
police duties.
Shaw states that the provinces seemed to be policed based upon whatever local support a 
governor could arrange, rather than any sort of organised force to draw upon.  I believe he is 
correct, though I would argue the point that what a governor had was actually a variety of personnel 
available which he himself could organise, if given enough time in office and with sufficient 
motivation and resources.  As the Roman system was specifically designed not to allow a governor 
to stay in one place long enough to organise such a thing (presumably in order to prevent said 
official from developing his own power base with which to attack the Emperor), the effect is the 
same.
Part V. Conclusion:
Asymmetrical strategies and small force tactics are, by dint of the current political situation, 
an area of warfare studies that is receiving a great deal of attention at the moment.  What the current 
studies have shown is that our modern understanding and even definition of these concepts is fluid 
at best, meaning that our ability to understand them in an ancient setting is even more unstable.  |
Because of this, almost any attempt to translate Graeco-Roman terms must first be prefaced with a 
definition for the modern English so as not to confuse the reader..
The main focus of this chapter has, of course, been the instances of small force operations 
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by both the Romans and their desert-based adversaries.  We have noted that there is very little 
difference in adaptations between Roman practice in North Africa and in the East; much as Callwell 
advises the main successful strategies are assaults against the support base, including both political, 
popular, and physical support, physical constraint to reduce or destroy enemy mobility and 
flexibility, increasing one's own tactical mobility and flexibility, forcing set-piece battles and, if 
necessary, annihilation of leadership and/or the entire enemy force and their supporters.  Tactics 
include scorched Earth, an increase in light-armed forces for battles and the development of flying 
columns; the latter in association with chains of garrisons were the usual methods of physical 
constraint.
These methods, however, were not confined to the desert.  Agricola's campaign against the 
Britons in the mountainous terrain of Scotland and Wales also featured the use of mobile troops 
against the Ordovices when they would not fight in the plains (18), as well as the cultivation of 
terror (18), chains of forts (23), and flying columns (25).  Though we cannot say for certain what 
the climatic conditions were during the time period, these regions could hardly be considered arid. 
None of the tactics used by either the Romans or their adversaries were desert-specific, though most 
did feature the use of hills (or, in the case of Theodosius, the fear of the hills) as sites for 
ambuscades.  We are told that Tacfarinas did flee into the desert, but that seems more because the 
desert was there and his home territory which he knew the Romans could not or would not penetrate 
rather than anything to do with it being a desert.  Returning to the modern studies, Callwell, in his 
discussion of hill warfare, does not differentiate between arid, semiarid and non-arid; he simply 
states that the terrain is ideal for guerrilla warfare.  Therefore, I believe the key factor was that the 
terrain was mountainous, rather than arid, in determining whether small force tactics would 
predominate; this would explain why the only major instances of small force operations in the 
Roman/Parthian conflict took place in mountainous Armenia.  
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It is also the case that constraining movement in deserts is a double-edged sword; though 
there are fewer places it would be viable to maintain a settlement, many of those places are virtually 
impossible to find without advance knowledge of the region.  Local small force groups do have a 
decided advantage in this area, especially given the frequent problems the Romans had in obtaining 
accurate intelligence.  
Finally, once an area was under Roman control they used small contingents of their military 
forces for what would be considered 'police' activities in modern terms.  These included patrolling 
and various other security operations, such as guarding areas in watchtowers or garrisons, 
controlling traffic across the limes, and also having powers of arrest and interrogation.  In desert 
areas,  the Romans may have used camelry for policing but the evidence is open to interpretation. 
As elsewhere, the Roman control of roads and their network of road stations, garrisons and cities 
under their control would have offered them control of the territory around the roads as well as the 
traffic upon them.
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Chapter Six
Conclusions
Part I. Introduction:
This project began with the intent to examine if and how the Roman army adapted its 
preparation and fighting styles when operating in an arid or semi-arid environment.   Those 
operations were further limited to those that took place between 108 BC and AD 400, and included 
operations in North Africa, Egypt, and the Roman East.  Let us briefly revisit the main points of the 
earlier chapters.
A. Logistics:  This section dealt with aspects of military operation such as intelligence 
gathering, specifically that of geographic and ethnographic data, and logistical support for provinces 
as a whole, armies on campaign and soldiers in battle.  The methods of gathering data within a 
desert environment were very similar to those without.  Geographic and ethnographic data on the 
whole were poor compared with a modern standard, but the shortfalls were less to do with the 
region being desert than the fact that they were remote from the Roman heartland.  We are badly 
hampered by lack of data with regard to logistics after the Punic Wars in all regards; the best that 
can be said is that there seems to have been a system in operation which was slightly different from 
the Western counterparts.  We have some evidence for logistical changes on some marches through 
areas known to be waterless, but these examples seem to be considered extraordinary, and if there 
were any standard changes we are not aware of them.  The major difference in logistical terms for 
the desert regions is the incorporation of camelry.  We have evidence that camels were used for 
communications and there is historical precedent for their use as beasts of burden, but our 
understanding of the specifics of their use is poor. 
B. Pitched battles and Sieges:  We see in both the East and North Africa a definite increase 
in the amount of cavalry in the Late Empire, though this is not a phenomenon confined to the 
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desert.  There is also the incorporation of camelry forces totalling between 5 and 10% of the total 
forces and 15-17% of individual mounted units, though their exact duties are unclear.  Finally, 
indigenous archery units were incorporated.  This all suggests an increased need for mobility.
There was very little wide scale change in either pitched battle or siege.  There were some 
instances where terrain and dust caused problems for siege engines and other equipment, and thirst, 
hunger and disease (including heat-related and unfamiliar food and other animals) did cause 
problems.  These, however, would also have been found in other environments.  There was some 
change in practices based upon the fighting styles of the opposing forces but again there were no 
blanket changes.  
C. Small-force warfare and Policing:  The Romans did frequently run into small, 
decentralised forces in the East and North Africa, and did sometimes suffer heavy losses.  But the 
Romans were able to adapt on both the strategic and tactical levels to defeat these forces, thus 
helping to refute the idea that the Romans were unable to contend with such tactics.  On the tactical 
level, they would increase their mobility by incorporation of lighter-armed groups and cavalry, 
especially Numidian cavalry.   They would also march in a formation that would allow them to be 
prepared for an assault upon any side.  
On the strategic side, in the case of multiple groups operating at once (i.e., Judea) the 
Romans would allow them to fight each other, actively encouraging sedition and other in-fighting 
amongst the groups or amongst their leadership in order to diminish their forces.  They also reduced 
the small forces' mobility by assaulting their political, public and practical support bases and 
constraining their movements throughout their own territory.  Once the small forces could not act as 
traditional small forces anymore, they would be forced to meet the Romans in pitched battles and/or 
sieges, neither of which the small force groups were militarily strong enough to able to withstand. 
During peacetime, Roman forces would act as police.  The forts along the roads are clearly 
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built to control water sources rather than to watch for or defend against high intensity warfare; 
though they could certainly be used to diminish and delay such an enemy in the event it arose, this 
seems to have been a secondary effect.
Let us now begin to analyse the data acquired by the variables of space and time.
Part II. Changes to Roman Operations Over Space:
As was stated in Chapter One, desert terrain is extremely variable.  This is the case even 
between deserts of similar type, and even within the same desert.  Despite this, however, there 
appears to have been little difference in adaptation.  Part of this may relate to lack of specific 
information, or part may simply be parallel evolution, wherein similar solutions are found to similar 
problems independent of each other.
The groups living in both the North African desert and the East were militarily light and 
mobile troops.  Though the surrounding terrain may have differed somewhat, due to the 
requirements of any widescale movement, i.e., being on a road with artificial or natural water 
sources present along the route and at termini meant that Roman and any other large scale 
movement was quite constrained in both places.  The small carrying capacity and widely scattered 
resources of the regions meant that small groups would be the norm, and we know that many of the 
highly mobile groups would or could engage in pastoralism, meaning that they would be 
accustomed to desert routes not known to the Romans, i.e., 'off-roads' or trackless areas; Viriathus 
used these to great effect in Lusitania, however, so this is not confined to purely desert regions; in 
Agricola 37 the Britons fled from Agricola into the trackless wilderness in what is most certainly 
not a desert environment.  Small force operations generally took place in hills or mountains and 
thus were no different from other Roman campaigns in mountainous regions that were not arid (e.g., 
Caledonia).   When countering small force tactics, the Romans physically constrained the enemy 
movements by chains of garrisons and flying columns; again, this was no different from what was 
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done in Armenia, Wales and Scotland, so it is a response to similar enemy tactics and similar hilly 
terrain, not the desert itself.
The major change in the Roman army which was predominantly desert-based was the 
incorporation of camelry.  This is poorly understood in both regions, but we do know that the 
percentage of camelry troops in garrisons is both regions was roughly the same.  Because we have 
so little extant evidence with regard to use, however, we cannot compare or contrast use.
Thus, as far as we can tell,  there seems to have been very little difference between 
operations in North Africa and the East.  Indeed, there are very few changes between what we see in 
the desert regions and outside them.
Part III. Changes to Roman Operations Over Time:
Over time, the major changes to operation are reflective of the changes going on in the 
Republic and Empire.  The establishment of Roman rule led to an army which was in charge of 
guarding the peace rather than actively expanding the Imperial holdings.  
With regard to logistics, one mild criticism of Roth's work is that it stops at the Punic Wars 
and assumes that the particular system of operational, tactical and supply depots did not change 
after this point.  What this study has underscored is the lack of data which would allow us to tell. 
As we have only a few instances of overall logistical failure in regions which had an established 
Roman presence (and those generally for reasons of plague, blight or other non-warfare problem) 
we can perhaps assume that the particular systems were in place and generally functional, but that is 
an argument from silence and must be treated as such.
Over the course of the study we can see that the style of warfare more or less followed the 
expanse of Roman territory.  When in an expansionist phase, there were more pitched battles and 
sieges as well as small force operations when and where applicable; when Roman domination had 
been established, most conflict was utilising small force tactics until the latron  in question became 
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leader of a large enough group to attempt more orthodox warfare, e.g, Tacfarinas' attempts at siege. 
This is most likely to do with the problems noted by Sallust's Marius, in that small force operations, 
though effective, cannot be used to take and hold territory.   
We have three major instances of 'revolt', or groups utilising asymmetrical strategies in 
roughly the same area in North Africa.  What we see in the cases of the Jugurthine War and the 
campaigns of Tacfarinas is that the Roman response was essentially identical; physical constraint 
with garrisons and flying columns, and assaults to reduce popular, political and physical support.  In 
the case of Theodosius' campaign against Firmus, he uses much the same tactics apart from chains 
of garrisons, though we are told that he sent Romanus to take charge of the frontier defences and 
that he reviewed the legions already in place.  By this campaign it would seem that the garrisons 
and their zones of control had already been established.  This is the only major change, though 
Ammianus' and Tacitus' descriptions do not give a great deal of detail and the former has several 
lacunae, so it is possible that some aspects are not extant.  
We do not have such continuity in the East or Egypt with regard to military activity.  Small 
force warfare seems to have been somewhat endemic, though it would most likely be categorised as 
traditional brigandage rather than something more political apart from the specific instances 
discussed in chapter five.  Zones of control held by strong points constrained movement, just as in 
North Africa over the time period in question, and flying columns and/or the chains of forts along 
the roads were used to quell any increasing banditry.
Part IV. Conclusions:
This study asked what innovations or changes occurred when the Roman army entered the 
desert, and whether any changes that were seen were part of an overall institutional change based 
upon environment.  The answer to the former is that we saw some incorporation of camelry and 
indigenous archer units, though the exact use of the former is unclear at best.  We see a great 
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increase in cavalry, but that is also seen elsewhere in the Empire wherever there is a need for greater 
tactical mobility and flexibility, so that is a response to an opponent rather than the desert.  The 
same holds true for the constraint of guerrilla forces through flying columns and garrisons as well 
as denying them a support base-- similar actions were taken in Armenia, Wales and Scotland, all 
non-desert regions.  The control of traffic is also apparent at Hadrian's Wall in the north of England, 
so it too has nothing to do with environment; in the desert however one would be further 
constrained with regard to the use of roads and guides.  The increase in fort-building in the late third 
and fourth centuries was likewise paralleled elsewhere.  The one thing that should be changed due 
to the desert conditions, i.e., increased supply requirements for humans and animals, is something 
that we have no evidence for and can only guess.  
Thus the Romans did not seem to change ahead of time their overall approach when sending 
an army into the desert.  This should not be all that surprising, however, when we recall two of the 
main points that Gilliver's work on Roman military treatises revealed were to reinforce the 
realisation that the Roman army was flexible and fluid by nature, and that the Roman commanders 
seemed to allow local conditions to dictate their operational specifics.  As this study has pointed out 
in its introductory chapter, not only is one desert not like another but even one section of the same 
desert may be vastly different from another.  The Romans would have quickly become aware of this 
fact, if it was not already presupposed; the modern conceit of 'seen one [region] seen them all' is 
based upon centuries of exploration and the ease of access to geographic and climatic information. 
The ancients would not have had such preconceptions.  I therefore believe that no one set of 
regulations or standards were instituted by the Roman army heading into desert conditions because 
the commanders believed that to decide upon a course of action before they (or their intelligence 
gatherers) would be contrary and limiting to their best interests.  Instead, they would make their 
decisions on the ground, based upon whatever information they had available at the time.   Too 
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much pre-planning could have caused a lack of flexibility for the army, which could be deadly when 
having to adapt quickly to new and unforeseen situations.  The increased tactical flexibility noted in 
the East and North Africa reflects an increase in tactical flexibility generally by the army.  Certain 
specifics may have been predominantly desert-based, such as camels, though at four garrison sites 
on the Danube (Vindonissa, Vemania, Abodiacum and Vindobona) camel bones have been found as 
well, though their use of camels is if anything more unclear than desert-based use.269  Thus the 
results of this study support the argument that the Romans did not adapt to the East (or North 
Africa) due to climate, terrain, or anything else; any changes referenced in the texts were merely an 
expression of the tactical flexibility which allowed them to respond to individual situations as they 
arose.  That flexibility was always inherent in the Roman system, and it increased over time no 
matter the region.  The variable of space/arid-environment that this study introduced had, as far as 
we are able to tell from the extant evidence, only minor effects upon the Roman operations, and 
what changes were made both reflect standard Roman practice of letting circumstances dictate 
action and also are similar enough to actions taken outside the desert to be considered as variations 
upon a the theme of reaction to these circumstances.  The mountains of North Africa were unsafe 
for Roman forces to enter for the same reason the Welsh hills were; because they were mountains 
and therefore perfect terrain for enemy small force operations.  The fact that the North African hills 
were hot and dry was an added concern but it is comparable to the concerns of poor footing and 
visibility due to rain and fog in Britannia; both are simply another element present and will be 
adapted to as needed, just as one would adapt one's order of battle to the features of the battlefield. 
Looking for an overall 'way of war' in the desert, or, indeed, any particular region, is, in my opinion, 
269  Keller, C., Geschichte der schweizerischen Haustierwelt, Fraunfeld, 1919, p.42, Garbsch, J. and Kos, P., Das 
Spatromische Kastell Vemania bei Isny I, C.H. Beck'sche Verlagsbuchhandlung, Munchen, 1988, p 53, Werner, J., 
Studien Zu Abodiacum-Epfach, C.H. Beck'sche Verlagsbuchhandlung, Munchen, 1964, pp 218-223, Berger W. and 
Thenius E., 'Uber Romerzeitliche Kamelfunde im Stadtgebiet von Wien,' in Neuman, A., Ausgrabungen und Funde 
im Wiener Stadtgebiet 1948/49, Verlang fur Jugend Und Volk, Wien, 1951 pp. 20-22. There have also been four 
camel bones found in Roman Iberia in civil contexts; as this work is focusing upon the military, I have elected to 
exclude them.  Muñiz, A.M. et al, 'Dromedaries in Antiquity: Iberia and Beyond,' Antiquity, Vol 69: 263, pp. 368-
375.
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not applicable; the Romans simply would not have thought in this way.  Though there is not enough 
data to address the logistic aspects of adaptation with any degree of confidence, tactically speaking, 
they adapted not to each region so much as to each battle.  Thus I would argue that any similarities 
seen between operations in similar climates, types of terrain or environments are neither overall 
policy nor extensive pre-planning but parallel evolution, nothing more.
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